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Directed by: Professor Vere C. Chappell
Is it possible to construct a machine that can act of its own accord? There are a number of
skeptical arguments which conclude that autonomous machine agency is impossible. Yet if autonomous
machine agency is impossible, then serious doubt is cast on the possibility of autonomous human action,
at least on the widely held assumption that some form of materialism is true. The purpose of this
dissertation is to show that autonomous machine agency is possible, thereby showing that the autonomy
of human action is compatible with materialism.
I proceed as follows. Chapter 1 casts the problem of autonomous machine agency. Chapter 2
sets out the skeptic's case against autonomous machine agency by canvassing arguments against the
possibility of machine agency and arguments against the possibility of autonomous machine agency.
Chapter 3 begins work on a theory of autonomous machine agency by developing and defending axioms
of a theory of agency from thought experiments and examples. Chapter 4 expands the theory of agency
to a theory of autonomous agency by adding axioms of autonomy.
The axioms of autonomous agency contain the primitive terms ‘belief, ‘desire', and
‘deliberation', which require further explication if the theory is to be of any use in arguing for the
possibility of autonomous machine agency. Chapters 5 and 6 take up this challenge by developing
mathematically tractable axioms of deliberation, belief, and desire.
Chapter 7 completes the theory by developing axioms of mechanism derived from the
substantial literature in the foundations of computer science. Chapter 8 employs the resulting theory of
autonomous machine agency to show just how the functional prerequisites ot autonomous agency can in
principle be met by machines, thereby demonstrating the possibility of autonomous machine agency.
viii
Chapter 9 serves as a cautionary postscript. In spite of having shown that autonomous machine
agency is possible, the implications are not always happy for current efforts in artificial intelligence or
current philosophical theories of autonomous human agency. Nevertheless, the argument for
autonomous machine agency suggests several research programs at the nexus of Philosophy of Mind and
Artificial Intelligence.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 A Brief History of Situated Robotics
Optimism about the possibility of creating an artificial intelligence (AI) ran high during the
19^0’s and 1970's. Only a few pessimists cast doubt on the enthusiastic expectations of human-level
AI. Of those, Dreyfus has been prominent.
Almost half a century ago computer pioneer Alan Turing suggested
that a high-speed digital computer, programmed with rules and facts,
might exhibit intelligent behavior. Thus was born the field later
called artificial intelligence (AI). After fifty years of effort, however,
it is now clear to all but a few diehards that this attempt to produce
general intelligence has failed. This failure does not mean that this
sort of AI is impossible; no one has been able to come up with such
a negative proof. Rather, it has turned out that, for the time being at
least, the research program based on the assumption that human
beings produce intelligence using facts and rules has reached a dead
end, and there is no reason to think it could ever succeed. (Dreyfus,
1999, p. ix)
The reason for the failure of AI is, Dreyfus thinks, simple: “we might say that the basic point which has
emerged is that since intelligence must be situated it cannot be separated from the rest of human
life. "( 1987, p. 203) That said, even Dreyfus would agree that AI research has not been completely
fruitless. Advances have been made in the development of medical and engineering expert systems and
in certain task-specific systems: Deep Blue’s success against the chess master Kasparov is noteworthy.
Beating Kasparov demonstrated the effectiveness of some AI techniques, but it is nothing as compared
to the creation of a human-level machine intelligence. The AI community has come to see that initial
expectations about creating such an AI will not be met any time soon.
In the last ten years there has been split in the AI community. Nouvelle AI and associated
research into Artificial Life takes seriously the suggestion that intelligence must be situated in an
environment. Enter situated robotics. Researchers in situated robotics avoid the traditional approach of
programming information about the environment into the robot by designing the robot in such a way
that it ’adaptively learns’ about its environment. Clancey (1997) describes the split:
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Some of the earliest and most well-known examples of situated
robotics were invented by Rod Brooks and his colleagues at MIT.
Brooks was especially irked by the dilemma of AI research in the
early 1980’s: The community was striving for automated physicians
and engineers, but hadn’t yet created a program that could tie its own
shoes or go down to the store and buy a quart of milk. A 3-year-old
could speak and learn better than any computer program. Carrying
this idea further. Brooks suggested in 1986 that we lower our sights
and aim for insect-level intelligence first.
Banishing maps from his programming repertoire. Brooks
aimed for a robot that could avoid obstacles, find doorways, and
identify simple objects like Coke bottles. Instead of drawing an
internal map of the world and examining it to plan its actions.
Brooks s robots react more directly to local sensors and represent
ongoing interactions with the environment, not objects.
The situated robot ’learns’ about its environment by directly
interacting with it. "Accepting that the environment cannot be
anticipated in detail, workers in situated robotics have resurrected the
insight-often voiced within classical AI, but also often forgotten-that
the best source of information about the real world is the real world
itself.” (p. 102)
Situated robotics is a far more modest enterprise than Traditional AI, yet the expectations of
situated roboticists are nonetheless impressive. As Brooks (1999a) put it,
I wish to build completely autonomous mobile agents that co-exist in
the world with humans, and are seen by those humans as intelligent
beings in their own right. I will call such agents Creatures. This is
my intellectual motivation. I have no particular interest in
demonstrating how human beings work, although humans, like other
animals, are interesting objects of study in this endeavor as they are
successful autonomous agents. 1 have no particular interest in
applications, it seems clear to me that if my goals can be met then
the range of applications for such Creatures will be limited only by
our (or their) imagination. I have no particular interest in the
philosophical implications of Creatures, although clearly there will
be significant implications.
...let us consider some of the requirements for our Creatures.
• A Creature must cope appropriately and in a timely
fashion with changes in its dynamic environment.
• A Creature should be robust with respect to its
environment; minor changes in the properties of
the world should not lead to total collapse of the
Creature’s behavior; rather one should expect only
a gradual change in capabilities of the Creature as
the environment changes more and more.
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A Creature should be able to maintain multiple
goals and, depending on the circumstances it finds
itself in, change which particular goals it is
actively pursuing; thus it can both adapt to
surroundings and capitalize on fortuitous
circumstances.
• A Creature should do something in the world; it
should have some purpose in being, (p. 86)
Two points about situated robotics bear emphasis. First, situated roboticists seek to create AI
on a par with insects by constructing mobile robots with sensors for immediate feedback about the
results of their motions. The idea is to construct robots which behave in such a way that they are able
to negotiate their environment; emphasis in situated robotics is not on the intelligence of the situated
robot pet se but on its ability to succeed in its environment. The successful situated robot adapts to its
environment by 'learning' strategies for accomplishing tasks. Presumably the better adapted robot will
also be the more intelligent robot. Intelligence is seen as a result of adaptive behavior not otherwise
achievable, given the failings of traditional AI.
Second, the situated robot is not pre-programmed with detailed instructions for completing its
tasks. Unlike industrial roboticists, the situated roboticist in all likelihood has no way of knowing in
advance what the situated robot will do in a given environment apart, perhaps, from global directives
like "move from position P to position P*." The roboticist has no way of knowing exactly how the
situated robot will end up solving the problem of a rock placed in its path, for instance. An excellent
example of this was the successful use of situated robotics techniques in the Mars mini-rover,
Sojourner Rover (SR). Because of a substantial delay in communication time between earth control
and SR, global objectives like "move to rock C" could be given to SR while the problem of just how
to get to C around intervening rocks A and B was left up to SR itself. Mission control could not
always anticipate the path SR would end up taking.
3
Figure 1.1. The newly deployed Sojourner Rover, (photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov)
1.2 The Problem
Brooks admits to having “no particular interest in the philosophical implications of Creatures,
although clearly there will be significant implications.” Maybe so, but perhaps he ought to be
interested in the philosophical assumptions of ‘Creatures'. His sweeping assumption that autonomous
machine agency is even possible strikes one as desperately needing justification in light of the intuitive
rub, if not outright conflict, between mechanism on the one hand and autonomy on the other. It is one
thing to suppose that a machine can act - a questionable assumption in its own right - quite another to
assume that a machine, the paradigm of causal pawns, can act of its own accord.
Just as there are serious questions about the possibility of machine intelligence, there are
serious questions about the possibility of autonomous machine agency. How can we be sure that a
situated robot which appears to be acting autonomously is not merely behaving in some predetermined
fashion, as much a slave to its causal environment as its simpler cousin the lever? The problem is
made acute by the existence of substantial arguments against Brooks' assumptions. There are
arguments in the literature to show that machines can't act autonomously even if they could act, and
there are arguments to show that machines can't act in the first place. Nor are they trivial arguments.
It's not that machines can't act or act autonomously because they are somehow being held back from
4
doing so. Rather, machines in principle can't do so, because mechanism itself excludes the possibility
of autonomous agency.
The upshot is that if situated robotics is to have a leg to stand on - or a wheel to roll on, as
the case may be - then a defense of Brooks' assumptions must be formulated. To be sure, no defense
is complete which only seeks to show that the skeptical arguments are unsound. Although the
discovery of counter-arguments would be suggestive, situated robotics is in need of a straightforward
argument for the possibility of autonomous machine agency.
1.3 Why is this a Philosophical Problem?
The possibility of autonomous machine agency is neither a scientific nor an engineering
problem. Science and engineering have considerable bearing on the matter, but it clearly won't be
settled in the absence of fundamentally philosophical arguments. One can imagine an exasperated
computer scientist or engineer saying, "Well, if what you want to do is show that autonomous machine
agency is possible then just look at the situated robots we have in the lab. Clearly they are machines
acting of their own accord. They learn by themselves, they solve problems by themselves, and they
negotiate their environment. End of problem."
The trouble with this response is that it fails to satisfy the Skeptic. The Skeptic can, with
considerable justification, respond by saying, "What I see are robots behaving in all sorts of ways, and
it is very interesting to observe their behavior. But surely you don’t think I should infer from this
behavior that they are acting of their own accord? Look, what I can tell you’ve done is create a
machine that responds to its environment - an impressive accomplishment, I assure you. But how do I
know that it's not responding in any way other than what you yourself intended in constructing it?
Response to stimulus alone does not make for agency, much less autonomous agency."
No amount of lab experience and demonstration will silence such a skeptic. Only careful
arguments, starting with theses the Skeptic agrees are true that lead in clear, inexorable steps to the
conclusion that autonomous machine agency is possible will do. What is required, in other words, is a
good deal of cautious philosophy.
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1.4 The Plan
A straightforward argument suggests a straightforward strategy. To show that autonomous
machine agency is possible, it suffices to show that the class of autonomous agents overlaps the class
of possible machines. 1 At a minimum, then, we require an extensional account of autonomous agency
and an extensional account of mechanism: it will do to develop a theory of autonomous agency and
mechanism that can pick out those things which are autonomous agents and those things which are
machines. Since a theory of autonomous agency presupposes a theory of agency, we also have a
starting point. My strategy amounts to this recipe:
• Begin by constructing a theory of agency.
Proceed by wrapping the theory of agency in a theory of autonomy.
Couple the resulting theory of autonomous agency with a theory of
mechanism.
Finish by drawing out the implication that mechanism does not exclude
autonomous agency.
The strategy is indeed straightforward, but the task is not trivial for being obvious.
Remember that we will be dogged by the Skeptic at each step. Every axiom of the theory will have to
be solidly grounded in example and thought experiment. Every step of the argument, from
constructing the theory to concluding that autonomous machine agency is possible, will have to be
small and clear. At no point will the Skeptic tolerate any hand-waiving or, in general, anything which
might fall under the category of “Here Something Magical Happens”.
1.5 Brass Tacks
Including this and my concluding remarks, there are a total of nine chapters. In Chapter 2 I
set out the skeptic's case against situated robotics by canvassing arguments against the possibility of
machine agency and arguments against the possibility of autonomous machine agency. In Chapter 3 I
begin work on a theory of autonomous machine agency by developing and defending the axioms of a
theory of agency which are suggested by various thought experiments and examples. In Chapter 4 I
1
That is, the two classes have a non-empty intersection.
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build on the theory of agency to construct a theory of autonomous agency by adding axioms of
autonomy. The ax.oms of autonomy are partly, like the axioms of agency, suggested by thought
experiments and examples and partly the result of triangulation between the widely diverging
philosophical conception of autonomy and computer science conception of autonomy.
At the close of Chapter 4 we have in hand a theory of autonomous agency which allows us to
pick out the class of autonomous agents. Or almost. Unfortunately, the axioms employ primitive
terms like ‘belief, 'desire', and ‘deliberation’ which require further explication if the theory is to be of
any use in arguing for the possibility of autonomous machine agency. Chapters 5 and 6 take up this
challenge by developing, respectively, axioms of deliberation and axioms of belief and desire. The
axioms of belief and desire are derived in large measure from work already done in the philosophical
literature, so Chapter 6 is largely a matter of exegesis and synthesis. Surprisingly, the axioms of
deliberation do not enjoy the same philosophical precedent. Despite the vast literature on Decision
Theory, it turns out there is very little which is of any use in constructing a theory of autonomous
agency. Hence the axioms of deliberation developed in Chapter 5 primarily result from the analysis of
examples and thought experiments.
Chapter 7 concludes the theory-building enterprise by developing axioms of mechanism.
Technicalities are kept to a minimum, and there is, fortunately, a substantial and highly relevant
literature in the foundations of computer science. Chapter 8 employs the resulting theory of
autonomous machine agency to show just how the functional prerequisites of autonomous agency can,
in principle, be met by machines (although perhaps not any actual machines.)
Chapter 9 serves as a postscript to the entire endeavor: I briefly reflect on what has and, in
some cases more interestingly, has not been accomplished in the process of providing a foundation for
situated robotics. The implications are not always happy for situated robotics in spite of having shown
that autonomous machine agency is possible. Some of the implications for autonomous human agency
also bear noting, particularly if one conceives of the human agent as a sort of biological machine. In
any case, a full list of chapters and their titles summarizes the flow of the argument:
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Chapter 1:
Chapter 2:
Chapter 3:
Chapter 4:
Chapter 5:
Chapter 6:
Chapter 7:
Chapter 8:
Chapter 9:
Introduction
Skeptical Arguments
Agency
Autonomy
Deliberation
Belief and Desire
Mechanism
Autonomous Machine Agency
Conclusion
1.6 A Note on Symbols and Special Terminology
Precision demands a certain amount of technical apparatus. Employed in just the right
quantity, technical tools like special terminology and formalism serve to simplify and clarify the
development and use ot concepts. In the absence of any technical tools, concepts blur, theories
become vague conjectures, and the conclusions of arguments carry no more than the force of
suggestions. Yet excessive reliance on technical tools is equally objectionable to the extent that the
tools themselves become an obstacle to understanding the concepts they explicate. From the reader's
perspective, too much formalism is just as likely to muddy a theory or argument as too little. The
challenge is to find that balance of technical apparatus which achieves precision and rigor without
sacrificing reader comprehension. Accordingly, I strive wherever possible to illustrate formalized
statements with concrete examples.
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CHAPTER 2
SKEPTICAL ARGUMENTS
2.1 The Skeptic's Case
The Skeptic finds the assertion that a machine can act of its own accord puzzling for two
reasons. First, why should we think that a mere artifact, no matter how complicated, can have the
capacity to act of its own accord given that its purpose and function is, like any artifact, completely
determined by the design of its creator? Second, why should we think that any such creation could be
more than a mere cog in its causal environment? Why, in other words, should we think that a machine
can act at all? The Skeptic's intuition is that autonomous agency and even agency itself are deeply
incompatible with machine-hood in just the way they are not with person-hood: two of the essential
features distinguishing persons from machines are autonomy and agency. The apparent autonomous
actions of a situated robot cannot therefore be anything more than an extension of the roboticist's
autonomous agency as surely as if the robot were tethered to the roboticist by puppet-strings.
The Skeptic presses two points: machine agency is impossible, and, even if it were not,
autonomous machine agency is impossible. In the philosophical literature there are both implicit and
explicit arguments which make one or the other point. Each argument can be stated in the form of a
Modus Tollens :
1 If X is an (agent or autonomous agent), then X must have the property P.
2 No machine can have the property P.
3 No machine can be an (agent or autonomous agent). 1&2
We begin with arguments that no machine can be an agent and later turn to arguments that no machine
can be an autonomous agent.
2.2 Against Machine Agency
Philosophers have paid little attention to the problem of whether machines can be agents.
Debate about the capacities of machines has generally centered on artificial intelligence and machine
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consciousness. Perhaps the thought is that an intelligent and conscious machine will surely be an agent,
so the problem of machine agency is not of independent interest. All of the arguments against machine
agency but one are implied by other arguments. We begin with the explicit argument.
2.2.1 Baker's Argument
Lynne Rudder Baker (1981) has argued that machines cannot act since actions require
intentions, intentions require a first-person perspective, and no amount of third-person information
supplied to a machine can enable the machine to jump the gap to a first-person perspective. Baker
usefully sets her argument out:
A 1 In order to be an agent, an entity must be able to formulate intentions.
2 In order to formulate intentions, an entity must have an irreducible
first-person perspective.
3 Machines lack an irreducible first-person perspective.
4 Machines are not agents, (p. 157) 1,2&3
Baker has, however, failed to state her argument correctly. It is not just that machines are not
agents or do not happen presently to be agents, since that allows that at some point in the future
machines may be agents - or at least that machines can in principle be agents. Baker’s conclusion is
actually much stronger. As she outlines her own project, “[wjithout denying that artificial models of
intelligence may be useful for suggesting hypotheses to psychologists and neurophysiologists, I shall
argue that there is a radical limitation to applying such models to human intelligence. And this
limitation is exactly the reason why computers can’t act.” (p. 157)
Note that ’computers can’t act’ is substantially stronger than ’machines are not agents’.
Apparently Baker wants to argue that it is impossible for machines to act, which is presumably more
difficult than arguing that we don't at this time happen to have the technical sophistication to create
machine agents. Revising Baker’s extracted argument to bring it in line with her proposed conclusion,
however, requires some corresponding strengthening of premise A. 3, as follows:
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B 1 In order to be an agent, an entity must be able to formulate intentions.
2 In order to formulate intentions, an entity must have an irreducible
first-person perspective.
3 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-person perspective.
4 Machines cannot be agents.
j 2&3
Argument B succeeds in capturing Baker’s argument provided that her justification for B.3 has
sufficient scope to conclude that machines cannot in principle have an irreducible first-person
perspective. What support does Baker give for B.l, B.2, and B.3?
B.l is true, Baker thinks, because agency implies intentionality. She takes this to be virtually
self-evident; the hallmark of agency is the ability to form intentions, where intentions are to be
understood on Castaneda’s model of being a “dispositional mental state of endorsingly thinking such
thoughts as ‘I shall do A'.” (p. 157) B.2 and B.3, on the other hand, require an account of the
first-person perspective such that
• The first person perspective is necessary for the ability to form intentions, and
• Machines necessarily lack it.
As Baker construes it, the first person perspective (FPP) has at least two essential properties.
Fiist, the FPP is irreducible, where the irreducibility in this case is due to a linguistic property of the
words used to refer to persons. In particular, first person pronouns cannot be replaced with descriptions
salve veritate. “First-person indicators are not simply substitutes for names or descriptions of
ourselves.” (p. 157) Thus Oedipus can, without absurdity, demand that the killer of Laius be found.
“In short, thinking about oneself in the first-person way does not appear reducible to thinking about
oneself in any other way.” (p. 158) Of course, if an essential property of the FPP is its irreducibility,
then it is unclear why Baker formulates her premises with the redundant “irreducible first-person
perspective.” Perhaps “irreducible” is included for emphasis, or perhaps she thinks that irreducibility is
an essential property of only some kinds of the FPP. In any case, I will continue with Baker's
formulation of her argument regardless of any apparent redundancy.
According to Baker, the second essential property of the FPP is that it is necessary for the
ability to “conceive of one’s thoughts as one’s own.” (p. 158) Baker calls this ’second-order
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consciousness’. For example, “if X cannot make first-person reference, then X may be conscious of the
contents of his own thoughts, but not conscious that they are his own.” (p. 158) In such a case, X fails
to have second-order consciousness. It follows that “an entity which can think of propositions at all
enjoys self-consciousness if and only if he can make irreducible first-person reference.” (p. 158) Since
the ability to form intentions is understood on Castaneda’s model as the ability to endorsingly think
propositions such as “I shall do A", and since such propositions essentially involve first-person
reference, it is clear why the first person perspective is necessary for the ability to form intentions. So
we have some reason to think that B.2 is true. But, apropos B.3, why should we think that machines
necessarily lack the first-person perspective?
Baker s justification for B.3 is summed up by her claim that “[cjomputers cannot make the
same kind of reference to themselves that self-conscious beings make, and this difference points to a
fundamental difference between humans and computers-namely, that humans, but not computers, have
an irreducible first-person perspective.” (p. 159) To make the case that computers are necessarily
handicapped in that they cannot refer to themselves in the same way that self-conscious entities do, she
invites us to consider what would have to be the case for a first person perspective to be programmable:
a) FPP can be the result of information processing.
b) First-person episodes can be the result of transformations on discrete input via
specifiable rules, (p. 159)
Since information processing, as it is usually conceived, is nothing more than the
transformation of discrete input via specifiable rules, (a) and (b) are distinct conditions only if the first
person perspective is distinct from first-person episodes. A case can be made that the FPP is nothing
more than serial first-person episodes, but the issue hinges on what Baker means by “first-person
episodes”. Unfortunately, Baker never explains what she means by “first-person episodes.” Leaving the
twin puzzles of what first-person episodes are and their relationship to the FPP unsolved, I will treat (a)
and (b) as distinct conditions on the programmability of the FPP.
Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-person perspective since both (a) and (b) are
false, (b) is straightforwardly false, since “the world we dwell in cannot be represented as some
number of independent facts ordered by formalizable rules.” (p. 160) Worse, (a) is false since it
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presupposes that the FPP can be generated by a rule governed process, yet the FPP “is not the result of
any rule-governed process.” (p. 160) That is to say, “no amount of th.rd-person information about
oneself ever compels a shift to first person knowledge.” (p. 160) Although Baker does not explain what
she means by “th.rd-person information” and “first person knowledge,” the point, presumably, is that
there is an unbridgeable gap between the third-person statements and the first-person statements
presupposed by the FPP. But since the possibility of an FPP being the result of information processing
depends on bridging this gap, it follows that the FPP cannot be the result of information processing.
Hence it is impossible for machines, having only the resource of information processing as they do, to
have an irreducible first-person perspective.
2.2. 1.1 Countering Baker's Critics
Recalling that my goal is to present these arguments in as favorable a light as possible, I now
turn to possible criticisms of Baker’s argument. It is useful to have a quick summary of the points
Baker has made in defense of Argument B at hand.
# Premise
B. 1 In order to be an agent, an entity must be
able to formulate intentions.
B.2 In order to formulate intentions, an entity
must have an irreducible first-person
perspective.
B.3 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible
first-person perspective.
Justification
Agency implies intentionality.
Forming an intention to X requires that one
endorsingly think, "I shall do X". But this
requires an irreducible reference to one’s self
which is only possible if one has a
first-person perspective.
There is a fundamental gap between
third-person statements, which are amenable
to information processing, and first-person
statements like “I shall do X” which cannot
be closed by information processing.
If we assume that an entity is an agent if it can act, then one way of understanding the slogan
that agency implies intentionality - and Baker’s assumption of B.l with it - is as the claim; If A did X
then A did X intentionally. Thus Baker is assuming that an action is never a mere action as such; it is,
rather, an intentional action. Surely, though, there are actions which are not intentional. For example, I
intentionally walk to the grocery store. But it is not the case that every step I take is intentional.
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In defense of Baker’s argument, though, it is not that the agent, in acting, acts intentionally.
Rather, B.I merely asserts that agency implies the capacity for intentional action. Thus is it is not that
agency implies intentionality in the sense that every action is an intentional action. Instead, it is that
agency implies intentionality in the weaker sense that an actor has a certain ability; the ability to form
intentions.
B 2 >s more troubling. Baker’s proposal that the ability to formulate intentions implies an
irreducible FPP is driven by her adoption of Castaneda’s (1975) analysis of intention: To formulate an
intention to x is to endorsingly think the thought, “I shall do x”. There are, however, other analyses of
intention which avoid the requirement of an FPP. Davidson (1980a) sketches an analysis of what it is
to form an intention to act: “an action is performed with a certain intention if it is caused in the right
way by attitudes and beliefs that rationalize it. (p. 87) It’s helpful to consider Davidson’s account in
more detail.
If someone performs an action of type A with the intention of
performing an action of type B, then he must have a pro-attitude
toward actions of type B (which may be expressed in the form: an
action of type B is good (or has some other positive attribute)) and a
belief that in performing an action of type A he will be (or probably
will be) performing an action of type B (the belief may be expressed
in the obvious way). The expressions of the belief and desire entail
that actions of type A are, or probably will be, good (or desirable,
just, dutiful, etc.), (pp. 86-87)
Evidently, Davidson is proposing that
S A’s with the intention of B-ing only if
i. S has pro-attitudes towards actions of type B
ii. S believes that by A-ing S will thereby B
The pro-attitudes and beliefs S has which rationalize his action cause his action. But, of
course, it is not the case that S’s having pro-attitudes towards actions of type B and S’s believing that
by A-ing she will thereby B jointly implies that S actually A’s with the intention of B-ing. (i) and (ii),
in simpler terms, do not jointly suffice for S's A-ing with the intention of B-ing since it must be that S
A’s because of her pro-attitudes and beliefs. For Davidson, ’because’ should be read in its causal sense.
Reasons - consisting as they do of pro-attitudes and beliefs - cause the action which they rationalize.
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Causation alone is not enough, however. To suffice for intentional action reasons must cause
the action in the right way. Suppose (Davidson, 1980a, pp. 84-85) Smith gets on the plane marked
’London’ with the intention of flying to London, England. Without alarm and without Smith’s
knowledge, a shy hijacker diverts the plane from its London, Ontario destination to London, England.
Smith’s beliefs and pro-attitudes caused him to get on the plane marked ’London’ so as to fly to
London, England. Smith’s intention is satisfied, but only by accident, as it were. So it must be that
Smith s reasons cause his action in the right way, thereby avoiding so called wayward causal chains.
Hence,
S A’s with the intention of B-ing if, and only if,
i. S has pro-attitudes towards actions of type B
ii. S believes that by A-ing S will thereby B
iii. S’s relevant pro-attitudes and beliefs cause her A-ing with the intention of
B-ing in the right way.
Notice that there is no reference whatsoever to an irreducible first-person perspective in
Davidson s account. Unlike Castaneda s account, there is no essential reference--or, indeed, any
reference at all-to the first person indexical. Were it the case that Davidson thought animals could
have beliefs, which he does not (Davidson, 1984), it would be appropriate to conclude from Davidson’s
account that animals can act intentionally despite worries that animals lack an irreducible first-person
perspective.
Given Davidson’s analysis of intention, the relevant criticism of premise B.2 is that in the
absence of any defense of Castaneda’s analysis of intention, we have no reason to prefer Castaneda’s
analysis over Davidson's, which does not share the implication of an irreducible FPP. Baker provides
no such defense, though presumably it is possible to defend Castaneda's analysis of intention.
Constructing a defense would, however, take us too far afield at this point.
Baker defends B.3 by arguing that machines cannot achieve a first-person perspective since
machines gain information only through rule-based transformations on discrete input and no amount or
combination of such transformations could suffice for the transition from a third-person perspective to a
first-person perspective. That is,
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c 1 If machines were able to have a FPP, then the FPP can be the result of
transformations on discrete input via specifiable rules.
2 If the FPP can be the result of transformations on discrete input via
specifiable rules, then there exists some amount of third-person information
which compels a shift to first-person knowledge.
3 No amount of third-person information compels a shift to first-person
knowledge
4 First-person episodes cannot be the result of transformations on discrete 2&3
input via specifiable rules.
5 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-person perspective. 1&4
Argument B stands or falls with Argument C. The problem with C is that it assumes a narrow
conception of machines and programming. Here is a simple way of thinking about machines and
programming as C would have it. There was at one time - for all I know, there may still be - a child’s
toy which was essentially a wind-up car. The car came with a series of small plastic disks, with
notches around the circumference, which could be fitted over a rotating spindle in the middle of the car.
The disks acted as a cam, actuating a lever which turned the wheels when the lever hit a notch in the
side of the disk. Each disk had a distinct pattern of notches and resulted in a distinct route. Thus,
placing a particular disk on the car’s spindle ‘programs’ the car to follow a particular route.
Insofar as it requires that programming be restricted to transformations on discrete input via
specifiable rules, Argument C treats all machines as analogous to the toy car and programming as
analogous to carving out new notches on a disk used in the toy car. Certainly Argument C allows for
machines which are much more complicated than the toy car, but the basic relationship between
program and machine behavior is the same throughout. The program determines the machine’s
behavior, while the program itself is in turn determined by the programmer. It is the point of C.2 that,
if an irreducible FPP were programmable, it would have to be because the third-person information
which can be coded by the programmer suffices for a first-person perspective, since all the machine has
access to is what can be coded by a programmer.
Why should we think that a machine’s only source of information is what the programmer
codes? Here are a few reasons to think that machines are not so restricted:
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r f loors S° c;onstructed as t0 ‘ learn ' by a variety of techniques. (Sutton andBarto, 1998) Even classical conditioning techniques have been used. The point is
merely that suitably constructed, a machine can put together information about its
environment and itself which is not coded in advance by the programmer and which is
not available other than by, for example, trial and error. It would be as if the toy carhad a navigation goal and could adjust the notches in its disk according to whether it
is closer or farther from its goal.
Machines can evolve. 1 (Ballard, 1997) Programs evolve through a process of mutation
and extinction. Code in the form of so-called genetic algorithms is replicated and
mutated. Unsuccessful mutations are culled, while successful algorithms are used as
the basis for the next generation. Using this method one can develop a program for
performing a particular task without having any knowledge of how the program goes
about performing the task. Strictly speaking, there is no programmer for such
programs. Here the analogy with the toy car breaks down somewhat. It’s as if the toy
car started out with a series of disks of differing notch configurations and the car can
take a disk and either throw it out or use it as a template for further disks, depending
on whether or not a given disk results in the car being stuck against an obstacle, for
instance.
• Programs can be written which write their own programs. (Ballard, 1997) A program
can spawn an indefinite number of programs, including an exact copy of itself. It need
not be the case that the programmer be able to predict what future code will be
generated, since that code may be partially the result of information the machine
gathers, via sensory modalities, from its environment. So, again, in a real sense there
is no programmer for these programs. The toy car in this case starts out with a disk
which itself generates disks and these disks may incorporate information about
obstacles or what have you.
Examples like these show that machines can have access to information and utilize it in ways
which are completely beyond the purview of the programmer. So while it may not be the case that a
programmer can code an irreducible FPP directly, as Argument C would have it, it is still open to
speculation whether or not another method of gaining information and self-programming will result in a
machine with an irreducible FPP.
The criticism of Argument C comes down to this: the fundamental puzzle is not one of figuring
out whether an FPP can be programmed in one way or another, as Argument C supposes. Rather, the
fundamental problem with which Baker is struggling is the question of whether or not an irreducible
To be sure, the physical entity by itself cannot do this yet, although work is
progressing in this area.
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FPP 18 comPutahle - Computability is a technical notion about which I have much to say in Chapter 7.
Informally, let me say for now that the question is whether an irreducible FPP is something which can
be broken down into a series of simple steps or procedures. Notice that this is a very different question
from the question Baker asks. Baker asks: Is it possible for a programmer to author a FPP? But the
important question is: Is the FPP such that it can be issue from small, precise procedures?
In defense of Baker’s argument, neither I nor anyone else has the slightest clue how to answer
the latter question. Not only do we not have any idea about whether a FPP might be computable, we
don’t even have an idea - what really comes to the same thing - as to what a FPP is in the first place.
So even though it might be helpful to learn that Argument C asks the wrong question, it is still open to
Baker to replace the argument with
D 1 If a machine were able to have a FPP, then a FPP is computable.
2 A FPP is not computable.
3 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-person perspective. 1&2
Argument D is unsatisfying until we get conclusive arguments for D.2.2 Still, for all we now
know D.2 might be true. Given what we know about machines and programming and what little we
happen to know about FPP’s, there is at least a presumption in favor of D.2 inasmuch as the
computability of the FPP is part of the apparently intractable problem of machine consciousness. It
seems that what ought to be provided are not arguments that an irreducible FPP is uncomputable; what
is owed are arguments which show that an irreducible FPP is computable - a tall order by anyone's
measure. I conclude that Baker makes a good case against the possibility of machine agency. At least,
it is a defensible case, which is as much as I set out to show.
For sufficiently well-defined tasks, such arguments are possible. That is, it is possible
to show that some functions are not computable. Suggestive of D.2, there are vastly
many more uncomputable functions than there are computable functions. Specifically,
there are uncountably many functions, but only countably many computable functions.
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2.2.2 The Argument from the Mentality of Mechanisms
Baker's argument suggests a further argument against machine agency. Perhaps it is only a
generalization on Baker's argument, but the impossibility of a FPP is not the only liability which
threatens machines. If agency presupposes the ability to formulate intentions, and the ability to
formulate intentions presupposes mental states, then reasons for thinking that machines cannot have
mental properties are also reasons for thinking that machines cannot be agents.
E 1 Necessarily, if x is an agent, then x has mental properties.
2 Machines cannot have mental properties.
3 Machines cannot be agents. 1^2
Unfortunately, any adequate discussion of Argument E would engage us in a long-standing debate in the
philosophy of artificial intelligence. Rest assured that Argument E has many defenders and poses a
considerable challenge to the possibility of machine agency.
So far we have two arguments - Arguments B and E - against the possibility of machine
agency. Baker’s argument, Argument B, is a rare instance of an explicit argument against the possibility
of machine agency. There are additional arguments in the philosophical literature which contain, imply,
or at least suggest further arguments. To be fair, the author's original intention in each case was never
to argue that machine agency is impossible: it may come as an unwelcome surprise to some that their
arguments carry such implications. In any case, the implied arguments are best viewed as mine alone. 3
2.2.3 Wolfs Argument
In “The Importance of Free Will”, Susan Wolf (1993) invites us to compare what she calls
‘reactive' attitudes with the 'objective' attitude. Reactive attitudes are just those attitudes we take
towards one-another: the feelings of gratitude or resentment we have are our responses to others' actions.
The objective attitude is the attitude a chef might take with respect to a mixer or the attitude a mechanic
Although, just for the sake of simplicity, I will label and discuss them as if they were
intended by the philosophers from whose arguments they are derived.
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might take with respect to a car. The behavior of the car or the mixer is not something it makes sense
to appreciate or resent. A balky car might anger us, but the thought of punishing the car is absurd.
What would the world be like if the only attitude we took were the objective attitude? Our
ordinary reactive world contains relationships of friendship and love; the objective world would contain
no such relationships except to the extent that they promote some other end. In our reactive world there
are heroes and people of virtue who inspire respect and admiration, as well as villains and people of
vice who inspire pity and hatred; the objective world might well have people doing good and bad things,
but they wouldn’t inspire respect or pity, admiration or hatred. In general, the objective world would be
so unlike our world as to be unrecognizable as a world containing moral agents. “A world in which
human relationships are restricted to those that can be formed and supported in the absence of the
reactive attitudes is a world of human isolation so cold and dreary that any but the most cynical must
shudder at the idea of it.” (p. 106)
Wolfs broader project is to determine whether or not it makes sense - whether or not it would
be rational - to take reactive attitudes towards a putative morally responsible agent even after it has
been found out that the agent is psychologically and/or physically determined to do precisely he or she
did. In the course of her discussion. Wolf presents the case of the perfect android.
To all appearances, behavioral and otherwise, the perfect android is a human being. Despite
appearances, it is an android; it is completely programmed. That is, its actions are programmed, its
choices are programmed, and even its thought processes are entirely programmed. Nothing it does or
’thinks’ is unprogrammed or, consequently, unexpected by its programmer. Indeed, to ensure that this is
so the programmer is actively and continually attached to the android so as to program its responses on
“a day-to-day or moment-to-moment basis.” (p. 1 10) A puppet is perhaps the clearest analogy to what
Wolf has in mind, although as Wolf puts it, “[o]ne might imagine the relation between robot and
programmer to be very much like a possible relation between author and character; or, perhaps even
better, one might imagine the relation to be like the relation between a magician and a human being
over whose thoughts and bodily movements the magician has complete control.” (p. 1 10)
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Wolf concludes that taking the objective attitude with respect to the android is the only way to
remain consistent with the facts. In no sense relevant to justifying reactive attitudes can the android be
considered a responsible agent.
In light of the nature of the robot's programming, I believe that the
only way of living in accordance with the facts would be by
regarding the robot solely with the objective attitude. That is, I
believe that the robot is not a free and responsible being in whatever
sense of ‘free and responsible' the objects of our reactive attitudes are
ordinarily assumed to be. Were we to be purely rational, we would
allow ourselves to feel some emotions toward the robot, but we
would not feel those emotions or sentiments constitutive of our
reactive attitudes. For though the robot might choose to perform the
actions he performs, he chooses to perform them only because he is
programmed to so choose. Though his decisions and judgments may
be preceded by thoughts which look or sound like reasons, he cannot
be said to reason to these conclusions in the way we do. He is not in
ultimate control of his value, his personality, or his actions. He is,
properly speaking, only a vehicle for carrying out the plans (if plans
there be) of his programmer, (p. 1 10)
I confess that I find Wolfs account of the perfect android deeply puzzling. Let us take
seriously the possibility of a ‘perfect android' as she describes it. The android is physically and
behaviorally indistinguishable from an ordinary, run-of-the-mill human person. Wolfs claim is that the
android is programmed, but her conception of programming stretches what we ordinarily understand
programming to be. The program is not written first and then compiled or interpreted and executed by
the android. Wolfs programmer must issue instructions on a moment-to-moment basis. Of course, in
order for this to work Wolfs programmer would have to have moment-to-moment access to what the
android ‘sees', ‘feels', ‘hears', etc. A feedback-instruction loop would have to exist between the android
and the programmer for the android to have any chance whatsoever of passing as an ordinary human
person. Given this picture, it is hard to understand why one should accept the conclusion that “the only
way of living in accordance with the facts would be by regarding the robot solely with the objective
attitude.”
To make sense of Wolfs story, it would have to be the case that the android is essentially a
humanoid ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle). Current ROV's employ a stereoscopic camera system
which links to the operator's stereoscopic goggles so as to give the operator the depth perception and
visual experience of actually being on the ocean floor or in the nuclear reactor. Wolfs ‘programmer is
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not so much a programmer as an operator. As such, it is perfectly appropriate to take reactive attitudes
with respect to the android, since the android's agency just is its operator's agency. One’s resentment of
or gratitude towards the android just is one's resentment of or gratitude towards the android's operator.4
What if the android were programmed - in the usual sense of the word - instead of being
operated? The programmer codes a set of instructions, stores them in the android, and has nothing more
to do with the android; the android executes the instructions without any further meddling by the
programmer. Wolfs assumption that the android would be behaviorally indistinguishable from ordinary
human persons is, in this case, egregiously question-begging, since it implies that the android would be
quite as capable as any human person at passing the Turing Test for artificial intelligence.5 Thus there
would be no reason whatsoever to adopt the objective view with respect to the android, since whatever
makes us think that we are responsible agents is equally true of the android. On the other hand, if the
android were behaviorally distinguishable from a human person, then Wolfs conclusion that it is rational
to adopt the objective attitude with respect to the android is plausible. What also follows is an
argument against machine agency.
F 1 If X is an agent, then it is not rational to take the objective attitude with
respect to X.
2 It is rational to take the objective attitude with respect to machines.
3 Machines are not agents. 1&2
Notice that Argument F is considerably weaker than either B or E. It does not conclude that
machines cannot be agents, only that machines are not agents since, to date, it is rational to take the
Of course, if the operator murdered via the android, it would make little sense to
imprison the android and leave the operator at large unless the operator's sole avenue
of agency were the android. For example, suppose that the operator is a brain in a vat
which is wired to radio controllers in such a way that it sees via the android's cameras,
it hears via the android's microphones, it feels via the android's tactile transducers, and
it acts via the android's motors. Imprisoning the vatted brain while leaving the android
at large would make as little sense in this case as imprisoning the android while
leaving the operator free would make in the former case.
A machine passes the Turing Test (Turing, 1997) if a human interlocutor fails to
reliably determine which of two subjects is the machine and which is a human based
solely on their (typed) answers to the interlocutor's questions.
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objective attitude towards them. Is it possible to strengthen Argument F? Simply adding the
appropriate modal modifiers raises an interesting question.
G 1 Necessarily, if X is an agent, then it is not rational to take the objective
attitude with respect to X.
2 Necessarily, it is rational to take the objective attitude with respect to
machines.
3 Machines cannot be agents. j
« 2
Why should we think that, necessarily, it is rational to take the objective attitude towards machines? A
good reason might be if machines could never pass the Turing Test: given G, any argument against the
possibility of machine intelligence is, a fortiori, an argument against the possibility of machine agency.
2.2.4 The Argument from Derived Agency
A further argument against machine agency may be gleaned from my discussion of Wolfs
article. In the course of criticizing Wolfs characterization of the perfect android, I pointed out that the
android should be treated as a responsible agent since its agency just is, in toto, its operator's agency —
this much is obvious when we appreciate that Wolfs perfect android is nothing more than a humanoid
ROV. An excellent question at this point is whether something similar would be true of a programmed,
as opposed to operated, android. Would a programmed android inherit its programmer's agency? To
understand the implications of this question, it may help to consider a related problem in AI.
What is distinctive of mental properties is their ‘aboutness': a belief that snow is white is about
snow and whiteness; a desire for a chocolate is about a chocolate; the goal of finding a pencil is about a
pencil. The technical term for this ‘aboutness 1 is ‘intentionality’. Intentionally (being about something
else) is unique to mental properties: hence Brentano's famous dictum, “Intentionality is the mark of the
mental.”
Things other than mental properties may also appear to be intentional. The sentence
The cat is on the table.
is about a certain state of affairs. The screen upon which I am now focused has, in addition to the
above sentence, a series of system status indicators off to the side which give me lots of useful
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information. They tell me, for instance, that the motherboard is currently at 84 degrees and the
processor cooling fans are turning at a quiet 5000 r.p.m. They indicate which processes are currently
running and the extent to which the twin CPUs are being taxed by those processes. They even g.ve me
current weather information from the local airport (temperature 0°F, dewpoint
-18°F, pressure 29.97,
humidity 41%, and wind out of the west at 29 mph), the date and time, and which track of the CD is
currently playing.
Not only is the sentence apparently intentional, the entire computer system which I use to write
it appears to have lots of intentional components as well. One might be inclined to conclude that my
computer is in one respect just like me: we are both intentional systems. Is my computer an intentional
system in the same way that I am? Or are the various features of my computer intentional in the way
that the sentence about the cat is intentional? Surely it is the latter. The sentence is intentional only
insofar as my making those particular marks amounts to my conveying some small piece of information.
The tiny graphs registering CPU usage are about CPU usage only because of the efforts of a helpful
programmer and agreed-upon conventions about what little green bars should convey. The computer,
like the sentence, has only derived intentionality, where derived intentionality is to be contrasted with
original intentionality. As Haugeland (1997) puts it,
Here's the idea: sentence inscriptions-ink marks on a page, say-are
only “about” anything because we (or other intelligent users) mean
them that way. Their intentionality is second-hand, borrowed or
derived from the intentionality that those users already have. ...Our
intentionality itself, on the other hand, cannot be likewise derivative:
it must be original. (‘Original’, here, just means not derivative, not
borrowed from somewhere else. If there is any intentionality at all,
at least some of it must be original; it can’t all be derivative.) (p. 7)
Why is this a problem for AI? Haugeland explains:
The problem for mind design is that artificial intelligence systems,
like sentences and pictures, are also artifacts. So it can seem that
their intentionality too must always be derivative-borrowed from
their designers or users, presumably-and never original. Yet, if the
project of designing and building a system with a mind of its own is
ever really to succeed, then it must be possible for an artificial
system to have genuine original intentionality, just as we do. (1997,
p. 7)
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The distinction between original and derivative intentionality is mirrored by a distinction
between original and derivative agency, provided that the well-spring of agency is the mind. Suppose
that Ted the Survivals, in a fit of deepening paranoia, resolves to keep his gun trained on the door of
his shack so as to kill anyone who might try to enter. After twenty hours of this Ted frightens himself
by startling awake upon nodding off: for a few seconds at least he was vulnerable! As clever as he is
paranoid, Ted fashions a simple system of strings and pulleys such that the gun fires dead-center into
the doorway when the door is opened. Ted is free to sleep and go about his usual business, secure in
the knowledge that anyone trying to enter his shack will be killed.
The purpose of Ted's contraption is to kill any would-be attackers. It has this purpose only
insofar as Ted has this purpose. Thus, the intentionality of the contraption is derived from Ted’s
original intentionality. Yet just as the contraption's intentionality is derivative of Ted's original
intentionality, its agency is derived from Ted's original agency. It would be far better to put Ted in a
secure psychiatric hospital than the contraption if, say, the postman is killed.
Let us press the example further. Suppose that Ted isn't any ordinary paranoid survivalist. Ted
is also a brilliant roboticist with considerable economic resources. To protect himself, Ted constructs a
mobile robot. The robot, which Ted affectionately dubs ‘R2D3’, looks like a wheeled trash-can. It has
three arms stuck out the sides that articulate in four locations and terminate in large, fully-automatic
guns. On top of R2D3 stands a thin, retractable pole, and on the top of the pole is the its 'head'. The
‘head’ is just a pair of side-by-side cameras which can swivel in nearly every direction. Ringing R2D3’s
base are sonar sensors which allow it to navigate from room to room.
In operation, R2D3’s head continuously bobs up and down and swivels back and forth as it
scans its vicinity. R2D3’s head orients on any movement and, using cues such as bi-lateral symmetry,
zeroes in on any faces. It then compares key features of the face to an on-board database of such
features. If there is, within a certain narrow tolerance which Ted keeps notching up as his paranoia
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deepens, a match in the database, then the object the robot is tracking is a “friend”. If it fails to find a
match, the object is a foe
,
at least for a few microseconds. 6
Suppose R2D3, suffering no malfunction whatsoever, kills the postman. Is its agency derived
or original? Does it now make more sense to put R2D3 in the secure psychiatric hospital than Ted's
original string-and-gun contraption? Surely not. Of course R2D3 ought to be disabled, but not as a
punitive measure. We disable the robot for precisely the same reason that we disable the string
contraption: to avoid any accidents. The scrap heap is the appropriate end for R2D3. Ted, the lethal
robot's designer and programmer, is the one who gets to go to the secure psychiatric hospital.
Machines are designed and programmed; their agency can never be original, yet agents
require original agency.
H 1 Necessarily, if X is an agent then X has original agency.
2 Necessarily, if X is designed and programmed, then X has only derived
agency.
3 Necessarily, if X has only derived agency then X does not have original
agency.
4 Every machine must be designed and programmed.
5 No machine can be an agent. 1,2,3&4
It may be objected that some machines are designed and programmed by other machines. This
is true, but then all that can be said is that any such machine will only have derived agency two or more
times removed. It might also be objected that some machines are not programmed at all: the algorithms
by which they operate are developed by reward and punishment or even, in the case of genetic
algorithms, by directed ‘evolution 1 . Such machines still have only derivative agency - derived, in these
cases, from the rewarder, the punisher, or the one who directs the evolution.
The necessity involved in Argument H may be troubling. If a machine were ever developed
which could actually understand what it is doing and change what it does accordingly, then no-one
The technology I've described is by no means science-fiction. Everything is currently
in use at many robotics labs, including the Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics (LPR)
at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst - except, I hope, for the weaponry. I am
confident that none of the robots at LPR enjoy live-fire capability; I wouldn't be
surprised to hear otherwise of military robotics labs.
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could deny that its agency would be original. Be that as it may, this line of thought only succeeds in
raising an additional question: is it possible for a machine to understand what it is doing? There are
reasons to think not.
2.2.5 Searle's Argument
The classic argument against the possibility of a machine understanding what it is doing is
Searle s Chinese Room Thought Experiment. (1990) To find out what a machine might understand,
Searle puts himself in the machine's position and asks, what would I understand in this context? The
context is straightforward: Searle imagines himself in a locked room where he is given pages with
Chinese writing on them. He does not know Chinese. He does not even recognize the writing as
Chinese per se. To him, these are meaningless squiggles. But he also has a rule-book, written in
English, which dictates just how he should group the Chinese pages he has with any additional Chinese
pages he might be given. The rules in the rule-book are purely formal. They tell him that a page with
s9uiggles °f this sort should be grouped with a page with squiggles of that sort but not with squiggles
of the other sort. The new groupings mean no more to Searle than the original ordering. It’s all just
symbol-play, so far as he is concerned. Still, the rule-book is very good. To the Chinese-speaker
reading the Searle-processed pages outside the room, whatever is in the room is being posed questions
in Chinese and is answering them quite satisfactorily, also in Chinese.
The analogy, of course, is that a machine is in exactly the same position as Searle. Compare,
for instance, Searle to R2D3. The robot is good at matching key features of faces with features stored
in its database. But the matching is purely formal in exactly the same way that Searle's matching of
pages is purely formal. It could not be said that the robot recognizes Ted any more than it could be
said that Searle understands Chinese. Even if R2D3 is given a ‘mouth' and facial features such that it
‘smiles' when it ‘recognizes’ a ‘friend' and ‘frowns' when it ‘sees' a ‘foe', so that to all outward
appearences the robot understands its context and what it is ‘seeing’, the robot is not ‘seeing
1
at all. It is
merely performing an arithmetical operation - matching pixels in one array with pixels in another array
according to purely formal rules set-up by Ted - in almost exactly the same way that Searle is matching
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pages with pages. R2D3 does not understand what it is doing any more than Searle understands what
he is doing following the rulebook.
It is precisely because R2D3 has no capacity to understand what it is doing that the thought of
putting the robot in a psychiatric hospital is absurd. Moreover, if Searle is correct, no amount of
redesigning will ever result in a robot which understands what it is doing, since no matter how clever or
complicated the rule-book, it is still just a rule-book. Yet if a machine cannot, in principle, understand
what it is doing, then it cannot be an agent.
I 1 If it is possible for machines to be agents, then machines must understand
what it is that they are doing.
2 Nothing which operates only according to purely formal rules can
understand what it is doing.
3 Necessarily, machines operate only according to purely formal rules.
4 Machines cannot understand what it is that they are doing. 2&3
5 Machines cannot be agents. 1&4
Of course, there have been many, many criticisms of Searle's thought experiment. In the same article
(1990), Searle presents replies to these criticisms. Suffice it to say that the Chinese Room Thought
Experiment poses a serious challenge to the possibility of Artificial Intelligence and to the possibility of
machine agency, as Argument I demonstrates.
2.3 In Summary
There are at least five non-trivial skeptical arguments that challenge the possibility of machine
agency:
• Argument B - Baker's Argument
• Argument E - The Argument from the Mentality of Mechanisms
• Argument G - Wolfs Argument
• Argument H - The Argument from Derived Agency
• Argument I - Searle's Argument
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The skeptical challenge is serious in each case. While I am sure that the reader has had thoughts about
how each argument might be answered, it cannot be denied that all the arguments together present a
skeptical challenge which is at once formidable and fascinating for those of us friendly to the possibility
of machine agency.
2.4 Against Autonomous Machine Agency
It is easy to turn each of the arguments B, E, G, H, and I into an argument against autonomous
machine agency.
J 1 If B, E, G, H, or I is sound, then machines cannot be agents.
2 B, E, G, H, or I is sound.
3 Machines cannot be agents. j o j
4 If machines cannot be agents, then machines cannot be autonomous agents.
5 Machines cannot be autonomous agents. 3&4
But this is trivial. Are there any non-trivial arguments against the possibility of machine autonomy,
independent of the question of machine agency?
2.4.1 Baker's Second Argument
Baker (1981) closes her article with just such a non-trivial argument against machine autonomy.
Her claim is that the inability of machines to formulate intentions implies that they cannot have a will of
their own and, in not having a will of their own, they cannot be autonomous. Consider Baker's
statement of the argument:
So machines cannot engage in intentional behavior of any kind. For example,
they cannot tell lies, since lying involves the intent to deceive; they cannot try
to avoid mistakes, since trying to avoid mistakes entails intending to conform
to some normative rule. They cannot be malevolent, since having no
intentions at all, they can hardly have wicked intentions. And, most
significantly, computers cannot use language to make assertions, ask
questions, or make promises, etc., since speech acts are but a species of
intentional action. Thus, we may conclude that a computer can never have a
will of its own. (p. 163)
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Whether or not Baker meant to take up the problem of autonomous machine agency in addition to the
problem of machine agency, the above passage suggests an argument.
K Necessarily, if X has a will of its own, then X is able to formulate
intentions.
Necessarily, if X is able to formulate intentions, then X has a FPP.
Machines cannot have a FPP.
Machines cannot have wills of their own.
Necessarily, if X is an autonomous agent, then X has a will of its own.
Machines cannot be autonomous agents.
1,2&3
4&5
Premises K.l and K.5 are the only differences between Argument B and K, so those are the
only premises to consider at this point. Premise B.l may be self-evident, or nearly so, but why should
we think that K.l is true? It is possible to argue for K.l without getting too far into a discussion of the
will, because it is safe to assume that having a will implies having intentions. An agent's intentions are
either their own or someone else's. If an agent's intentions were not her own, then her will would not
be her own. Having a will of one’s own requires having intentions of one’s own, but having intentions
of one’s own requires the ability to formulate intentions.
1 In order to have a will of its own, an agent must have intentions of its own.
2 In order to have intentions of its own, an agent must be able to formulate
intentions.
3 In order to have a will of its own, an agent must be able to formulate
intentions.
1&2
Premise K.5 is straightforwardly true. While we won't be taking up the concept of autonomy
until Chapter 4, it is safe at this point to suppose that an agent's autonomy requires that its will is its
own for much the same reason that someone who is under mind-control is not autonomous. Argument
K, in short, gives the skeptic an excellent start on autonomous machine agency.
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2.4.2 Fisher's Argument
Fisher (1983) criticizes a claim, made independently by Boden (1977) and Sloman (1978), that
"the collision between the concepts of free action and of scientific knowledge can be avoided, thanks to
a new understanding of the former afforded by the new discipline of artificial intelligence (AI)." (Fisher,
1983, p. 76) Fisher takes exception: there is nothing AI can offer which will convince us that free will
is possible in a deterministic universe, since free will and determinism conflict. “The conflict can be
described with maximum brevity as the collision between the necessity demanded by scientific
knowledge and the possibility demanded by free action.” (p. 76) Fisher is asserting incompatibilism,
where incompatibilism is the thesis that free action cannot exist if determinism is true. In Fisher's
understanding of incompatibilism, any true explanation necessarily involves causal laws, which are
necessarily deterministic. It follows that there can be no sense in which an agent could have done
otherwise, since any true description of the agent’s action must be an instance of a causal law if it is
explicable at all.
Boden (1977) and Sloman (1978) argue that as AI becomes better at enabling computers to
exemplify planning behaviors, purposeful behaviors, intentional behaviors, etc., it will become clear how
the free action is possible. Fisher (1983, p. 78) admits that much of what Boden and Sloman anticipate
for AI may come to pass, but he argues that nothing AI can offer will help the cause of compatibilism.
In so arguing, it is apparent that Fisher is more than an incompatibilist: he is a hard determinist. A
hard determinist is an incompatibilist who thinks that determinism is true. Hard determinists, therefore,
reject the possibility of free action.
M 1 If it is possible for a machine to act freely, then it is possible for a human
to act freely.
2 If determinism is true then it is not possible for a human to act freely.
3 Determinism is true.
4 It is not possible for a machine to act freely. 1,2&3
Argument M is not especially insightful: it merely extends the hard determinist's case against
human freedom to machine freedom. Any problems with the hard determinist's case are inherited, since
machine autonomy is assumed to be nothing more than a species of human autonomy. For instance,
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determinism may well be false depending upon one's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. (Salmon.
1998)
2.4.3 The Argument from Complete State Descriptions
Nonetheless, argument M suggests a further, more interesting argument against machine
autonomy. Machines are unique in that we can ‘look under the hood'. More precisely, machines admit
of complete state descriptions. For any state a machine is in, whether it be mechanical, electrical,
chemical, or some combination thereof, a complete description can be given of the machine's current
state and its operational rules such that it is possible to infer with perfect accuracy — barring
malfunction, of course - a description of the machine’s next state.7
N 1 If it is possible to infer a complete state description of X from a previous
complete state description of X, then X cannot act autonomously.
2 Every machine is such that it is possible to infer a complete state
description of X from a previous complete state description of X.
3 No machine can act autonomously. 1&2
Note that Argument N implies nothing about whether a machine can act. The conclusion is
merely that, even if a machine were able to act, it could not do so autonomously. Note also that the
argument can be sound even if determinism is false, since locally indeterministic processes need not
affect globally deterministic processes. 8
Dennett (1981) provides a useful framework for understanding Argument N. Borrowing
Dennett’s example (p. 221), suppose that you are playing against a chess-playing computer. As with
any opponent, you have a distinct interest in being able to anticipate the computer’s next move. Dennett
argues that there are three approaches one can take in trying to predict the computer’s next move which
depend on your understanding of the computer.
The machine's designer is second only to Laplace's Demon in her foreknowledge about
the machine's behavior.
Exactly when an atom of a radioactive isotope decays on the moon may be purely
random, but the Moon's orbit about the Earth is not.
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Suppose you view the chess-playing computer as a functional whole of functional parts,
exactly as a computer scientist might view it. Suppose further that you actually know just how the
computer is designed. You know how to follow the computer’s program so that you can anticipate what
the computer s response will be to your next move. Predicting the computer’s response to even a small
number of your possible moves will, of course, be computationally onerous. So to keep onlookers from
dying of boredom or old-age, as the case may be, we allow you to construct a functional duplicate of
the chess-playing computer in advance. Then, when you want to find out how the computer will
respond to a particular move, you play that move against the functional duplicate and see how it
responds. In order to create the functional duplicate, you have to know down to the last subroutine
exactly how the chess-playing computer is designed. Since the important information is in the
computer’s design specifications, Dennett (p. 221) declares that you have taken the design stance.
Design-stance predictions presuppose knowledge of the computer's design sufficient to construct a
functional duplicate of the machine.
But suppose you are not a computer scientist. You are, instead, a physicist. You understand
how to make explanations and predictions from physical laws. You treat the computer as a physical
system so as to predict the chess-playing computer’s response to your next move, which requires that
you gather as much information as possible about the construction of its circuits, put that information
together with the voltage levels and resistances at numerous points in the computer’s circuitry, and
predict the computer’s response to your move based on electrical laws such as, for example, Ohm’s
Law. To be sure, this would be an almost unbelievably challenging task. But difficulty does not imply
impossibility. In principle, it could be done. Insofar as you treat the chess-playing computer as a
complex physical system and predict its behavior from information about its physical state and physical
laws, you are taking the physical stance. (Dennett, 1981, p. 222)
Suppose, however, that you are neither a physicist nor a computer scientist. You are simply a
chess enthusiast engaged in a game of chess with a computer. The design stance, and more-so the
physical stance, is completely beyond you without many years of study. The most natural approach for
you to take in anticipating the computer’s response to your next move in this case is to assign beliefs
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and desires to the computer. You have neither access to the computer’s physical description nor access
to the computer’s design specification; the best you can do is suppose that the computer is an intentional
system. That is, you assume that the computer is such that it desires to win the game and believes,
among other things, that the Queen can move any number of unobstructed squares in any single
direction and the King can move only one unobstructed square in any direction.
In short, you assume for the purpose of anticipating the computer’s response to your next move
that the computer has pretty much the same beliefs about the game as you do. Given its desire to win
the game, and given its beliefs about how to go about winning the game, you make predictions about
how the computer will most likely respond to your next move.9 Dennett (p. 224) calls this approach the
intentional stance. There are important reasons, he thinks, for preferring the intentional stance over the
design stance or the physical stance.
The best chess-playing computers these days are practically inaccessible to
prediction from either the design stance or the physical stance; they have
become too complex for even their own designers to view from the design
stance. A man’s best hope of defeating such a machine in a chess match is to
predict its responses by figuring out as best he can what the best or most
rational move would be, given the rules and goals of chess. That is, one
assumes not only (1) that the machine will function as designed, but (2) that
the design is optimal as well, that the computer will "choose" the most
rational move. Predictions made on these assumptions may well fail if either
assumption proves unwarranted in the particular case, but still this means of
prediction may impress us as the most fruitful one to adopt in dealing with a
particular system. Put another way, when one can no longer hope to beat the
machine by utilizing one’s knowledge of physics or programming to anticipate
its responses, one may still be able to avoid defeat by treating the machine
rather like an intelligent human opponent. (1981, pp. 222-223)
Dennett goes on to argue that it is possible - indeed, often practically necessary - to take the
intentional stance towards machines, animals, and aliens and that taking the intentional stance in such
cases is perfectly justified. Contrasted with the design and physical stances, the intentional stance is
less-than-perfect. That is, it is easier to see how you might make a mistake predicting the chess-playing
computer's response to your move if you take the intentional stance than if you take either the design oi
Of course, you assume that the computer will work properly. Behavior on its part
which does not conform to your predictions and which you find inexplicable in light of
the goals and beliefs you’ve ascribed to the computer may well lead you to the
conclusion that the computer is malfunctioning.
34
the physical stance. Assuming that the computer does not utilize stochastic or pseudo-stochastic
functions, the practical impossibility Dennett posits for taking the design or physical stances implies that
you are stuck with imperfect predictive powers. Since one of the hallmarks of autonomous agents is
their resistance to perfect prediction, Dennett’s distinction between the design stance, the physical stance,
and the intentional stance provides us with a useful way of recasting Argument N:
O 1 If it is possible to take either the design stance or the physical stance
towards X, then X cannot act autonomously.
2 It is possible to take either the design stance or the physical stance towards
machines.
3 Machines cannot act autonomously. 1&2
Premise 0.1 is true even if X incorporates stochastic functions, since the unpredictability of
autonomous agents is of a different kind than the unpredictability derived from, say, flipping a coin.
Taking either the design stance or the physical stance allows one to determine whether X's behavior is
determined or stochastic and, if stochastic, its degree of probability. But autonomous agency is neither
determined nor stochastic; doing something for a reason is neither necessitated by causal circumstances
nor random whim. The autonomous agent's actions are se//-directed, which suggests a further argument
against autonomous machine agency.
P 1 If X can act autonomously, then it is possible for X’s actions to be
self-directed.
2 It is not possible for a machine’s actions to be self-directed.
3 No machine can act autonomously. 1&2
Argument P gets at the heart of the matter. What arguments N and O presuppose is that
machine behavior is determined by factors which have nothing to do with being self-directed. Such
determination precludes the possibility of autonomous agency.
2.4.4 The Look-Up Table Argument
Premise P.l depends on the hypothesis - to be justified in Chapter 4 - that to act autonomously
is to act in a self-directed manner. Why, then, is it not possible for a machine’s actions to be
self-directed? The simple answer is that in the case of machines, it is always possible, albeit often
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impractical, to take either the design or the physical stance towards them. To show why the design
stance or the physical stance deny the possibility of self-direction, I offer the Look-Up Table Argument.
What is a look-up table? Suppose I am teaching little Timmy how to tell time. Timmy knows
how to add and subtract, but he was taught that 1 + 12 = 13. The notion that 1 + 12=1 boggles his
mind. Living up to my academic standards, I explain to him the concept of modulo arithmetic. I tell
him that numbers need not go on forever. Sometimes, they make rings, especially if we throw away the
multiples of a number when we count. He's learned that 0 + 1 = 1, 1 + 1 = 2, 2 + 1 = 3, and so on,
forever. But that's only part of the story, I tell him. There's a special kind of addition called “modulo
addition”. To make a very small ring of numbers, I use addition modulo 3. 0+1 = 1 mod 3, 1 + 1 =
2 mod 3, but 2 + 1 = 0 mod 3, and 2 + 2=1 mod 3. I tell Timmy that Modulo addition makes
numbers circle back on themselves, just like an analog clock makes a circle with its hands. Timmy,
who just wanted to know when we would be going to the zoo, listens patiently as I explain to him that
the clocks we use to tell time are based on addition modulo 12 with no zero. Hence 1 + 12=1 mod
12, and 7+10=1+4 mod 12.
Timmy is dumbfounded, even after I give him a general definition of a commutative ring.
Frustrated, I write out the following table for him:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3 4 5
4 5 6
5 6 7
6 7 8
7 8 9
8 9 10
9 10 11
10 11 12
11 12 1
12 1 2
1 2 3
2 3 4
3 4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
8 9
9 10
10 11
11 12
12 1
1 2
2 3
3 4
4 5
5 6
6 7
7 8
9 10 11 12
10 11 12 1
11 12 1 2
12 1 2 3
12 3 4
2 3 4 5
3 4 5 6
4 5 6 7
5 6 7 8
6 7 8 9
7 8 9 10
8 9 10 11
9 10 11 12
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Then, if it’s 10 and I tell him that we'll be going to the zoo in four hours, he can look up “10" in the
left-most column, 4 in the top row, find their intersection and, without having to learn modulo
arithmetic, learn that we will be leaving for the zoo at 2 - yes, poor Timmy.
The table I gave Timmy is called a look-up table by computer scientists. The value of a look-
up table is that in some cases it speeds up the task of determining the value of a function. Functions
can either be programmed in as algorithms, as when I tried to teach Timmy modulo arithmetic, or they
can programmed in as look-up tables. Algorithms have the advantage of generality with the liability of
speed. Look-up tables have the advantage of speed at the expense of generality.
So far I have focused on numerical functions. But it is also possible to conceive of behavioral
functions. A robot might have a repertoire of behaviors associated with various stimuli. It might move
back two feet and turn left ninety degrees if it ‘sees’ a wall. Or it might move towards a yellow ball,
but not a blue ball. Like numerical functions, behavioral functions can be programmed in as algorithms
or as look-up tables. Moreover, if a behavioral function is programmed in as an algorithm, it can
usefully be represented as a look-up table, (and vice versa, although that case in unimportant for this
argument.) To represent a behavioral (unction as a look-up table, simply list relevant stimuli along one
or more - in cases where conditional behaviors are to be represented - axes of a table, and write down
behaviors in the intersections. Then, to find out what a behavior will be, locate the current stimulus (or
stimuli) on the axis (or axes) and, bingo, you’ve got the resulting behavior. Note that a look-up table
need not be two-dimensional; n-dimensional look-up tables offer the possibility of extraordinarily
complicated stimulus/behavior relationships.
According to the Look-Up Table Argument, behavior cannot be autonomous if it can be
represented by a look-up table, since the look-up table allows for perfect determination of behavior. Yet
it is always possible to represent machine behaviors using a look-up table, since machine behavior must
be programmed in the first place. Hence machines cannot act autonomously.
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Q 1 If X's behavioral characteristics can be represented by a look-up table, thenX cannot act autonomously.
2 Every machines' behavioral characteristics can be represented by a look-up
table.
3 No machine can act autonomously. j o
-
The Look-Up Table Argument gives an example of a feature of machines to show just how the design
stance, in particular, excludes the possibility of self-directed machine behavior. Other features such as
algorithms and nested IF-THEN logic structures could be used to construct analogous arguments. The
point is the same in each case: the machine's behavior is not self-directed because it is determined by
characteristics extraneous to itself.
2.4.5 Malcolm's Argument
Malcolm (1982) presents an important argument against the possibility of autonomous machine
agency which departs somewhat from the line we have been pursuing. Malcolm begins by explaining
what he means by “mechanism”.
By mechanism I am going to understand a special application of physical
determinism namely, to all organisms with neurological systems, including
human beings. The version of mechanism I wish to study assumes a
neurophysiological theory which is adequate to explain and predict all
movements of human bodies except those caused by outside forces. The
human body is assumed to be as complete a causal system as is a gasoline
engine. Neurological states and processes are conceived to be correlated by
general laws with the mechanisms that produce movements. Chemical and
electrical changes in the nervous tissue of the body are assumed to cause
muscle contractions, which in turn cause movements such as blinking,
breathing, and puckering of the lips, as well as movements of fingers, limbs,
and head. Such movements are sometimes produced by forces (pushes and
pulls) applied externally to the body. If someone forced my arm up over my
head, the theory could not explain that movement of my arm. But it could
explain any movement not due to an external push or pull. It could explain,
and predict, the movements that occur when a person signals a taxi, plays
chess, writes an essay, or walks to the store, (p. 127)
Mechanism is a species of physical determinism: mechanism is physical determinism as it
applies to organisms with neurological systems. Such an organism is mechanistic if there exists a
neurophysiological theory that both explains and predicts all movements of the system’s body, except
those due to external forces, on the basis of information about neurological states and processes and the
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general laws correlating states to physical movements. Presumably, these general laws are causal laws,
and the neurophysiological system is a complicated causal system.
Next, Malcolm distinguishes between Neurophysiological Explanations (NE's) and Purposive
Explanations (PE s). Using Malcolm's example (1982, p. 129), suppose we want an explanation for why
a man climbed a ladder up to a roof-top. As it turns out, the man's hat was blown up onto the roof by a
gust of wind, and he wanted it back. A PE of the man's behavior might be:
If a man wants to retrieve his hat and believes this requires him to climb a ladder, he will
do so provided there are no countervailing factors.
This man wanted to retrieve his hat and believed that this required him to climb a ladder,
and there were no countervailing factors.
Therefore, he climbed a ladder, (p. 129)
In general, PE's differ in form from NE's. NE's are of the form,
Whenever an organism of structure S is in neurophysiological state q it will emit
movement m.
Organism O of structure S was in neurophysiological state q.
Therefore, O emitted m. (p. 129)
while PE's have the form,
Whenever an organism O has goal G and believes that behaviour B is required to bring
about G, O will emit B.
O had G and believed B was required of G.
Therefore, 0 emitted B. (p. 129)
The most important difference between PE's and NE's lies in their first premise. The first
premise of the NE expresses a contingent correlation between neurological processes and behaviour,
whereas the first premise of the PE expresses an a priori connection between intentions and behavior.
As Malcolm puts it,
Premisses of the one sort express contingent correlations between neurological
processes and behaviour. Premisses of the other sort express a priori
connections between intentions (purposes, desires, goals) and behaviour.
This difference is of the utmost importance. Some students of behaviour
have believed that purposive explanations of behaviour will be found to be
less basic than the explanations that will arise from a future
neurophysiological theory. They think that the principles of purposive
explanation will turn out to be dependent on the neurophysiological laws. On
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this view our ordinary explanations of behaviour will often be true: but the
neural explanations will also be true and they will be more fundamental. Thus
we could, theoretically, by-pass explanations of behaviour in terms of purpose,
and the day might come when they simply fall into disuse, (p. 131)
Contrary to these “students of behavior”, Malcolm argues that neurophysiological theory will
not be found to be more basic than purposive explanation. His argument is given in a single, somewhat
dense paragraph:
I wish to show that neurophysiological laws could not be more basic than
purposive principles. I shall understand the statement that a law L2 is more
basic than a law LI to mean that LI is dependent on L2 but L2 is not
dependent on LI. To give an example, let us suppose there is a uniform
connection between food abstinence and hunger: that is, going without food
for n hours always results in hunger. This is LI. Another law L2 is discovered
namely, a uniform connection between a certain chemical condition of body
tissue (called cell-starvation) and hunger. Whenever cell-starvation occurs,
hunger results. It is also discovered that L2 is more basic than LI. This would
amount to the following fact: food abstinence for n hours will not result in
hunger unless cell-starvation occurs; and if the latter occurs, hunger will result
regardless of whether food abstinence occurs. Thus the LI regularity is
contingently dependent on the L2 regularity, and the converse is not true. Our
knowledge of this dependency would reveal to us the conditions under which
the LI regularity would no longer hold.
Our comparison of the differing logical natures of purposive principles
and neurophysiological laws enables us to see that the former cannot be
dependent on the latter. The a priori connection between intention or purpose
and behaviour cannot fail to hold. It cannot be contingently dependent on any
contingent regularity. The neurophysiological explanations of behaviour could
not, in the sense explained, turn out to be more basic than our everyday
purposive explanations, (pp. 131-132.)
Unpacking Malcolm's argument requires a brief foray into modal analysis. Malcolm claims that
if a purposive law (PL) is true, then it is necessarily true. The PL
If a man wants to retrieve his hat and believes this requires him to climb a ladder, he will
do so provided there are no countervailing factors.
is true a priori. That is to say, the a priori connection between intention or purpose and behaviour
“cannot fail to hold,” which is just to say that the PL is necessarily true if it is true at all.
But if a neurophysiological law (NL) is true, then it is contingently true. This may seem odd,
since physical laws are usually taken to involve some sort of necessity. The point of claiming that
instances of
Whenever an organism of structure S is in neurophysiological state q it will emit
movement m,
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if true, are contingently true is just to assert that it is possible for an organism of structure S to be in
neurophysiological state q and not emit movement m.
The usual (semantic) analysis of modal claims like the one above is done in terms of possible
worlds. A proposition is necessarily true if it is true at every possible world, while a proposition is
possibly true if it is true at some possible world. Physical laws, like those embodied by instances of the
NL schema above, are necessary in the sense that they are true at the actual world and they are true at
every world which has the same underlying physics as the actual world. Since there are possible worlds
which differ in their physics from the actual world, instances of the NL schema are not necessarily true.
Natural laws are physically necessary, or true at every possible world in a proper subset of all possible
worlds, but they aren’t logically necessary - i.e., true at every possible world.
According to Malcolm, a true NL could not be more basic than a true PL since there are
possible worlds at which the PL is true but the NL is not. Spelling the argument out, we have,
R 1 If NL can be more basic than PL, then PL is dependent on NL and NL is
not dependent on PL.
2 If PL is dependent on NL and NL is not dependent on PL, then it is not
possible for PL to be true and NL to not be true, but it is possible for NL
to be true and PL to not be true.
3 If it is not possible for PL to be true and NL to not be true, then NL is
necessarily true if PL is necessarily true.
4 NL is not necessarily true and PL is necessarily true.
5 NL could not be more basic than PL. 1,2,3&4
Pausing for a moment, what does all this have to do with different explanations of behavior?
Suppose there is an NE of the man's ladder climbing behavior. If Argument R is sound, it follows that
the ladder-climbing man could be climbing the ladder without having any intention to do so provided
that he was in the neurophysiological state indicated in the NE. Indeed, regardless of his intentions, if
the NE of his behavior is true and NL's are not more basic than PL's, then his ladder-climbing behavior
occurs regardless of what a PE might say. In this sense, his goals, intentions, beliefs, and desires are
irrelevant to his subsequent ladder-climbing behaviors. But a PE assumes exactly the opposite; a PE is
based on the relevance of the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions to his, her, or its behaviors. Hence
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a (true) NE for a given behavior excludes the possibility of a PE, given that NL's could not be more
basic than PL's. As Malcolm puts it, “a mechanistic explanation of behaviour rules out any explanation
of it in terms of the agent’s intentions. If a comprehensive neurophysiological theory is true, then
people’s intentions never are causal factors in behaviour.” (p. 142) The argument is more easily
followed once it has been set-out:
S 1 If it is not possible for NL’s to be more basic than PL's, then it is not
possible for a NE and a PE to be true of the same behavior.
2 It is not possible for NL's to be more basic than PL's.
3 It is not possible for a NE and a PE to be true of the same behavior. 1&2
What has Argument S got to do with machine autonomy? Naively, autonomous behavior is
self-directed behavior. A true explanation of autonomous behavior, then, necessarily involves reference
to the agent's goals, intentions, beliefs, and desires, among other things. At least in the case of
autonomous behavior, the agent s goals, intentions, beliefs, and desires could never be irrelevant. NE's
are thus incompatible with autonomous behavior in the sense that a behavior is autonomous only if there
exists a PE of it, and NE's are incompatible with PE's if Argument S is sound.
The implication for machine autonomy is obvious, particularly when one notes that the
equivalent of a NE can be given for every machine behavior. But since behavior cannot be autonomous
if it is possible to give the equivalent of an NE for it, machines cannot act autonomously. The argument
can be set out as follows.
T 1 If X is a machine behavior, then the equivalent of a NE can be given for X.
2 If the equivalent of a NE can be given for X, then X cannot be an
autonomous behavior.
3 If X is a machine behavior, then X cannot be an autonomous behavior. 1&2
I should note that Argument T is not, strictly speaking, the point of Malcolm's argument (Argument S).
Rather, the conclusion of T is a corollary of S, but it is not one for which Malcolm explicitly argued.
That said, T stands with S, but does it fall with S?
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2.4.5. 1 A Criticism of Malcolm's Argument
Dennett (1982) believes he can show that Malcolm's Argument (Argument S) is unsound. It is
instructive to see why Dennett's criticism does not, ultimately, succeed against Argument T, even if it
does succeed against Argument S, in part because it explains why so much turns on autonomy.
Dennett correctly casts Malcolm's Argument as an argument for a certain kind of
mcompatibilism. Traditionally, incompatibilists have based their claim that free will and determinism
are incompatible on the thought that determinism implies a necessity with respect to action that excludes
the possibility of free choice. Traditional incompatibilism, then, derives from a kind of modal worry. If
the universe really is such that all events are necessitated by prior events, then there is no room in the
universe for free action: following Watson (1982, p. 12), call this modal incompatibilism. Malcolm,
however, has shown that modal incompatibilism is irrelevant in light of what Watson (1982, p. 12) calls
explanatory incompatibilism. Modal incompatibilism may be true or false. Regardless, free will - and
moral responsibility with it - are impossible if certain kinds of explanations are true of actions. In
particular, if a mechanistic explanation (what Malcolm calls an NE) is true of a given action, then there
is no sense in which the agent performing the action did so freely, and there is no sense in which the
agent can be held accountable or morally responsible for the action. Explanatory incompatibilism is
more worrisome than modal incompatibilism because a mechanistic explanation can involve reference to
both stochastic and strictly deterministic processes. As Dennett puts it,
In the eyes of many philosophers the old question of whether determinism (or
indeterminism) is incompatible with moral responsibility has been superseded
by the hypothesis that mechanism may well be. This is a prior and more
vexing threat to the notion of responsibility, for mechanism is here to stay,
unlike determinism and its denial, which go in and out of fashion. The
mechanistic style of explanation, which works so well for electrons, motors,
and galaxies, has already been successfully carried deep into man s body and
brain, and the open question now is not whether mechanistic explanation of
human motion is possible, but just whether it will ultimately have crucial gaps
of randomness (like the indeterminists' mechanistic explanation of electrons)
or not (like the mechanistic explanation of macroscopic systems such as
motors and billiards tables). In either case the believer in responsibility has
problems, for it seems that whenever a particular bit of human motion can be
given an entirely mechanistic explanation with or without the invocation of
random interveners any non-mechanistic, rational purposive explanation of the
same motions is otiose. (1982, p. 150)
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But, Dennett argues, purposive explanations are never falsified solely by the existence of a true
mechanistic explanation, whether the mechanistic explanation is stochastic, deterministic, or both. To
make his case that purposive explanations are compatible with mechanistic explanations, Dennett
introduces the aforementioned distinction between the design stance, the physical stance, and the
intentional stance. An intentional system according to Dennett is any system towards which it is
sensible to adopt the intentional stance. To borrow Dennett's example, it is certainly possible to adopt
either the design or the physical stance with respect to a chess-playing computer. But given human
limitations, it is simply not feasible to do so in the course of playing a game against such a machine.
One is left with adopting the intentional stance towards the machine: treating it as if it had beliefs about
better and worse moves and the desire to win. The chess-player will not always be able to predict the
machine’s next move, but his chances are greatly improved if he assumes that the machine has all these
mental properties. Thus, for pragmatic reasons the player adopts the intentional stance. It follows for
Dennett that the machine is an intentional system, because successful prediction of the machine's
behavior requires the presupposition of the machine's rationality.
Reason, not regard, is what sets off the Intentional from the mechanistic; we
do not just reason about what Intentional systems will do, we reason about
how they will reason. And so it is that our predictions of what an Intentional
system will do are formed on the basis of what would be reasonable (for
anyone) to do under the circumstances, rather than on what a wealth of
experience with this system or similar systems might inductively suggest the
system will do. It is the absence from the mechanistic stances of this
presupposition of rationality that gives rise to the widespread feeling that there
is an antagonism between predictions or explanations from these different
stances. The feeling ought to be dissipated at least in part by noting that the
absence ofa presupposition of rationality is not the same as a presupposition
of non-rationality. (1982, p. 160. Italics mine.)
Dennett's point may, perhaps, be put a little more strongly: a mechanistic explanation assumes
nothing about the rationality of the behavior that is the object of explanation. But assuming nothing
about the rationality of the behavior is not, as Dennett correctly points out, equivalent to assuming that
the behavior is non-rational. Thus it is possible for a mechanistic explanation and a purposive
explanation to be true of the same behavior. It follows that Premise S.l,
If it is not possible for NL's to be more basic than PL's, then it is not possible for a NE
and a PE to be true of the same behavior.
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is false, since an NE and a PE can be true of the same behavior even if it's not possible for NL’s to be
more basic than PL's. So perhaps Malcolm's Argument is, after all, unsound.
2-4.5.2 Why Argument T Might Still be Sound
Does it follow from Dennett's criticisms that Argument T, the corollary to Malcolm's argument,
is likewise unsound? I think not, and here is why.
The existence of a mechanistic explanation of a given agent's behavior does not imply that the
behavior is non-rational, but it does imply that the agent was not autonomous when performing the
behavior. To see why this is so, it is helpful to consider Bok's (1998) reasons for finding fault with
compatibilist arguments like Dennett's. True, an action can be explained as the result of mechanism and
be perfectly rational. But mechanism, Bok argues, divorces the agent from his or her action:
Mechanism holds that our deliberation and choices are as fully determined as
other natural events, and that they can be explained in the same terms. When
we are tied up, our trajectories through space-time are determined by coarse
and obvious means; when we are not, external events determine them by
causing us to want to achieve one end rather than another or to follow one
line of reasoning while leaving others unexplored by dictating the entire
course of our deliberation, thereby determining what we will choose, (p. 18)
An agent’s action may very well be rational, but if the action is explicable in mechanistic terms,
then the agent’s choices and deliberations were as determined as the subsequent action. Note that
‘deliberation' and ‘choice' are odd locutions to use in this context, since the agent's mental processes
follow a path as determinate as that of a satellite around the Earth. Thus, “mechanism's particular threat
to the idea that we are free and responsible beings stems from its implication that we are caused to want
what we want, and to choose what we choose. As far as these [compatibilist] arguments are concerned,
mechanism is an entirely new kind of threat...” (Bok, 1998, p. 20) The upshot is that an agent's action
may be rational
,
but the action is no more up to the agent than, for instance, a muscular spasm which
causes the agent's hand to knock over a glass of milk would be. Indeed, it is precisely because the spilt
milk was not up to the agent that we refuse to hold the agent accountable or responsible. Casting the
issue in terms of responsibility makes it all the clearer why Dennett's criticism of Argument S fails to
apply to Argument T.
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Consider a computer program that was designed to respond to questions about
why it did something by offering explanations; that was self-correcting; and
that was designed to discover and remedy errors in response not only to
failure but to criticism. (“BAD PROGRAM!” we type, and-because it was
designed to respond to this input-it searches for faults and, if it finds some,
corrects them.) While such a program might be able to explain why it does
what it does, we do not think it genuinely answerable for its conduct; and
while criticism might be an effective form of behavior modification for such a
program, praise and blame do not seem to be truly appropriate to it in the
same sense in which they are appropriate to persons.
One way of explaining why we do not take such a program to be either
answerable or an appropriate object of moral criticism is that computer
programs are written by people. Its programmer completely determined what
shape the program took, and its quality depends entirely on her skill (or lack
thereof). For that reason we praise or blame the programmer, not the program
itself, for whatever flaws or merits it might contain, whether or not it was
designed to correct itself in response to criticism. But if mechanism is true, it
is not clear why precisely the same reasoning should not serve to excuse the
programmer. She, after all, was also caused to have certain “design flaws”;
given those flaws, she can no more avoid writing atrocious code than her
program can avoid losing game after game of chess. Both could have avoided
their failures had they spotted their errors in time and corrected them; but
things, and in particular their “programs,” being as they were, neither could
have met this condition. (Bok, 1988, pp. 34-35)
If Bok is correct, it is possible to grant Dennett's criticism of Argument S while denying that
his criticism shows us anything about Argument T. The possibility of a mechanistic explanation of an
agent's behavior precludes the possibility of the agent's autonomy even though the agent's behaviors may
be rational, which suggests that Argument T can be revised as follows:
U 1 If it is possible to give mechanistic explanations for X's behavior, then X
cannot act autonomously.
2 It is possible to give mechanistic explanations for machines' behavior.
3 No machine can act autonomously. 1&2
It seems that we have come full circle. Argument U is clearly a generalization on Argument Q. Q, the
Look-Up Table Argument, showed that the possibility of a certain kind of mechanistic explanation, a
look-up table, precludes the possibility of autonomous agency. Argument U goes further in claiming
that any kind of mechanistic explanation precludes the possibility of autonomous agency.
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2.5 A Concluding Remark
Argument U caps off a series of arguments which together make the Skeptic's case against
machine autonomy. To be sure, one can not help but think of responses to these arguments in studying
them. Yet it must be granted that the Skeptic's case against autonomous machine agency is substantial
when measured by either weight or number of argument. To meet the Skeptic's challenge, we must
answer two all-important questions which have been hovering in the background:
• What is autonomous agency?
and
• What are machines?
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CHAPTER 3
AGENCY
3.1 The Many Senses of ‘Action’
What is it to be an agent? The simplest answer identifies an agent with an actor in the broad
sense of someone or something having the capacity to act: x is an agent iff x has the capacity to act.
But just what is it to have the capacity to act? To answer this question, we have to understand what it
is to act.
To be sure, there are many senses of ‘action’. For example, climatologists speak of the action
of El Nino on global weather patterns; geologists speak of the action of heat and compression on the
formation of rocks; oceanographers speak of the action of the Moon on tidal patterns; astronomers speak
of the action of the Andromeda Galaxy on the trajectory of the Milky Way galaxy. For the natural
sciences, at least, ‘action’ is used to talk about both stochastic and deterministic causal processes.
Yet while the Andromeda Galaxy, the Moon, heat and compression, and El Nino are certainly
causal agents, they are not the kind of agent that reflects on, deliberates about, chooses, decides upon, or
intends its actions. There is a third sense of ‘action’ distinct from random and determined causal
agency. Human agents, for instance, are causal agents, but they are not merely causal agents. That is,
human agents are neither random, chaotic actors nor mere cogs in causal chains. We see ourselves as
more or less rationally deliberating about our alternatives and acting accordingly in a way that would be
absurd to attribute to the Moon. We act with a purpose: we intend to bring about desired outcomes. It
makes no sense to argue that El Nino brings about an increase in hurricane activity because it wants to,
unless one prefers looking at the world through superstitious eyes.
What is it to be more than a mere causal agent? I answer this question by developing a theory
of action that specifies the extension of ‘action’ in such a way as to distinguish what we might call its
interesting sense from its merely causal - stochastic or deterministic - senses.
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3.2 A Game of Billiards t
To help motivate the theory, consider a clear of example of an action in the interesting sense.
I find myself, during a game of billiards, in an extremely difficult situation. My opponent has
skillfully left the cue ball behind the 8-ball:
Unfortunately, I must pocket the red ball and then the purple ball. There are not many options. I could
try to bounce the cue ball off the left board and send the red ball into the lower right pocket. Or I
could try to bounce the cue ball off the board behind the purple ball, but that's not a very good idea
since it would leave the cue ball some distance from the purple ball even if I managed to get the red
ball into the upper left pocket. A better option, perhaps, would be to try to use the blue ball to send the
red ball into the top side pocket. There’s no time limit, and my competitor is in no hurry, so I take my
time weighing the various alternatives. The alternative I finally choose requires that I bounce the cue
ball off the board, bounce it off the blue ball, and send the red ball into the side pocket while leaving
the cue ball to rest in a good position for a shot at purple:
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Having deliberated at some length about just what to do, I must now figure out just how to do
it. Note how carefully I must strike the cue ball; it must be on exactly the right vector— equivalently,
it must have just the right speed and direction— to glance off the board and strike the blue ball so as to
impart sufficient, but not too much, momentum at a precise angle for the blue ball to impart enough
momentum at the proper angle to the red ball to send the red ball into the side pocket. It's an
interesting exercise in physics which must be accomplished sans calculator. Relying on past experience,
I carefully think through the problem. Lining up the cue-stick, I give the cue ball a good whack and go
on to win the game.
3.3 Action Descriptions
The shot may be complicated, but the picture of agency it suggests is not. A series of events
occurs. If each arrow tip in the picture represents an event and we add the initial cue stick/cue ball
event, then we have a series of 5 events. Label them ‘El’, ‘E2\ ‘E3’, ‘E4\ ‘E5\ How should we
describe El - E5?
El = The cue stick's hitting the cue ball.
E2 = The cue ball's bouncing off the board.
E3 = The cue ball's hitting the blue ball.
E4 = The blue ball's hitting the red ball.
E5 = The red ball's dropping into the side pocket.
The problem is that this way of describing El - E5 appears to preclude my having anything to do with
the game. The apparent agent in each case is an object: the cue stick, the cue ball, the blue ball, etc.
My contribution is nowhere to be found, nor is there any room in these descriptions to give me my due
credit. To allow for my contributions, we must describe El - E5 differently.
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El = My hitting the cue ball with the cue stick.
E2 = My bouncing the cue ball off the board.
E3 = My hitting the blue ball with the cue ball.
E4 = My hitting the red ball with the blue ball.
E5 = My dropping the red ball into the side pocket.
Now I do receive proper credit. Bear in mind that our central question is whether or not El -
E5 are actions and, if they are actions, what is it that makes them so? Describing El - E5 as above
begs the question in favor of El - E5’s being actions.
The puzzle in a nutshell is that the first set of descriptions seems to preclude, while the second
set seems to presuppose, human agency. Is there a way of describing El - E5 that is neutral with
respect to agency?
El = The hitting of the cue ball with the cue stick.
E2 = The bouncing of the cue ball off the board.
E3 = The hitting of the blue ball with the cue ball.
E4 = The hitting of the red ball with the blue ball.
E5 = The dropping of the red ball into the side pocket.
At first glance this set of descriptions appears to be agent-neutral. But on closer inspection one sees
that descriptions like ‘the hitting of the cue ball with the cue stick' seems to presuppose the existence of
a human agent. After all, the natural question to ask about the hitting of the cue ball with the cue stick
is: Who hit the cue ball with the cue stick? The alternative
El = The hitting of the cue ball by the cue stick.
E2 = The bouncing of the cue ball off the board.
E3 = The hitting of the blue ball by the cue ball.
E4 = The hitting of the red ball by the blue ball.
E5 = The dropping of the red ball into the side pocket,
fares no better, since descriptions like ‘the hitting of the cue ball by the cue stick' appear to preclude the
existence of a human agent.
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I conclude that there is no agent-neutral way of describing El - E5. The ordinary language we
use to describe events commits us to either human or non-human agency, which is a considerable
quandry when the distinction between human and non-human agency is the object of investigation. To
handle the trouble, I will fail-back on the device of stipulation. Let us describe El - E5 as we did at
first,
El = The cue stick's hitting the cue ball.
E2 = The cue ball's bouncing off the board.
E3 = The cue ball's hitting the blue ball.
E4 = The blue ball's hitting the red ball.
E5 = The red ball's dropping into the side pocket,
and stipulate that such descriptions do not preclude human agency. Specifically, let El - E5 be
described as above and allow that, possibly,
The cue stick's hitting the cue ball = My hitting the cue ball with the cue stick.
The cue ball's bouncing off the board = My bouncing the cue ball off the board.
The cue ball's hitting the blue ball = My hitting the blue ball with the cue ball.
The blue ball's hitting the red ball = My hitting the red ball with the blue ball.
The red ball’s dropping into the side pocket = My dropping the red ball into the side pocket.
3.4 Why This Series of Events?
Having a way of describing events does not, however, answer all pertinent questions. Why, for
example, was I careful to introduce El - E5 as a series of events as opposed to the series of events? 1 It
might be argued, quite plausibly, that between each of the above events is a further event: between E3
and E4, for instance, is the moving of the blue ball towards the red ball. The goal of specifying the
series of events can never be met, since it is always possible to divide the time from El to E5 into finer
For that matter, what is an event? Suffice it to say that events are either ontologically
primitive or swiftly reducible to ontologically primitive entities, although the interested
reader is encouraged to go to Appendix A: Action Ontology for a more comprehensive
discussion.
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and finer segments such that each segment picks out a (possibly) distinct event. “The motion of the
blue ball towards the red ball” obscures a number of separate events: the motion through one millimeter,
a further millimeter, etc.
So why should we focus on this series of events— El -+ E2 _+ E3 — E4 - E5 as opposed
to another, more complicated series? El - E5 are the events that are most relevant to my deliberations.
Of course, it's also important that the cue stick and balls travel according to plan; known and substantial
irregularities in the surface of the table would have made consideration of intervening movings
important as well. But in plotting just how to strike the cue ball with my cue stick, my attention is
fixed on the series of subsequent collisions. There is an important lesson in this: to some extent, what
we count as an event is driven by our interests in deliberating about them. Notice that my opponent
may well be interested only in whether or not the red ball drops in the side pocket - she might see the
entire series as just one event.
3.5 Actions and Occurrences
However we individuate them, what is important about events is that they form a super-class of
actions, or so I assume. Moreover, the complement of the class of actions is non-empty; there are
events which are not also actions. Call these ‘occurrences'. What distinguishes an action from an
occurrence?
Suppose I had videotaped the sequence of events El - E5 from start to finish — i.e., from the
time 5 minutes or so prior to El when all the balls are stationary to the time just after E5 when all the
balls have come to rest. Yet all I showed you was the interval between E3 and E5. All you saw was
the blue ball moving towards the red ball, hitting it, and the red ball moving away from the blue. If all
you saw were just this segment, would you be justified in claiming that what you saw was an action?
Would you have, in other words, any reason for thinking that an agent was behind what you saw?
Certainly not. The movement of the blue ball could very well have been the result of some natural
force: an earthquake, say, or the impact of a hailstone. Of course, the fact that E4 occurs on a billiards
table might strongly suggest that it is an action on someone's part, since human agents are usually
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involved in events on billiard tables. But there is nothing obvious about E4 alone that would lead one
to believe that it is an action instead of an occurrence.
To find out whether E4 is an action or an occurrence, we have to see more of the videotape.
We have to establish E4’s causal history. Suppose we go to the end of the tape and then rewind; the
red ball pops out of the side pocket and apparently collides with the blue ball, the blue ball comes to a
rest after being struck by the cue ball which, all the while, was moving to intercept it, and the cue ball
rebounds off the board and appears to be sucked up by my cue-stick. Pause at precisely the point where
the cue ball abruptly stops moving with the cue-stick just touching it. Here we have the first sign that
anything other than random natural processes are responsible for the series of events: my hand is on the
cue-stick. Continue rewinding. I appear to jerk the cue-stick back away from the cue ball, as if the cue
ball is very, very hot. Pause.
With what we have seen so far about the causal history of E4, can we conclude that E4 is an
action? One might be inclined to say, “well, it's obvious since your hand was on the stick. The cue
stick didn’t move by itself. You moved it.” What the videotape crucially demonstrates is that El is
preceeded by another event: EO = My moving the cue stick.
But how do we know that I moved the stick? Clearly, I am holding it. Yet everything we've
seen so far of E4’s causal history is compatible with my having been bumped or my arm's having
moved as the result of an unusually strong nervous twitch. Of course, just from the evidence of the
videotape there is no way we can ever rule out a remarkable nervous twitch, but we can rule out my
having been bumped. Rewinding further, I am seen moving awkwardly backwards here and there, all
the while appearing to study the lay of the balls on the tabs. I wear a frown. I sometimes line up a
shot with my cue stick and sight down the stick. I stare at the table and tap my foot. I slowly chalk
my cue tip without looking at what I'm doing. Evidently, I am weighing alternatives, examining the
situation, and plotting out how best to strike the cue ball. Evidently, I am deliberating.
It is true that we can never know just on the basis of the videotape whether E4 is an occurrence
or an action, simply because we cannot rule out things like nervous twitches from observational
evidence. This is, however, a problem of epistemology, which I happily set aside since this chapter is
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not about epistemological problems. The nervous twitch problem is nonetheless instructive. It tells us
that there is an important distinction between my moving the cue stick and my arm's moving the cue
stick. For E4 to be an action, it must be the case that / move the cue stick. My arm's moving the cue
stick alone implies nothing about E4. It follows that, in terms of agency, what is important is hidden
within EO.
3.6 Deliberation - The Source of Agency
In order to move the cue stick I must grip it firmly and move my arm at the same time. But if
I am to move my arm, neural impulses have to travel a short distance from the cerebellum and the basal
ganglia down the spinal column to cause, at precisely the right times and in precisely the right
sequences, my shoulder, tricep, bicep, and forearm muscles to contract and relax. The nervous twitch
problem could still reappear, perhaps as the result of some cerebellar malfunction. So it must be the
case that the functioning of the motor control brain structures is the result of functioning of other parts
of the brain. The cortex, perhaps, sends appropriate signals down the pons to the cerebellum. Yet
clearly those signals might be the result of malfunction on the part of the cortex. At best, all we can
say is that the signaling has to happen in the right way from the right sources, which is not especially
informative.
On the other hand, the brain somehow underwrites the mind, and we do have convenient
mental terms for explaining E4’s history. I deliberated at some length about how best to sink the red
ball while leaving the cue ball in a good position for the next shot. In the process of deliberating I
employed the resources of experience both past and present. My deliberations led me to grip the cue
stick, move it, and strike the cue ball with the cue-tip so as to cause E2, E3, E4, and E5 in just that
order and in just the way described. My moving the cue stick just so is the consequence of my
deliberations. It is not the case that I merely moved the cue stick; I deliberately moved the cue stick.
My deliberately moving the cue stick presupposes that I deliberated about how best to move the
cue stick. I moved the cue stick simply because the deliberations which make it true that I deliberately
moved the cue stick were mine: the fact that these were my deliberations, founded in my beliefs and
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desires, makes this an act of mine. I am the agent responsible for dropping the red ball into the side
pocket because I deliberately moved the cue stick in such a way as to cause the red ball to land in the
side pocket as a result of the sequence,
E0-+E1 -> E2 - E3 - E4 - E5
3.7 A Causal Digression
What exactly does represent? The short and uninformative answer is that it denotes the
causal relation. So far I’ve been talking quite liberally about E5’s causal history and events causing one
another, but I haven’t offered even the slimmest of an account of causation.
There have been various attempts to provide a reductive account of causation. (Sosa and
Tooley, 1993) None have succeeded. So apart from some commonplace statements such as
An event c is the cause of an event e if, had c not occurred, e would not have
occurred,
and
Singular causal statements are instances of true nomological (lawlike) generalizations,
there is little I can add. Accordingly, I will take the causal relation as a primitive notion in this and the
remaining chapters. Whether or not this dodge is satisfactory, it turns out that little hangs on the nature
of the causal relation if one’s interest is in a theory of action, in part because actions may or may not be
related causally. Suppose, for instance, that driving my old Chevy truck one day I find that my turn
signals are inoperative and I need to signal a right turn. I quickly roll down the window, stick my arm
out, and raise my arm in an ‘L’. Now, it seems true to say that by raising my hand I signal my turn,
given the context and given conventions about hand signaling directions. Yet it seems false to say that
my arm-raising caused my signalling; intuitively, the event of my arm-raising is the same event as my
signalling. In formulating a theory of action, then, one must look for a relation between actions which
is sufficiently general to obtain both when the actions are causally related and when they are not. The
'is a consequence of is an example of one such relation, although it is not the relation I finally settle on.
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3.8 Formulating a Recursive Theory of Action
Return to my billiards game. The inclusion of EO suggests that E5 is an action because it, like
all actions, has just the right sort of history— a history, in particular, which can be traced back to my
deliberations
. The picture of agency suggested by the billiards example is straightforward:
An event is an action if it is the consequence of an agent's deliberation.
Of course, this is extremely rough as it stands. Overlooking the problem of spelling out what it is to be
a consequence of an agent s deliberation, it is hopelessly circular, since actions are specified in terms of
agents, while agents, according to the introductory paragraph, are given in terms of actions.
Nonetheless, the circularity can be removed by taking care in formulating the theory.
The solution I adopt to the problem of circularity takes the form of a non-reductive, recursive
theory of action. Consider an analogy. A theory of numbers is wanted that will allow us to do all the
things we ordinarily do with numbers but that will allow us to separate out the class of numbers from
the super-class of abstract objects. One way to do this would be to say that an abstract object is a
number if it is the result of an operation on a number. Like the statement that an event is an action if it
is the consequence of an agent's deliberation, this is circular.
There are two solutions open to number theorists: look for more primitive abstract objects to
which numbers can be explicitly reduced, or give a recursive theory of numbers by first holding that
some abstract object is a number, and then supposing that another abstract object is a number if it
derives in some way from the original abstract number. In particular, number theorists give a recursive
theory of numbers by first asserting what is known as the base clause:
0 is a number.
The next step is to build up the class of numbers recursively with a second axiom — the so-called
inductive clause:
If x is a number, then x' is a number.
Thus O' is a number, as is 0" and O'". 2
Read: “Thus, the successor of 0 is a number, as is the successor of the successor of 0
and the successor of the successor of the successor of 0.”
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Recursive number theory is non-reductive in the sense that it is never explained precisely what
a number is. The theory never states that x is a number iff where a proposition not containing
'number' fills in the blank. ‘Number’ is taken as a primitive in the theory, as is the successor operation
denoted by A reductive theory, on the other hand, seeks to replace numbers with more fundamental
abstract objects. The usual move in the case of number theory is to define numbers in terms of sets, so
that number theory is essentially traded in for the more abstract and much more powerful set theory. 3
That is not to say that recursive number theory is without merit; had set theory never developed,
mathematicians would get along almost as well with number theory.
3.8. 1 The Base Clause
Optimism about current developments in neurophysiological theory notwithstanding, I know of
no analogy to set theory for action theory: there is no super-theory currently available which can
subsume a theory of action. Until one becomes available, it seems that our only alternative is a
recursive (non-reductive) theory of action. Taking a cue from recursive number theory, let us assert as
our base clause the axiom that, for any physical system A, at any time (interval) t, and such that a verb
substitutes for ‘u’,
A's deliberately u-ing at t is an action. 4
Just as the ‘seed’ for numbers in number theory is 0, the seed for actions in action theory is a
deliberate doing. There is considerable intuitive appeal in this idea. Recall the videotape of the
billiards table. At no point in the process of rewinding do we have any evidence that E5 is an action
until we get to what precedes E0: my apparent deliberations about how to take the shot. Of course, my
deliberations are mostly a private matter, but it seems safe to infer them from observations of my
Realizing that reductive analyses must come to an end somewhere, it should come as
no surprise that set theory itself is based on a recursive account of sets. For instance,
the base clause might be “0 is a set”, and the inductive clause might be, “if x is a set,
then { x } is a set”.
‘Physical system' is used here as a neutral term encompassing organisms, on the one
hand, and machines on the other.
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behavior prior to El. Because of my apparent deliberations about whether and how to strike the cue
ball with the cue stick, we infer that EO is correctly described as my deliberately moving the cue stick.
Precisely what, one might ask, is the relationship between deliberating about doing something
and deliberately doing it? Is it the case that if one deliberately does something, then one must have
deliberated ? Is it conversely the case that, if one deliberates, then one must deliberately do something?
These are important questions— so important, in fact, that I devote a good portion of Chapter 5 to
answering them. Suffice it to say for now that deliberate actions must be backed by appropriate mental
antecedents. From the standpoint of watching the videotape, the upshot is that only after watching me
size up the situation and evidently consider various alternative shots are we willing to grant that EO is a
deliberate action and, thus, that E5 is an action.
3.8.2 The Inductive Clause
How should we build the class of actions from the seed of deliberate action? In number
theory, the “successor of’ operation nicely builds up the class of (natural) numbers from 0. In a sense,
E6 is a successor of E5. But in what sense? Clearly, E5 causes E6. It may indeed be possible to use
the causal relation to build up the class of actions, but recall that not all actions are related as cause to
effect. A more general relation which will hold between actions like E5 and E6 and actions like arm-
raising and signalling is needed. Consider the following statements:
• I won the game by dropping the red ball into the side pocket.
• I dropped the red ball into the side pocket by hitting it with the blue ball.
• I hit the red ball with the blue ball by hitting the blue ball with the cue ball.
• I hit the blue ball with the cue ball by bouncing the cue ball off the board.
• I bounced the cue ball off the board by deliberately hitting it thus-and-so with the
cue stick.
Anyone viewing the videotape— in play mode, not rewind — will, I think, find that these statements
accurately describe what happens. The 'by' relation is well suited to building up the class of actions,
analogous to the way the ‘successor of operation is well suited to building up the class of numbers,
because it has an ordinary use in which actions are tracked back to their agents. Who killed the butler ?
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The maid did it by deliberately poisoning him! In its ordinary usage, the ‘by' relation is fortuitously
ambiguous with respect to causally related actions, as in the billiards example, and actions which, for
want of a better phrase, describe the same event, as in the signalling example. The relation is thus
ideally suited for use in an inductive clause.
However, developing an inductive clause using the ‘by’ relation turns out to be more
complicated than the number theory analogy would suggest. Suppose that verbs uniformly replace ‘u'
and V wherever they occur, and add a second time-interval, t*, which may or may not be identical to t.
It is tempting to propose that
If A's u-ing at t is an action, then A’s v-ing at t* is an action if A v's at t* by u-ing at
t.
So, for example, if we have it that the maid deliberately poisoned the butler, and we know that the maid
killed the butler by deliberately poisoning him, then we know that the maid is responsible for killing the
butler. Intuitively, the picture behind the base clause and this inductive clause is that actions initiate
with what the agent does deliberately and radiate via the ‘by' relation out from the agent. A series of
not-necessarily distinct events each related to the other by the ‘by' relation is a series of actions if we
trace the series back up the chain of 'by' relations and find that it is bolted to the agent's deliberations
via what the agent has done deliberately.
Unfortunately, this inductive clause only lets us work our way outwards, as from the maid's
poisoning of the butler to her subsequent killing of the butler. Suppose the butler left an unlikely note
saying “The maid deliberately killed me!” Assuming what the note says is true, we know that the
maid’s killing of the butler was an action, and we know that the maid deliberately killed the butler by
poisoning him. We should be able to conclude on the basis of the inductive clause that the maid’s
poisoning of the butler was an action, but we can't. This inductive clause only catches half the actions
because it only allows us to trace agency from the left to the right of the ‘by’ relation. Correcting this
problem requires an amendment:
If A's u-ing at t is an action, then A's v-ing at t* is an action if either A v's at t* by u-
ing at t or A u's at t by v-ing at t*.
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The maid's deliberate killing of the butler is an action, and she deliberately killed him by poisoning, so
her poisoning of him is an action.
3.9 Recursive Action Theory
With the amended inductive clause it is possible to track agency out from the agent and back
towards the agent. Putting the inductive clause together with the base clause. Recursive Action Theory
(RAT) consists of the following three axioms:
Base Clause
Ax 1 : A's deliberately u-ing at t is an action.
Inductive Clause
Ax2. If [A s u-ing at t is an action, and either (A v-ed at t* by u-ing at t, or A u-ed at t by
v-ing at t*)], then A's v-ing at t* is an action.
Closure Clause
Ax3: Nothing else is an action. 5
To be sure, RAT looks imposing given the complexity of the inductive clause. Yet from the
standpoint of assessing theories generally, RAT is simple. Theoreticians strive to minimize the number
of primitive or unanalyzed concepts in their theories. Zermelo-Frankel (ZF) Set Theory, for example,
has just two primitives: the property of being a set and the relation denoted by ‘is an element of. RAT
has just three primitives: the property of being an action, the property of doing something deliberately,
and the ‘by' relation. The rest of Axl and Ax2 is mere logic.
To some extent, the way in which a theory's primitives are used in ordinary language contexts
lends the theory intuitive plausibility. We all have an idea of what a bag of marbles looks like; we
might even call it a set of marbles. We also know that the red marble in the bag is an element of the
set of marbles. Surely, ‘set' and ‘is an element of were chosen because they have some use in ordinary
contexts. But it is misleading to think that a bag of marbles bears any but the most crude resemblance
Just as number theory requires an axiom to the effect that nothing other than what is
specified here is a number, RAT requires an axiom, the closure clause, which ensures
that nothing failing to satisfy either the base or inductive clauses is an action.
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to a set. To really understand what a set is, one must abandon certain preconceived notions — for
example, that for something to be in a set it must be in the immediate vicinity of the rest of the things
in the set— and rely on the implications of the theory to flesh out the primitives. Unlike ZF Set
Theory, RAT is much more tied to the ordinary usage of its primitives since we as human agents are
intimately and daily familiar with its implications. A full understanding of RAT nonetheless requires
that one reflect on its implications for test cases.
3.9.1 RAT on Signalling
Consider first the arm-raising/signalling case. According to the story, my truck's turn signals
malfunctioned so I signalled a right turn by raising my arm out the window. We want to know whether
my signalling was an action. Leaving the times implied, the signalling is my action if, according to
Ax2, there was something I did such that, by doing it, I signalled. So if we know that
My arm-raising was an action,
and that
I signalled by raising my arm,
then RAT implies via Ax2 that the signalling was my action since, by hypothesis, we know that I
signalled by raising my arm.
But how do we know that my arm-raising was itself an action? Surely, I had a reason for
raising my arm. Given the story, I wanted to make a right turn, my turn signals were broken, and I
wanted to signal that I would shortly be turning. I have certain beliefs about conventions on hand-
signalling turns, and putting two and two together I stuck my arm out the window and raised it; my arm
raising was not the result of a nervous reflex. I deliberately raised my arm. By Axl and hypothesis,
we have it that
My deliberately raising my arm was an action.
So my signalling was an action since it follows from Ax2 and the fact that
I signalled by deliberately raising my arm.
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3.9.2 RAT on Stumbling
Essentially, RAT chases agency up or down a chain of by-related events to an event which is
an action. RAT fails to find agency if it fails to find an action in the chain. In particular, a chain
which does not contain a deliberate action will fail to be a chain of actions. Consider a case where an
agent u's, but his u-ing is not an action: While going to answer the door, my foot snags the edge of the
carpet and I stumble. Is my stumbling an action? It is if either I did it deliberately, or there is
something I did such that, by doing it, I stumbled, or by stumbling I do something else. Clearly, I did
not stumble deliberately, so Axl does not apply. Ax2 applies if there is something I did such that, by
doing it, I stumbled, or by stumbling I did something. Of course, there is no such thing in either case.
Notice that in the story I was careful to say that
My foot snags the edge of the carpet,
as opposed to saying that
I snagged my foot on the edge of the carpet.
The latter is ambiguous. Either I snagged my foot on purpose or I snagged it accidentally. Usually the
context of the statement decides which alternative obtains. But the former statement is unambiguous: it
was not I that snagged my foot, whether on purpose or accidentally; it was my foot that snagged the
carpet. As expected, there is nothing I did such that, by doing it, I stumbled.
Is there anything I did by stumbling? I might have hurt myself, but there is no action one can
point to such that I did it by stumbling. Looking up and down the chain of ‘by'-related events, RAT
sees no action, so my stumbling is itself not an action. This is trivial, of course, because there isn't
much of a chain of ‘by'-related events to speak of. Suppose, however, that it was not I who stumbled.
Rather, the story is about a physical comedian like Dick Van Dyke or Jerry Lewis stumbling in front of
an audience. Presumably, then, by stumbling the comedian made the audience laugh. Since making the
audience laugh is an action, the stumbling is an action.
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3.9.3 RAT on Billiards
For a final example of RAT's application, return to the billiards example. According to the
story, I set in motion a chain of causally related events,
El E2 — E3 — E4 -+ E5
In order to win the game, I must be the agent of E5. Equivalently, in order to show that it was I who
won the game, we must show that the dropping of the red ball into the side pocket is an action and that
it is my action. One could argue via Ax2 that E5 is my action by showing that
and
• My hitting the red ball with the blue ball was an action,
• I dropped the red ball into the side pocket by striking the red ball with the blue
ball.
But this would require in turn showing that
• My hitting the blue ball with the cue ball was an action,
• I hit the red ball with the blue ball by hitting the blue ball with the cue ball,
and so on back up the chain. This is tedious and time-consuming. Fortunately, there is a simpler
argument.
3.9.3. 1 Telescoping By-Histories
We have a series of events, EO - E5. What makes it a series? The numbering of the names is
suggestive, but artificial. For all we can tell from the list, at most we have a random set of events:
{EO, E5, E4, El, E3, E2}.
What orders the set and gives the naming convention some substance is the by-relation. For in addition
to being a causal chain,
EO —* E 1 —. E2 — E3 — E4 — E5
is also a chain of events related one to the other by the ‘by’ relation. Thus the sinking of the red ball in
the side pocket is by the striking of the red ball with the blue ball. Hence, E5 is by E4, while E4 is by
E3, etc. Schematically, we have the by-chain,
E5 by E4 by E3 by E2 by El by EO
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By-chains have an important property: they telescope. Note that the 'by' relation is transitive. If I made
the gravy by reducing the stock, and I reduced the stock by boiling it, then I made the gravy by boiling
the stock. Thus, with respect to the set of events in question, the by-relation is just
{<E0,EI>, <E1,E2>, <E2,E3>, <E3,E4>, <E4,E5>, <E0,E2>, <E0,E3>, <E0,E4>,
<E0,E5>, <E1,E3>, <E1,E4>, <E1,E5>, <E2,E4>, <E2,E5>, <E3,E5>},
which is all, set-theoretically speaking, a relation is anyway— i.e., a set of ordered pairs. But to get a
history of E5, say, we want to order the set of ordered pairs. Thus, a by-history of E5 is an ordered 6-
tuple:
<E0, El, E2, E3,E4, E5>
So as to make room for telescoping by-histories, let us say that a pathway in this case is any segment of
the 6-tuple:
<E1, E2, E3>, or
<E3, E4>
for example. Subtracting pathways, we get alternate by-histories:
<E0, E4, E5>, and
<E0, E2, E5>,
respectively. Thus, a by-history of an event is an n-tuple of events such that each event occurs by the
one to the left in the n-tuple, and a pathway is any segment of the n-tuple. As a limiting case, the
empty set is also a by-history.
3. 9. 3.2 The Transitivity Axiom
The upshot is that a harmless addition to RAT makes it much easier to apply the theory:
Transitivity Axiom
Ax4: If the v-ing at t* was by the u-ing at t, and the u-ing at t was by a w-ing at
t
A
,
then the v-ing at t* was by the w-ing at tA .
Using Ax4, it is possible to subtract the pathway <E1, E2, E3, E4> from the by-history <E0, El, E2,
E3, E4, E5> to get an alternate and substantially much less complicated by-history of E5: <E0, E5>.
Since my deliberately moving the cue stick is an action by appeal to Axl, and I dropped the red ball
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into the side pocked by deliberately moving the cue stick by hypothesis, it follows that the sinking of
the red ball into the side pocket was my action by Ax2.
3.10 A Defense of RAT
The ease with which RAT is applied to various examples is due in large part to RAT's
simplicity and its strong intuitive basis. Yet the fact that RAT has the right implications for these few
examples may very well be an artifact or accident of the examples themselves: in statistical terms, we
have an intolerably small sample size for concluding that RAT always has the right implications. And
while simplicity is generally thought to be a theoretical virtue, it can also mislead given the complexity
of agency. Moreover, intuitions vary and may in any case be mistaken. Is it possible to give a general
defense of RAT?
In what follows I construct a defense of RAT by responding to four criticisms of the theory.
Certainly there are other criticisms besides these four, but the responses given here are intended to also
serve as examples. So as to provide some intuitive basis for the criticisms, consider the following story.
I had never played tennis prior to being invited by Tim for an
afternoon of informal lessons at his exclusive country-club. It was a
long afternoon. A typical volley consisted of Tim lobbing a high,
easy shot my direction as I tried to aim the racket and time the
swing. With luck I would manage to get the ball back over the net,
whereupon Tim would race to intercept the ball and effortlessly sail
it back my way-almost straight to my racket. Tim is a great tennis-
player; he is not a great tennis-teacher. He couldn't explain how he
did it. He just, somehow, did it (he had, of course, been playing his
whole life.)
The disastrous afternoon was not complete, however, until a bird
for some reason dive-bombed me. Startled, I swung my racket at the
bird. For once the racket connected with something; the bird became
a projectile on a trajectory into the nearest court, where, much to my
horror, it ricocheted off none other than Mick Jaggar and hit Keith
Richards square in the chest. (Yes, it seems I hit two Stones with
one bird.)
3.10.1 Intentional Actions
My swings could very well be described as deliberate, but not Tim s. He knows how to play
tennis and can play it well. His swings are apparently too rapid for him to have put in much thought.
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But it is true that he hits the ball with the intention of landing it near me. It is clear that he is hitting
the ball intentionally
,
but it is not clear that he is hitting the ball deliberately. Yet if he’s not hitting the
ball deliberately, then his hitting is not an action according to RAT. Surely, though, it is an action.
Although I have put off a full discussion of the relationship between deliberately doing
something and deliberating, it is still fair to wonder why RAT’s base clause depends on deliberate
action. There is, after all, a tradition in the philosophical literature of supposing that the distinction
between action and occurrence is to be found in the agent’s intentions. According to Davidson, “a man
is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional.”
(Davidson, 1980c, p. 46) As Baker puts it, “[a]n action is either something done intentionally (in the
sense that the agent means to do it, or does not do it by accident), or something done by doing
something else intentionally.”6 (Baker, 2000)
What is it to act intentionally? Mele (1992, p. 200) offers what he calls 'proto-analyses'. Any
fully developed theory of intention must capture one or the other of the following proto-analyses.
Al: S intentionally A-ed iff S A-ed in the way that S intended to A.
A2: S intentionally A-ed iff S A-ed for a reason.
If Mele is right, then every deliberate action is an intentional action, since deliberation at the very least
involves deciding whether and how to perform an action. Hence the converse must fail for this
criticism to have merit, such that not every intentional action is a deliberation action. Put another way,
this criticism requires that the class of intentional actions be a proper super-class of the class of
deliberate actions.
Indeed, since anything an agent does intentionally is certainly something the agent does, why
not follow Baker (2000) and take as our base clause,
A's intentionally u-ing at t is an action?
Baker (2000) can be read as constructing and defending a recursive theory of action
which, if explicitly formulated, takes as its Base Clause
A’s intentionally u-ing at t is an action.
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One response might be to assert that every intentional action is a deliberate action, perhaps by adding an
axiom.
A intentionally u's at t iff A deliberately u's at t.
The reasons for adopting the base clause,
A's deliberately u-ing at t is an action
would then be mostly pragmatic. But there is a problem with this response: I suspect that the proposed
axiom is false. It seems that there are intentional actions which are not also deliberate actions. Tim's
hitting the tennis ball is, perhaps, an example. In any case, one should avoid dismissing criticisms
axiomatically unless it is clear that an additional axiom really is needed and can be well-justified on
independent grounds. The proposed axiom is unnecessary machinery at this stage, even if it were true.
What gives this criticism its force? Imagine a by-history of events that nowhere includes a
deliberate action. RAT concludes that these events are not actions; they are mere occurrences. But
suppose the by-history does include an intentional action. Then surely these are not mere occurrences.
So RAT fails to count as actions what are actions after all. If it were true, this would be devastating
criticism for RAT. In response, it suffices to show that if a by-history includes an intentional action,
then it must include a deliberate action as well.
Suppose that intentional action is analyzed along the lines of the first proto-analysis. An
agent's action is intentional just in case it was performed in the way the agent intended. Let us say that
an action is performed in the way intended if it has a by-history which the agent anticipated. For
example, Tim intentionally lands the ball in my immediate vicinity because of a strong, sure hit and
good aim on his part. But if the ball landed in my vicinity by first glancing off the net and then
bouncing off one of the posts, then it would not be the case that he intentionally landed the ball in my
vicinity because the landing would not have the by-history he anticipated.
If an action is intentional because it has a by-history that the agent anticipated, then the action
is also deliberate since it presupposes that the agent put in sufficient thought to have anticipated a by-
history. Tim's intentionally landing the ball in my immediate vicinity is a deliberate action, since it
must be the case on this view of intentional action that he plotted out what might be called a by-future
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tor his landing the ball near me. It turns out that a by-history containing an intentional action must
contain a deliberate action, since the intentional action will in every case itself be a deliberate action.
What about the second proto-analysis? An agent intentionally does something if he has a
reason for doing it. Tim intentionally returns the ball so as to land it near me. But if that is the case,
then it is also true that Tim deliberately lands the ball near me. And if it is proposed that, no, Tim did
not deliberately land the ball near me so much as he intentionally landed the ball near me, then, since
Tim's reason for doing so was to make it easier for me to hit the ball, Tim deliberately made it easier
for me to hit the ball. The second proto-analysis, unlike the first, appears to allow for intentional
actions which are not also deliberate. But since there must be a reason for the agent's intentional action
on this view, and since a reason presumably involves a desire on the agent's part, then the satisfaction of
that desire will always count as a deliberate action in the by-history of the intentional action.
No matter which proto-analysis is adopted, the criticism is answered by pointing out that there
are no by-histories of actions which include intentional actions but do not include deliberate actions.
RAT does not mistake actions for mere occurrences. Yet if intentional and deliberate actions are so
connected in by-histories as my reply requires, why not follow philosophical trends and take as RAT's
base clause the axiom that o's intentionally u-ing at t is an action? What justifies RAT's deviation from
the philosophical norm? Put simply, the answer is that a deliberate action, as opposed to an intentional
action, is, first, more clearly the agent's action, and, second, it is more clearly the agent's action. An
explanation is in order.
The first reason for preferring deliberate action over intentional action looks ahead somewhat.
There is a theme, explored in Chapter 4, which holds that an agent is autonomous when the agent is
self-governed or self-ruled. One way of understanding this point is to emphasize that an agent’s actions
must be the agent's if the agent is to have any chance of being autonomous. Intentional action does not
suffice, since an agent's intentions may or may not be its own. But an agent’s deliberations are always
its own. It is better, then, to begin a theory of autonomous agency with deliberate action than with
intentional action.
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The second reason for preferring deliberate action over intentional action is that doing so allows
us to handle some hard cases with ease. For example, Davidson (1980d, p. 79) invites us to consider a
precarious situation: A mountain climber’s unbidden and momentary desire to release the awkward and
dangerous hold he has on another climber together with his belief that, by doing so, he might thereby
save himself, unnerves him and causes him to let go unintentionally.
The climber wants to save his own life, and he believes that he has a chance of saving his own
life by releasing his grip. And in fact he does release his grip. So his releasing his grip appears to be
an intentional action. But is releasing his grip an action on his part? A by-history of the event might
go something like this: The climber released his grip by becoming unnerved, and by releasing his grip,
he saved his life. The releasing of his grip is an action if his saving his life is an action. But clearly he
did not deliberately save his life by releasing his grip, so we cannot yet conclude that his saving his life
was an action. Looking back up this by-history, all we have is his becoming unnerved. But becoming
unnerved is not itself an action since it is neither deliberate nor is it by-related to a deliberate action.
By hypothesis, any by-history of the grip-releasing will have to initiate in his becoming unnerved.
Hence, his releasing his grip was not an action, so he did not intend to save his life by releasing his
grip-
In cases like that of the mountain-climber, adopting deliberate action for RAT's base clause
pays-off where intentional action does not because it is clear when an event involving an agent is the
agent’s action. The reason for RAT's success in this case can only because its Base Clause uncovers the
roots of agency better than its intentional counterpart.
While I grant that the class of deliberate actions may well be a proper subset of the class of
intentional actions, there is every reason to think that RAT and its intentional version (see Baker, 2000
for an example) recursively specify the same class of actions. Yet my preference for RAT is not a
matter of whim. RAT better accomplishes those things theories set out to do: it has greater explanatory
power, and it points us straight to the underlying elements of agency.
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3.10.2 Reactive Actions
I could not have deliberately hit the bird since I did not have the time to do so. But I did hit
the bird. It was my action. Keith and Mick are justifiably upset with me.
This criticism is like the first since, if it is sound, RAT fails to count many actions as actions.
The problem here is much more serious than the problem of intentional action, since there are many,
many things we do which we do quickly and without hesitation or thought, yet they are our actions
nonetheless.
It may be that this criticism trades on a kind of confusion. There is a common use for
“deliberate” as an adjective for actions which describes how an action was performed. The gunfighter
deliberately took off his gloves. The detective deliberately lit a cigarette. To be sure, it was not my
idea in proposing Axl that something be an action if it is done slowly or meaningfully. If the criticism
is to be taken seriously, it should not be taken to imply that my hitting the bird was not an action since
I did not hit it slowly or with enough meaning. The point of the criticism must be that a great many of
our actions are reactive in the sense that we do not deliberate before doing them: we just do them.
Tennis is a fast moving game, as evidenced by the rapid to and fro motion of spectators' heads.
Let's put some numbers to it. Tennis ball speeds in a professional match may exceed 120 miles per
hour. A regulation tennis court is 78 feet long. Suppose, optimistically, that I can manage a serve of
half the speed of a professional. Thus, my serve will travel from my racket to the far end of the court
in approximately .9 seconds. By tennis standards, this is slow. But Tim is under his own constraints.
Neurons take a full millisecond to generate and transmit a signal. Anything more complicated than the
firing of a single neuron requires much more time, as follows, (adapted from Ballard, 1997, p. 18)
Approximate Minimum Time Activity Example
1 ms Neuron Spike
10 ms Neural Circuit
50 ms Neural Act Noticing a stimulus
300 ms Physical Act Moving arms, moving eyes
2 sec Simple Task Saying a sentence
10 sec Complex Task A move in speed chess
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These time scales place strict limits on what a human agent can do. Tim, for instance, has no
time to utter this very sentence from the time the ball leaves my racket to the time he must act. But he
does have, thanks to my slow serve, about three times as much time as is required for him to take a
swing. It may seem like a lot, but say “one-hippopotamus” aloud to get a feel for the amount of time
available to Tim. Most of Tim's time is taken up getting into an intercept-and-swing position. In other
words, even with my slow serve, Tim has precious little time to devote to plotting out a strategy for
where and how to return the tennis ball. The criticism is that Tim simply doesn't have time to spend
deliberately moving into position and deliberately swinging his racket, because he doesn't have time to
deliberate about moving into position and swinging his racket. Hence his landing the ball is not an
action according to RAT.
Before answering the criticism, I note that there is a substantial adaptive advantage in
performing tasks efficiently. The human brain must be, and in fact is, composed in such a way that
certain tasks are spun off to automatic control systems so that the agent doesn’t have to devote precious
time to consciously performing those tasks. Tim's physical motions are one example. Having played
tennis since childhood, Tim has developed a comprehensive repertoire of motions which are done with
an intention
,
but are not themselves deliberate. Learned responses take over and translate the directives
of deliberation into appropriate movements so that Tim's attention is directly about hitting the ball. Not
having developed any such learned responses, I am at a distinct disadvantage. Chances are I would end
up just standing there dumbfounded if Tim were to send a full-speed, 100+ mile per hour serve my way.
Accordingly, not everything a human agent does is done deliberately, including bodily
movements. But it is also important to point out that there is a 250 millisecond gap between the time
Tim notices the ball coming towards him and the time he swings his racket. What happens during this
250 milliseconds? Since Tim deliberately lands the ball near me, it must be the case that during this
250 milliseconds he is putting together just how best to land the ball near me. Deliberation about how
best to land the ball near me takes very little time, particularly in the case of an experienced player like
Tim. Indeed, the advantage of having experience at tasks such as tennis is both an improvement in
one's learned physical responses and an improvement in ones' ability to make choices quickly.
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Of course, there is a limit on the speed at which a human agent can be correctly said to have
deliberated. Since a neuron spike requires a millisecond, human deliberation may be quick, but it
cannot be too quick. Consider a man who touches a hot stove he thinks is cold and jerks his hand
away. 7 Surely the man deliberately jerked his hand away. He touches the stove, realizes that it is hot,
and, given the alternatives of being burnt or not, quickly moves his hand back. In fact, the interval
from the moment the man touches the hot stove to his hand's movement is too short for the neural
signal to have propagated up the arm to the spinal chord. The man did not, in this case, move his hand.
Rather, his arm moved itself. Our limbs are ‘hard-wired’ for this sort of reaction, for obvious reasons.
Despite the man's protestations, he did not act to save himself from being burnt. His arm did. Despite
his own perceptions after the fact, the man s arm movement was not his action, any more than my leg's
movement upon being thwacked with a rubber mallet just below the knee-cap is my action.
Deliberation can be quick; often all the elements necessary for deliberation - all the relevant beliefs,
desires, and inferences — are there ‘to be had', as it were. But constraints on human neural response
time place constraints on just how quickly deliberation can take place.
Ultimately the criticism depends on what we mean by “reactive actions”. If what we mean by
“reactive actions” are bodily movements which the agent did not have time to direct, then we are pre-
theoretically disinclined to think that they are actions, and RAT concurs. On the other hand, if we mean
by “reactive actions” those actions the agent performed with the intention of doing something further,
then there is no problem since such actions need not be deliberate; what is done further will be.
3.10.3 Basic Actions
Is it possible that I could have deliberately hit the Stones with the bird, or must it be the case,
as RAT seems to suggest, that only my physical motions can be deliberate? This is certainly a question
Keith and Mick will want to take up with me. The criticism is that there are certainly things I do
deliberately which are far removed from my vicinity. Such distal actions are to be contrasted with
proximal actions like those involving bodily movements. RAT appears to require, in its search for
7
I am grateful to Rod Grupen for this example.
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deliberate actions, that actions be tracked through their by-histories back up to a proximal action, thus
requiring that there always be a proximal action which is deliberate in a by-history of actions.
The problem may be an artifact of my examples. The billiards example, for instance, is
described in such a way that what is deliberate is my moving the cue stick. The thought, then, is that
the only things I can do deliberately are my bodily movements. This seems to suggest that actions can
be divided into two kinds: bodily movements, and the consequences of bodily movements. Perhaps that
is a reasonable distinction to draw, but it is not a useful distinction for my purposes. Nor is it the case
that RAT presupposes such a distinction. As we have just seen in the course of discussing reactive
actions, it is certainly possible that I deliberately hit the Stones by hitting the bird with my racket in just
the way that it is possible for Tim to deliberately land the ball near me by hitting it well. Bear in mind
that RAT's inductive clause allows one to look up and down a by-history for a deliberate action.
3.10.4 Subsidiary Actions
It is true that I deliberately swing my racket as best as I am able. But is it also true that I
deliberately flex and relax the various muscles necessary to deliberately swing the racket? If Tim
deliberately runs to intercept a return, does he deliberately take the first step? the second? the last? It
would be absurd if RAT required that every action preceding a deliberate action in a given by-history
also be deliberate. Fortunately, RAT has no such implication. RAT allows for the possibility that there
may be actions which are done so as to do something deliberately, but the actions themselves need not
be deliberate.
For example, I know how to type on the QWERTY keyboard layout. I type a sentence, this
very sentence, that once uses and once mentions the word ‘that'. Twice over I pressed the t, h, a, and t
keys to complete the sentence. Having been trained on the QWERTY keyboard, I do not pay attention
to which fingers are doing what. Indeed, to know what is happening, I must slow down and watch my
own fingers typing ‘that' to know that my left index finger hits the t key, my right index finger hits the
h key, my left pinky finger hits the a key, and my left index finger hits the t key once again in very
rapid succession. So far as I am concerned, I deliberately type “that”, and I just do so without any
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further thought. Indeed, if the instruction to type ‘that’ is sent down the pipe, as it were, incorrectly,
then I have the odd sensation of watching my fingers typing ‘that’, while knowing that 'that' is not what
I want them to be typing at that moment.
Common lore - myth, perhaps - has it that the QWERTY keyboard was designed specifically
to slow typists down so as to avoid jamming clunky mechanical typewriters. Jamming simply isn’t an
issue with a computer, since a computer's speed in interpreting the keyboard and performing relevant
functions exceeds my response time by many orders of magnitude. In fact, I have often been told that I
should convert to the Dvorak keyboard mapping. The Dvorak keyboard mapping is intended to
maximize efficiency of finger movement. But I hesitate to change to the Dvorak keyboard. Not
because it is difficult to re-map the keyboard: a single command issued on my computer would do the
job. Rather, I would confront a learning curve which by some accounts takes many months. Moreover,
the net gain in speed is reported to be slight. It may not justify the time spent on the learning curve,
since at first I would have to deliberately move each finger to type ‘that’, which would slow down my
typing enormously. The real virtue of habit or doing repetitive tasks automatically is speed. In any
case, the upshot is that subsidiary actions are not a special problem for RAT, since RAT makes room
for actions which are actions insofar as they are included in a by-history of actions.
Thus far I have been engaged in a general defense of RAT by defusing several criticisms. In
the next chapter I set the stage for RAT’s transformation into a theory of autonomous agency.
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CHAPTER 4
AUTONOMY
4.1 A First Stab at Autonomy
What has an agent achieved with autonomy? Consider Mele’s introductory comments:
It is commonly held that personal autonomy encompasses self-
control, and the two topics are quite naturally treated together. The
root notion of autonomy (from autos and nomos) is self-rule (or self-
government) and self-control. Of course, whether the common view
about their relationship is correct depends on what self-control and
personal autonomy are.
The terms 'self-control' and ‘autonomy’ are used in a variety of
senses in the literature. To avoid confusion, some guidance should
be offered at the outset about my employment of these terms in this
book. I understand self-control as, roughly, the contrary of akrasia
(want of self-control, incontinence, weakness of will). By autonomy,
taking etymology seriously, I mean, again roughly, self-rule or self-
government. (1995, p. 3)
I confess that I am confused, and being told that self-control is the contrary of want of self-control does
not help much. Mele goes on to say that
Autonomy, as I understand it, is associated with a family of freedom-
concepts: free will, free choice, free action, and the like. In some of
the philosophical literature that I will examine, the discussion is
framed in terms of freedom rather than autonomy; but we are talking
about the same thing, or at least aspects of the same thing. (1995, p.
4)
I remain lost, although in all fairness I must mention that Mele's comments are introductory in
nature and thus can be expected to be somewhat sketchy. One might nonetheless hope for something
more specific on the concept. Unfortunately, I find that Mele's comments are typical of much of the
philosophical literature on autonomy. Nods are made in the direction of etymology and ‘family’ terms,
but little or no attempt is made to provide either a rigorous analysis of autonomy or a theory of
autonomy. 1
Note that in this and the previous chapter I am careful to distinguish between an
analysis and a theory. An explanation is in order. Where others use ‘reductive
analysis', I use ‘analysis', mostly because I have no idea what a non-reductive analysis
might look like. At a minimum, an analysis provides necessary and sufficient
conditions. For example, current attempts at an analysis of causation seek to give
necessary and sufficient conditions on A's causing B - i.e., A causes B if, and only if,
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Simply put, the lack of an account of autonomy suggests that there is little philosophical
agreement on the concept of autonomy. The phrase ‘the concept of autonomy’ may be a mistake at the
outset; there appear to be distinct, competing philosophical conceptions of autonomy. Dworkin, (1988)
who has done as much as anyone to get a handle on the concept of autonomy, concurs: “It is... apparent
that the term is used in very different ways by different authors. It is not at all clear that they are all
referring to the same concept, nor that they should be given that they are dealing with very different
issues... About the only features held constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a feature
of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.” (p. 6)
Although I do not think Dworkin's account of autonomy is ultimately successful, it is a sterling
example of an attempt to get a coherent philosophical conception of autonomy, so that is where I begin.
4.2 Jack and Jill
I have, as a matter of fact, two students who smoke tobacco cigarettes - call them ‘Jack’ and
‘Jill
. Jack and Jill are both nineteen, and they both began smoking at the age of thirteen. Jill likes to
smoke. She relishes the taste and finds smoking to be very relaxing. She knows that there are
numerous health risks; she has admitted as much in conversation. But she has no desire to quit.
Unlike Jill, Jack has tried every way he knows to quit: nicotine gum, nicotine patch, hypnosis,
etc. He says that he wants to quit and says so in such a way that one has no doubt he really does want
to quit. Yet everyday after class I see the two of them chatting and smoking on the front steps of the
hall.
S, where S is a set of conditions. The conditions themselves might be further
analyzed, but an analysis cannot, of course, go on forever without being circular. At
some point, bedrock concepts which are not themselves further analyzable must be
employed. A theory attempts to give a systematic treatment of such concepts.
Perhaps the clearest examples come from mathematics. Set Theory is a theory of sets,
but it does not analyze the property of being a set. Indeed, Set Theory takes both the
property of being a set and the membership relation to be primitives - read
“unanalyzed”. But Set Theory includes analyses of, for instance, set unions and
intersections. (With respect to unions, e is an element of sets A and B if, and only if,
either e is an element of A or e is an element of B.) A theory builds up a complicated
structure from very few primitive concepts and numerous analyses of more complex
concepts in terms of the primitives.
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Jack and Jill differ greatly in their attitudes. Jack is conflicted with respect to smoking,
whereas Jill is not, in the sense that Jack has competing desires. On the one hand he really does want
to quit smoking, but on the other hand he evidently really does want that after-class cigarette. One
might, of course, argue that the difference between Jack and Jill is more than altitudinal. Jack is clearly
addicted, while Jill is not clearly addicted. Even so, focusing on addiction in this context misses the
point of the example. Let us suppose that Jack and Jill are equally addicted to nicotine. Their desire to
smoke, then, is a compulsion. The difference between Jack and Jill with respect to smoking, then, lies
solely in their differing attitudes towards their compulsion. To be glib, Jill is a happy addict, and Jack
is an unhappy addict. Both Jack and Jill have the desire to smoke in equal measure, but Jill's preference
is to have the desire to smoke, while Jack's preference is to not have the desire to smoke.
The distinction between Jack and Jill's attitudes about smoking suggests, following Frankfurt
(1971), that we must distinguish between first-order and second-order desires. A first-order desire is a
preference to perform one action as opposed to another - smoke, for example, versus not. A second-
order desire is a preference for a first-order desire over another - the desire to smoke versus the desire
to not smoke, for instance.
What makes the example of Jack and Jill so interesting is that it is not the case that Jack has
conflicting desires given the distinction between first and second-order desires. That is to say, it is not
the case that Jack has conflicting first-order desires in the sense that he would like to smoke and he
would like to water-ski, but he can't presently do both. Jack's trouble is that he has a first-order desire
to smoke that he prefers not having. How is it possible to have a desire one doesn't desire? Put this
way, it seems patently paradoxical. But the answer should be obvious: Jack's second-order desire to not
want to smoke is his desire, while his first-order desire to smoke is not his desire. It is instead a desire
imposed upon him by his addiction to nicotine. Jill's first-order desire to smoke is likewise imposed
upon her by her addiction, but Jill effectively accepts the desire as her own by not having any second-
order desires to the contrary.
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4.3 Dworkin's Account of Autonomy: Autonomy as Self-Rule
Dworkin grounds an account of autonomy in the distinction between first and second-order
desires, but he begins roughly where Mele does:
What I believe is the central idea that underlies the concept of
autonomy is indicated by the etymology of the term: autos (self) and
nomos (rule or law). The term was first applied to the Greek city
state. A city had autonomia when its citizens made their own laws,
as opposed to being under the control of some conquering power.
There is then a natural extension to persons as being autonomous
when their decisions and actions are their own; when they are self-
determining. (1988, pp. 12-13)
From this we learn that Dworkin s goal is an account of the autonomous agent
,
as opposed to
autonomous agency. Autonomy, for Dworkin, is the capacity of (specifically) human agents to be self-
determining. The puzzle is to explain just how a human agent has the capacity for self-determination.
Dworkin's strategy, then, is to find an account of autonomy in an account of the capacity for self-
determination.
To understand Dworkin's account of the capacity for self-determination, let us consider an
account that is initially plausible yet clearly false. An agent has the capacity for self-determination, we
might say, provided that it is the source of all its beliefs and desires. 2 None of its beliefs or desires are
in the slightest bit derived from or influenced by the beliefs and desires of others. The agent is isolated
so far as its attitudes are concerned. Its beliefs are all derived from its own senses or its own
inferences. The agent's desires result solely from the its own reflections on its type and context. It has
the capacity for self-determination precisely because all the attitudes relevant to action are derived from
itself. We can be sure of such an agent that it is the author of its own actions precisely because it alone
is the author of its actions. On this view, self-determination is established by something like the process
of elimination. There is no one else determining or influencing the agent's attitudes, so any attitudes it
has are generated by itself. The agent is self-determining because its attitudes have just such a history.
Let us call this the ‘self-generation’ account of self-determination.
So as not to prejudice the case for autonomous agency against machines, I henceforth
employ ‘it’ instead of the more specific and awkward ‘he or she'. To ‘racism', ‘sexism',
and ‘speciesism', perhaps we should add ‘machinism'?
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However plausible, the self-generation account of self-determination is false, as shown by the
example of Jack and Jill. Neither Jack nor Jill are themselves the source of their desire to smoke. The
source of the desire in each case is their addiction to nicotine. Yet where Jack is dismayed by his
desire to smoke, Jill is delighted by hers. Jill is self-determining insofar as she condones and happily
accepts her desire to smoke. Were Jill not addicted, she would doubtless continue smoking; the source
of Jill s desire to smoke is therefore irrelevant to her self-determination. Self-generation is neither
sufficient nor necessary for self-determination.
Apparently, what the agent does with its attitudes once it has them is more important than
where it got them. Taking this lesson to heart, Dworkin proposes that an agent has the capacity for
self-determination when its first-order desires are subject to critical review by its second-order desires
and its beliefs about the first-order desires.
[AJutonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to
reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes,
and so forth and the capacity to accept or change these in light of
higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity,
persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their
lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are. (1988,
P- 20)
That explains why autonomy is a good thing to have, but it is a rather loose account of autonomy.
Getting it into something approaching analytic normal form is not easy. Since Dworkin is interested in
giving an account of autonomy as a capacity of human agents, the account should begin with
x is an autonomous human agent iff
.
How should we fill in the blank?
It seems that Dworkin is not giving necessary and sufficient conditions on being an autonomous
(human) agent. His claim is that “autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons”,
which sounds much more like the start of a definition. To give a definition is not to give a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, although such conditions can sometimes be derived from a
definition. We have to fill in a different blank first:
autonomy =df .
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On the surface, Dworkin s definition takes autonomy to be the conjunct of two capacities.
Autonomy is “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences,
desires, wishes, and so forth” and “the capacity to accept or change these in light of higher order
preferences and values.” However, it is not at all clear that these capacities can be conjoined in quite
the way Dworkin has it. I have the capacity to walk and the capacity to chew gum, and I certainly have
the capacity to walk and chew gum at the same time. But is this a new capacity? Or is it just two
distinct capacities coincidentally exercised? I suppose intuitions will vary, but in this case it makes no
difference. The capacity to accept or change first-order desires in light of second-order desires is surely
no different than the capacity to “reflect critically” upon first-order desires, assuming that critical
reflection is done according to second-order desires and critical reflection encompasses acceptance or
change. My suggestion is simply that we treat the second conjunct as an elucidation of the first and
take Dworkin's conception of autonomy as a singular capacity.
Dworkin's definition simplifies to the identification of autonomy with the capacity to employ
second-order desires to critically accept or change first-order desires. That is,
autonomy =df the capacity to critically accept or change first-order desires on the
basis of second-order desires.
Loosely, an agent's autonomy is nothing more than the agent's capacity to either accept or reject first-
order desires in accordance with its second-order desires.
It is tempting to go immediately to examples. One wants to say that Jack, for instance, is not
autonomous since he does not have the capacity to change his desire to smoke, even though he very
much does not want to have the desire to smoke. Jill, however, fully accepts her desire to smoke. Of
course, Jill is addicted, so she could not change her desire to smoke. Yet Dworkin's definition is stated
as a disjunction: either critically accept or change. Jill is autonomous since she accepts her desire to
smoke, despite the fact that she could not change her desire to smoke.
However tempting examples may be, the fact is that we only have a definition; we do not have
necessary and sufficient conditions. The application of a concept, even in light of a definition, is
suspect in the absence of necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, Dworkin is careful to
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emphasize that autonomy is a capacity or ability. He does not say that an agent must employ the ability
to be autonomous. Of course, Dworkin does claim that “[b]y exercising such a capacity, persons define
their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person”,
which suggests that he has in mind the actual use of the capacity as one of the conditions for autonomy.
Nonetheless, the definition alone does not settle the matter.
Nor does the definition alone settle the question of whether an autonomous agent must have the
capacity to critically accept and, if not accept, then change its first-order desires. If so, then Jill is not
autonomous, because were she to reject her desire to smoke she would have no ability to change her
desire. On this matter, Dworkin states that
The idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or reflective
notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter one's
preferences and to make them effective in one's actions and, indeed,
to make them effective because one has reflected upon them and
adopted them as one's own. (1988, p. 17) [italics mine]
The ‘as well' is striking, because it suggests that what Dworkin has in mind is not the disjunction stated
in his definition: “the capacity to accept or change these in light of higher-order preferences and
values.” Instead, the agent must have the capacity to critically accept and, if not accept, then change
first-order desires according to second-order desires.
I would be happy if that were the end of the story, but Dworkin also says, in defense of the
distinction between first and second-order desires, that
We need to distinguish not only between the person who is coerced
and the person who acts, say, to obtain pleasure, but also between
two agents who are coerced. One resents being motivated in this
fashion, would not choose to enter situations in which threats are
present. The other welcomes being motivated in this fashion,
chooses (even pays) to be threatened. A similar contrast holds
between two patients, one of whom is deceived by his doctor against
his will and the other who has requested that his doctor lie to him if
cancer is ever diagnosed. Our normative and conceptual theories
would be deficient if the distinction between levels were not drawn.
(1988, p. 19)
Is Jill autonomous or not? The above passage seems to suggest that she is, while the previous
passage suggests that she is not. Let us set this issue aside and return to the original problem, must the
agent exercise the ability that makes for autonomy in order to be autonomous?
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If we think of the process of reflection and identification [critical
acceptance] as being a conscious, fully articulated, and explicit
process, then it will appear that it is mainly professors of philosophy
who exercise autonomy and that those who are less educated, or who
by nature or upbringing less reflective, are not, or not as fully,
autonomous individuals. But a farmer living in an isolated
community, with a minimal education, may without being aware of it
be conducting his life in ways which indicate that he has shaped and
molded his life according to reflective procedures. This will be
shown not by what he says about his thoughts, but in what he tries to
change in his life, what he criticizes about others, the satisfaction he
manifests (or fails to) in his work, family, and community. (1988, p.
Implicit in the example of the farmer is the thesis that an agent is autonomous only if it actually
exercises the capacity to critically evaluate and, where need be, reject first-order desires according to
second-order desires. Hence the autonomous agent is so in virtue of coordinating its first-order desires
with its second-order desires (assuming that Jill is not autonomous in answer to the problem we just set
aside.) Set out, we have it that
x is an autonomous human agent iff x coordinates its first-order desires with its
second-order desires.
Naturally, this account is severely under-determined by the definition and textual evidence. But it is at
least as consistent with the definition and the text as any other version, so I take this to be Dworkin's
account of autonomy.
4.3.1 Autonomous Agents or Autonomous Agency?
In responding to a criticism, Dworkin touches on a fairly important distinction without noting
its importance. The criticism is quite simple: how can the act of critically evaluating and accepting or
rejecting first-order desires on the basis of second-order desires be autonomous, since if it were, we
would be launched into an infinite regress? Dworkin puts it better as a dilemma:
Either these acts are themselves autonomous (in which case we have
to go to a higher-order reflection to determine this, and since this
process can be repeated an infinite regress threatens) or they are not
autonomous, in which case why is a first-order motivation evaluated
by a nonautonomous process itself autonomous. (1988, p. 19)
Dworkin's response is not to defuse the dilemma by showing that one horn or the other is not
really as problematic as it appears. Instead, Dworkin tries to sidestep the dilemma altogether. “My
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response to this objection is that I am not trying to analyze the notion of autonomous acts, but of what
it means to be an autonomous person, to have a certain capacity and exercise it.” (pp. 19 -20).
Ignore Dworkin's solution for a moment; the distinction to be noted is that between autonomous
agents and autonomous actions. Is it that the agent is autonomous, and the agent’s actions are
derivatively autonomous? Or is it that the agent's actions are autonomous, and the agent is autonomous
relative to its actions? I think this is a fair and proper question to ask of Dworkin. Consider that what
we have taken to be Dworkin’s account of autonomy is missing at least one quantifier: does the
autonomous agent always, usually, often, or sometimes coordinate first-order desires with second-order
desires? Put another (not necessarily equivalent) way, are all, most, or some of the agent's first-order
desires coordinated with its second-order desires?
These questions are not mere logical loose-ends. Suppose Dworkin's position is that only
agents who always coordinate their first-order desires with their second-order desires in such a way that
all their first-order desires are coordinated with their second-order desires are autonomous. Then an
agent with but one uncoordinated first-order desire - i.e., the agent has one first-order desire which has
not been critically evaluated and either accepted or, if not accepted, then rejected - will not be
autonomous. Surely this is absurd, and the explanation for why it is absurd is straightforward.
Autonomy is normally thought to be a necessary condition on accountability. That is, we would
normally refrain from praising or blaming an agent we knew was not autonomous. So if I have just one
uncoordinated first-order desire, then I cannot, on Dworkin's view, be praised or blamed for any of my
actions, since I am not autonomous.
If we allow an autonomous agent to have less than perfectly coordinated first-order desires, as
it seems we must, then Dworkin will be unable to sidestep the dilemma. For in this case the best we
can say is that the agent is autonomous relative to a subset of their first-order desires. In particular, the
agent is autonomous insofar as its operative (first-order) desires at a given time have been critically
accepted on the basis of second-order desires. But desires are operative only in the sense that they play
a role in determining the agent’s present course of action. Hence the agent is autonomous relative to a
given action. To say that an agent is autonomous relative to a given action is, however, just to say that
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the autonomy of agency is fundamental to the autonomy of agents. Conversely, an agent's autonomy is
derivative of the autonomy of its actions. Trying to sidestep the dilemma by claiming to give an
account of agent autonomy, as opposed to an account of the autonomy of actions, is illicit since a
satisfactory account of agent autonomy presupposes an account of the autonomy of actions.3 The
possibility of an infinite regress will assuredly arise; it is a problem Dworkin cannot simply dodge.
4.3.2 A Few More Nails in the Coffin
I don't see how Dworkin's account can escape the Infinite Regress Dilemma he himself has so
effectively posed. Yet even if he can pull a rabbit out of the hat, there are two additional problems
which bury his account and which we will encounter in the course of developing an account of
autonomous agency.
The first problem is uncovered in considering the second horn of the Infinite Regress Dilemma.
How can an agent be autonomous if only its first-order desires are coordinated with its second-order
desires? It the agent’s second-order desires are beyond the scope of its critical evaluation, then what
difference does it make if its first-order desires are coordinated with its second-order desires? For
example, suppose that Janey has been indoctrinated from birth in the One True Corporate Way of The
Man. As a result of this indoctrination, she critically accepts all her indoctrinated desires to live her life
in a hell-hole of a corporate cubicle precisely because the lion's share of the indoctrination involved
manipulating her into having deep-seated desires to have desires to live her life in a corporate cubicle,
which is the key, of course, to any successful indoctrination. Dworkin's account implies that Janey is
autonomous in her job-seeking activities, but it is hard to see how this can be so, especially if one
Specifically, the autonomy of agency is fundamental to the autonomy of agents.
Autonomy is a property of actions, not agents. At best, “Joe is autonomous” is
elliptical for “Joe's action was autonomous”. I suspect that philosophers' insistence on
seeing autonomy as a property of agents is an artifact from its original use in moral
philosophy (but see Schneewind, 1998 for more on the traditional use of the
‘autonomy'.) After all, the property of being moral is taken to be a property of actions
and a property of persons. To the extent that autonomy is a necessary condition on
moral responsibility, perhaps autonomy too is a property of persons? Notice that we
do not make the same mistake with the property of being intentional. Only actions can
be intentional, never persons. To be sure, a person has intentions, but he or she is not
thereby intentional.
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compares Janey to a cult-member. Cult-members are ordinarily thought to need treatment
,
whereas the
cult-leader is the one held accountable. Suffice it to say that Janey needs treatment as well.
The second problem is, I think, much more serious. Put a (human) agent whose first-order
desires are perfectly coordinated with his second-order desires in a straight) acket, and suspend the agent
by his teet from the ceiling. According to Dworkin’s account of autonomy, the agent is autonomous.
Even if he were not autonomous prior to being hung up, his current state assures him lots of time to
reflect and bring his first-order desires in line with his second-order desires. Yet if anyone
(pretheoretically) lacks autonomy, it is this man. An account of autonomy which implies that a person
is more likely to be attain autonomy while in prison is absurd.
Although part of what this example shows is that the autonomy of an agent's actions is
fundamental to the agent’s autonomy, it also shows that the philosophical conception of autonomy as
self-rule or self-determination with which both Mele and Dworkin begin is seriously deficient. I can
psychologically rule myself perfectly well and still not enjoy the view from my prison cell. Critically
evaluating desires may be (and I think is) an aspect of autonomy, but there must be more to autonomy.
4.4 The Mathematical Conception of Autonomy
The philosophical conception of autonomy, which I shall call the Autonomy as Self-Rule
conception, has not panned out particularly well. It turns out that mathematicians also use the term
‘autonomy', but their conception of autonomy is importantly distinct from Autonomy as Self-Rule.
Taken alone, the mathematical conception of autonomy is about as bad off as the philosophical
conception. Yet in a curious twist, each conception supplies what the other is missing.
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4.4.1 The Plumb Bob
Many physical systems, when described mathematically, require finding a function which
satisfies an equation containing one or more derivatives of the unknown function.4 Mechanical (free)
vibration provides a reasonably intuitive example. Suppose that a plumb-bob is suspended from the
ceiling by an elastic spring. If I pull down on the bob and release, I expect it to bounce up and down
for a time, but not forever: air resistance to the bob gradually dampens the bob’s up-and-down
movement.
How far I pull down on the bob and the initial velocity of the up-springing bob, combined with
the drag of the air and the elasticity of the spring, have a lot (well, actually everything ) to do with how
the bob will bounce up and down over time. We could examine the relationship between initial
distance, velocity, and drag empirically. We could, for example, glue a pen to the side of the bob and
put a long, fairly wide strip of paper behind the bob with the pen just touching the paper. If we move
the strip ot paper at a constant velocity, say by rolling it off one roller onto another with a motor, the
pen puts a trace of the bob's movement on the paper which we can study.
Of course, the pen introduces a factor of friction on the paper, which unfortunately changes the
experiment itself. Since, wherever possible, we must not allow our observations to alter the conditions
of an experiment - we don't, in this case, want to alter the natural bobbing of the bob - we could
replace the paper with photographic paper and shine a bright light on the bob. As the strip of
photographic paper is exposed behind the bob, it’s shadow traces out something like Figure 4.1.
I must confess that I find mathematical exegesis challenging. Modern mathematics is
an imposing body of knowledge which not every reader may be assumed to have
mastered. Mathematicians typically employ ‘autonomy' at some distance from the
foundation: to have a firm grasp of the concept, one must have a sufficient background
in differential equations, which in turn requires a background in real analysis. Either a
full account is given which would run into the hundreds of pages, or an altogether
unsatisfactory sketch is given. I take the latter option. For a fuller account, begin
with a textbook on Pre-Calculus algebra, then move on to a textbook on Calculus
which includes both differential and integral calculus. Follow Calculus up with an
introductory text on Differential Equations. Finally, take up the study of Control
Theory (sometimes called The Theory of Optimal Control). For this discussion of
Control Theory, I will be relying on Roxin (1997).
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Figure 4.1. Free Oscillation
If we are interested in the effects of damping, we might suspend the mass in a tank of water
and conduct the same experiment to get something like Figure 4.2.
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The motion of the mass displays a regularity which suggests that it might admit of
mathematical modeling, and such is the case. 5 In particular, if m is the mass of the bob, d is the
damping force of the air or the water, as the case may be, and k is the elasticity of the spring, then the
motion of the bob is given by an unknown function whose derivatives are related to it in the following
second-order differential equation:
my" + dy' + ky = 0
Depending on the values of m, d, and k, a function can be found which satisfies the above equation -
i.e., solves for ‘y\ For example, if m = 1, d = 0, and k = 4, then y = cosine(2x). In such a case there
is no damping force, so the oscillation of the bob is continuous with no decay. As d grows - as the
damping force increases - the oscillations decay more quickly, much as figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, and
more complicated functions solve for 'y' to give the motion of the bob.
Suppose, however, that the spring is such that it has its greatest elasticity immediately upon
manufacture and slowly and steadily loses elasticity over time - k, in other words, is inversely
proportional to the time, t. Then the motion of the bob will depend on when the bob is pulled down
and released. If the bob is pulled down a set distance and released very soon after the spring was
manufactured, it will bob up-and-down quite rapidly. If the bob is pulled down the same distance much
later, it will bob up-and-down more slowly. The trace the bob makes on the photographic paper today
is not the same trace it will make next year. Contrast this behavior to the case in which the spring's
elasticity is assumed to be constant. No matter when — today, tomorrow, or ten years from now — the
bob is pulled down and released, its trace will be the same as at any other time, provided, of course,
that the drag on the bob and the bob's mass don't change.
Mathematicians say that the equation describing the spring-bob system is autonomous if none
of its parameters - m, d, or k - are dependent on time. The equation is non-autonomous otherwise. As
See Boyce and DiPrima (1986, pp. 166-171) for a clear discussion of the application
of second order differential equations to the modeling of free vibration mechanical
systems.
Note that the reduction in elasticity over time is not the same thing as an increase in
damping force; the damping force produces a non-linear decay in amplitude, while the
(steady) loss of elasticity results in a linear decrease in frequency.
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With most things, mathematicians have a very precise way of defining autonomy. A differential
equation x' = F(x,t) is autonomous if it has the form, x' = F(x). In otherwords, F is independent of t,
where t ranges over times. Autonomous differential equations describe physical systems which are
invariant in time. Put another way, if x(t) is a solution of x' = F(x) in the interval [t„ t2 ], then x(t - r) is
also a solution in the interval [t, - r, t, - r], for real r. A simple and intuitive way of putting all this is
to say that the trace of the spring-bob system is identical to a trace made at any other time if the system
is describable by an autonomous differential equation.
4.4.2 Control Systems
More important for my concerns is the application of the mathematical conception of autonomy
in Control Theory. Control Theory seeks to model physical systems which, for want of a better term,
have inputs or controls . To explain, first consider isolated physical systems. Strictly speaking, the
universe is an isolated physical system. Every physical system within the universe is acted upon by
other systems. But it is possible to treat other systems as isolated since, for example, the effect of
Jupiter's gravitational pull on the spring-bob system is negligible. Similarly, the Earth-Moon-Sun
system is mostly independent of the Alpha-Centauri stellar system. Physical laws like the conservation
of momentum, mass, and energy only apply to isolated systems or to systems which closely approximate
isolated systems insofar as non-system influences are sufficiently minimal as to be safely ignored. A
good example of the latter is the spring-bob system. Given its initial release, the bob behaves in a way
which can be modeled by an equation whose only parameters are the mass of the bob, the elasticity of
the spring, the damping force of the air, and the two initial conditions of distance when released and
velocity imparted.
Now change the spring-bob system in such a way that the spring's elasticity changes when an
electric current was passed through it, and suppose I cleverly attach wires to the spring so as to not
introduce any additional friction on the system, and I attach the wires to a battery and a rheostat which
allows me to control the amount of current passed through the spring. We no longer have a pure
spring-bob system. In its place we have a spring-bob-battery-rheostat system, which is not an isolated
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system. It has an input, the rheostat, that allows me to control the elasticity of the spring and thus the
trace of the bob. I can control the frequency of the bob by turning the knob on the rheostat.
The behavior of the spring-bob-battery-rheostat system is no longer determined according to the
functions which model the pure spring-bob system. The new system's behavior is determined in large
measure by what I do with the rheostat. So the mathematical questions change considerably. We no
longer want to know what functions model the bob's behavior, since this application of mathematical
modeling is passive and so does not help us understand systems with inputs. Rather, we want
something much more active: we want to know, given a certain desired behavior, what is the best
adjustment to make to the rheostat. Systems with inputs include cars, ovens, phones, robots, and
computers. Robots differ from cars, of course, since cars are explicitly designed - although increasingly
less-so as cars become more sophisticated - so that the controls are manipulate by humans, while robot
controls are manipulate by the robot itself. But the existence of controls in either case raises questions
that control theorists seek to answer: what states of a system can be achieved by available inputs, and
what are the ideal inputs for a given achievable state?
The mathematical conception of autonomy is extended to the equations employed in modeling
physical systems with inputs in a fairly obvious way. Control systems - physical systems with inputs -
are described by differential equations of the form,
x' = F(t, x, u),
where u(t) is a measurable control function ranging over possible values for the control mechanisms.
Such a differential equation is autonomous if it is of the form,
x' = F(x, u),
and neither x, nor u, nor any of the constraints on possible values of u, are functions of t. It follows
that if u(t) is a possible control value and x(t) is the corresponding solution, then u(t - r) is a possible
control value having the solution x(t - r), for real r. Put another way, control-solution pairs of a
differential equation describing a control system are translation-invariant in time, provided that t is
understood to represent time. The spring-bob-battery-rheostat system can be modeled by a differential
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equation which is autonomous in just this sense, since when the rheostat is adjusted has nothing to do
with what the bob's subsequent behavior will be.
The mathematical conception of autonomy, then, is that of an equation which is independent of
a certain variable, t. If t represents time, then the behavior of the control system so modeled is
translation-invariant in time. The behavior of said system will be the same for a given combination of
control values and its solution no matter when the controls are adjusted to those values. Control
systems that can be described by autonomous equations are of particular interest to computer scientists
and engineers, since a car which accelerates when the brake pedal is depressed on Tuesdays and
Thursdays, but stops every other day of the week, will not sell terribly well.
4.4.3 Why is a Property of Equations Relevant?
Mathematicians give a reasonably precise definition of ‘autonomy’. But according to their
conception, autonomy is a property of equations, and we can be sure that neither agents nor actions are
equations. Nonetheless, autonomous equations are of interest precisely because they can be used to
model the behavior of certain special kinds of systems. Such systems display a kind of temporal
stability: their behavior is translation invariant in time. But ‘stability’ in this sense is really another word
for independence. Systems with behavior that is translation invariant in time are crucially independent
of factors which might, from one moment but not to the next, alter their behavior.
Although it is technically a category mistake, mathematicians and those who use their tools will
often call systems which can be modeled by autonomous equations ‘autonomous’. I do not think this an
objectionable mistake, since systems which can be modeled by autonomous equations do have special
properties which enable them to be so modeled. If we extend the mathematical conception of autonomy
in this manner to include systems which can be modeled by autonomous equations, then I suggest that
we call the mathematical conception of autonomy ‘Autonomy as Independence', since that seems to
fairly describe what the mathematicians have in mind.
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4.4.4 The Failure of Autonomy as Independence
As I noted earlier, it turns out that Autonomy as Independence is as seriously deficient as
Autonomy as Self-Rule, although for different reasons. The first problem, to put it bluntly, is that an
intergalactic rock is autonomous under Autonomy as Independence.7 But a conception of autonomy
which implies that things like rocks are autonomous is not, to understate the matter, an especially
interesting conception of autonomy. In the end we want an account of autonomous agency, but it is
hard to see of what use a conception of autonomy as indiscriminate as Autonomy as Independence will
be.
There is an additional problem which, I think, is truly devastating for Autonomy as
Independence. For Autonomy as Independence is not just indiscriminate, it is, for want of a better
word, promiscuous. The problem is this: any system which can be modeled at all - specifically, any
system which can be modeled by a non-autonomous equation - can be modeled by an autonomous
equation by a mathematical trick of sorts. Increase the dimensions of the non-autonomous equation
once to include t, and the resulting equation will be translation-invariant with respect to t. If systems
are autonomous because the equations which model them are, then any system which can be modeled at
all is autonomous. But since Autonomy as Independence is so promiscuous as to include any model-
able system in the extension of ‘autonomous', it has little to tell us about autonomous agency.
4.5 Where Independence and Self-Rule Meet
Yet surely Autonomy as Independence has something to tell us about autonomy. Recall the
straight-jacketed agent hanging from the ceiling, which we used as a counter-example to Autonomy as
Self-Rule. What he lacks is precisely what Autonomy as Independence suggests he lacks. His
behaviour is not independent, since there is almost no behavior possible for him. Behavior he otherwise
would have displayed has been halted. The reason why he is not autonomous is because his behavior is
stifled by his circumstance. He is not, in a word, independent.
A rock, that is, which is so remote as to have little causal interaction with its
environment.
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One finds that integrating the two conceptions of autonomy is the best approach to developing
an account of autonomous agency, since each makes up for the other's shortcomings. We have seen
how Autonomy as Independence might be used to solve some of the problems which bear on Autonomy
as Self-Rule. At the same time, Autonomy as Self-Rule shows how to solve the problems plaguing
Autonomy as Independence. To wit, no rock has the capacity for self determination. Self determination
is a capacity unique to agents, so Autonomy as Self-Rule neatly circumscribes the range of what can
count as autonomous. The problem now is to synthesize Autonomy as Self-Rule and Autonomy as
Independence into a single account of autonomous agency.
4.6 The Axiom of Autonomy
The intuition behind my synthesis of Autonomy as Self-Rule and Autonomy as Independence is
easily stated but difficult to make precise. The statement is this: An agent's action is autonomous if the
agent intended to so act and its intentions are its own. Hence the agent's action is independence-
autonomous because the agent's intentions were successfully realized, which they would not be if
something intervened, and the agent's action is self-rule-autonomous if its intentions to so act are its
intentions. The hard part is to construct some sensible account of what it is for an agent's intentions to
be its intentions. Nevertheless, we have a place to start. If my intuitive account is close to the mark,
then a defensible Axiom of Autonomy can be constructed out of the materials provided by an account of
intentional agency, so that is where I begin there.
4.6.1 Intentional Agency (Again)
In the previous chapter we touched on intentional action as part of my defense of RAT's Base
Clause. Recall Mele's (1992, p. 200) proto-analyses of intentional action:
Al: S intentionally A-ed iff S A-ed in the way that S intended to A.
A2: S intentionally A-ed iff S A-ed for a reason.
RAT could accommodate both proto-analyses if we were to add, following Davidson (1980a), the
following axiom:
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A intends to v at t* by u-ing at t iff
a) A desires v-ing at t*,
b) A believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero degree d of
u-ing at t via a pathway p,
and
c) if A desires v-ing at t* and A believes that v-ing at t* is probable to
degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p, then A u's at t.
Of course, this axiom would complicate RAT considerably. Consider its logical structure when
it is parsed a bit more clearly:
A intends to v at t* by u-ing at t IFF
a) A desires v-ing at t*,
b) A believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero
degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p,
AND
c) IF
A desires v-ing at t*
AND
A believes that v-ing at t* is probable to degree d of u-ing
at t via a pathway p
THEN
A u's at t.
Condition (a) is straightforward enough, even in the absence of an account of desire. Condition
(b) is more complex. First, “v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero degree d of u-ing at t via a
pathway p” falls entirely within the scope of “believes that”. Thus it is not the case that the agent
believes, of v-ing at t*, that it is probable to some non-zero degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p. Nor
is it the case that the agent believes, ofa pathway p, that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero
degree d of u-ing at t. The agent, after all, may be mistaken. There may be no v-ing at t* open to the
agent. There may be no pathway from u-ing to v-ing such that, by u-ing at t, the agent v's at t*. u-ing
at t, for that matter, may not be open to the agent. In loose terms, (b) requires that the agent have a
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belief with roughly two components. First, the agent must think that there is a chance of v-ing at t* by
u-ing at t, and it must have an idea as to just how it can v at t* by u-ing at t. Accordingly, both proto-
analyses are reflected in this axiom. The agent must have a reason for acting consisting of the its
beliefs and desires, and it must have certain beliefs about how the action is to be done.
It should also be noted that conditions (a) and (b) ensure that A does not intend to v at t* by u-
ing at t by default
,
as it were, since without them it would be true that A intends to v at t* by u-ing at t
whether or not A has the relevant beliefs and desires. Condition (c), in other words, is vacuously true if
either A u s at t, or A either doesn't desire v-ing at t* or doesn't believe that v-ing at t* is probable to
some non-zero degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p. All three conditions are necessary to account for
an agent's intentions.
4.6.2 How to get Autonomous Agency From Intentional Agency
We are ready to take a run at autonomy. Since autonomous agency is fundamental to being an
autonomous agent, we require necessary and sufficient conditions on
A autonomously v's at t*
The goal is to construct necessary and sufficient conditions that account for both Autonomy as
Independence and Autonomy as Self-Rule. For Autonomy as Independence, the guiding intuition is that
an action is independence-autonomous just in case the agent's intentions are, in fact, realizable by the
agent. Put in the negative, independence requires that the agent's intentions not be thwarted, which
implies that the agent's intentions must be realistic. For example, it is within my power to run a mile; it
is not within my power to run a mile if I am chained to a ten-ton weight, nor is it within my power to
run a mile in less than four minutes. In the first case, my intentions are not realizable, because my
intention to do something I could otherwise do is thwarted by a peculiar feature of the world: namely,
my being chained to a ten-ton weight. In the second case, my intentions are not realistic, because
running a mile in less than four minutes is not something I could otherwise do whether chained to a
rock or not.
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It is not the case that actions which are realistic and realizable are thereby autonomously doable
for me, however, since it may not be my intention to do them in the first place. The intuition behind
Autonomy as Self-Rule is that the agent's intentions must be its own. The puzzle is to understand just
how to make sense of this intuition. Despite the fact that coordination between first and second order
desires is insufficient for autonomy, Dworkin's (1988) account is highly suggestive. An agent's
intentions are its own, at least in part, when the desires behind those intuitions are its own. When is an
agent s desires its own? Surely Dworkin is right on this score: an agent's desires are its own - or,
alternatively, an agent owns its desires - when its desires have been filtered through a process of critical
evaluation.
An agent's owning its desires can only be part of the story, however. An agent can be
manipulated as deftly by manipulating its beliefs as by manipulating its desires. This, I think, is a point
that Dworkin misses altogether. The agent must also own its beliefs, which is just to say that its beliefs
must be filtered through a process of critical evaluation. So the desires and beliefs behind an agent's
intentions must be filtered if the agent s intended action is to be the agent's action — i.e., if the action is
going to be self-rule autonomous.
How shall we describe this process of critical evaluation? At the very least, the process of
critical evaluation is one in which the agent weighs alternatives to candidate operative (intention
relevant) beliefs and desires. But this sounds awfully like a concept we've already employed:
deliberation, namely. Of course, I haven’t spelled out exactly what deliberation is, but the intuitive
account I've been employing throughout has cast deliberation as a process of evaluating alternatives.
Perhaps, then, we can use the concept of deliberation to make sense of an agent's owning a desire or
belief. For instance, an agent owns a desire when it deliberately so desires. Equivalently, an agent's
desire is its own just in case it deliberately desires, and, finally, an agent's belief is its own just in case
it deliberately believes.
In sum, an agent's action is autonomous just in case it is both independence-autonomous and
self-rule-autonomous, and an action is both independence-autonomous and self-rule-autonomous just in
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case it realizes the agent's own intentions. Perhaps, then, we can construct an Axiom of Autonomy out
of the putative Axiom of Intentionality simply by replacing ‘intentionally' with ‘autonomously'.
A autonomously v's at t* by u-ing at t iff
a) A desires v-ing at t*,
b) A believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero degree d of
u-ing at t via a pathway p,
and
c) if A desires v-ing at t* and A believes that v-ing at t* is probable to
degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p, then A u's at t.
Appearances notwithstanding, this formulation fails to capture either Autonomy as
Independence or Autonomy as Self-Rule. It fails to capture Autonomy as Independence because all
three conditions may obtain and v-ing may not realize A's intentions by A’s u-ing. A may well have the
relevant beliefs and desires - as required by (a) and (b) - and may indeed do v, yet v may be only a
(happy) accident since A does not v by u-ing. For example, I want to talk to a friend on the west coast,
and I believe that calling him is a pathway which has a certain probability of allowing me to talk to this
friend, so I pick up the phone and dial, yet as the phone rings on the other end, I get a call-waiting
beep. Remarkably, it’s my buddy Kent, the very same friend I was about to call, calling me on another
line. So even though I wanted to talk to Kent by calling him, and I called him for that very reason, it's
not the case that I talked to Kent by calling him. I talked to Kent by his calling me.
Matters are even more complicated when we realize that I may have had the desire to talk to
Kent and the belief that calling him would allow me to talk to him, yet my belief and desire were not
the reasons for my calling him. That is, it may be the case that I reach for the phone to call my Mother
who is also on the west coast, but I mistakenly dial Kent's number. Even though I wanted to talk to
Kent and I believed calling him would be the way to do it, and I did, furthermore, call him, I did not
call him for my reasons for calling him. It was a second sort of accident, which, when combined with
the first sort, shows that the putative Axiom of Intentionality is seriously deficient if we hope to use it
as an Axiom of Autonomy.
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The upshot is that we need to strengthen condition (c) in such a way as to assure that it is by
u-ing that A v's - and not by some happy coincidence - and it is because of A's beliefs and desires that
A u s at all. It suffices in both cases to rephrase (c) as the conjunction of two counterfactuals:
c ^ were not the case that A desired v-ing at t* or A believed that v-ing at t*
was probable to degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p, then A would not
have u-ed at t, and, if A had not u-ed at t, A would not have v-ed at t*.
Swapping (c) out for (c*) captures Autonomy as Independence, but as yet we do not have Autonomy as
Self-Rule, because there is no reason to think that As desires and beliefs are its own. The way to do
that is to adjust (a) and (b) in such a way that, for (a), A does not merely desire v-ing, it deliberately
desires v-ing and similarly for (b). Thus, we have
a*) A deliberately desires v-ing at t*
and
b*) A deliberately believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero degree d
of u-ing at t via a pathway p,
Putting it all together, we have
Axiom of Autonomy
Ax5: A autonomously v’s at t* by u-ing at t iff
i) A deliberately desires v-ing at t*
ii) A deliberately believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero
degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p,
and
iii) If it were not the case that A desired v-ing at t* or A believed that v-
ing at t* was probable to degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p, then
A would not have u-ed at t, and, if A had not u-ed at t, A would not
have v-ed at t*.
4.7 Revisiting Dworkin's Dilemma
Dworkin, it may be recalled, was caught in a dilemma. Either the act of coordinating first-
order desires with second-order desires is itself autonomous, or it is not autonomous. If it is
autonomous, then it seems that we have to look to third-order desires in order to determine that it is.
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But then the question arises again, and so on up through a mind-numbingly infinite hierarchy of desires.
If the act of coordinating first-order desires with second-order desires is not itself autonomous, then one
wonders just how the result of a non-autonomous process can be autonomous.
Dworkin's dilemma can be restated in our terms. Are the agent’s relevant desirings and
believings autonomous or not? All that is required by the axiom of autonomy is that they be deliberate.
But a deliberate action may or may not be autonomous. Since the axiom is silent on this matter, it
under-determines whether or not the agent s intention-relevant desirings and believings are autonomous.
That is, it might be, with respect to a particular autonomous action, that the agent's intention-relevant
desirings and believings about the action are autonomous or it might not. Let us see if it makes any
difference one way or the other.
Suppose we have an autonomous action which turns out to have been grounded in autonomous
intention-relevant desirings and believings. The threat of an infinite regress does not, I think, arise in
our case as it does in Dworkin’s case. We have not posited any hierarchy of desires (much less beliefs),
and the axiom of autonomy does not require that the desirings and believings involved in deliberating
about intention-relevant desirings and believings must themselves be autonomous. But should they be
required to be autonomous for an adequate account of autonomy? What happens if they're not?
Suppose we have an autonomous action which is grounded in non-autonomous desirings and
believings. Does that fact impugn the autonomy of the action, or make it any the less (pre-theoretically)
autonomous? Clearly, Autonomy as Independence is not at issue here. At root, the question is whether
deliberately desiring and believing suffices for Autonomy as Self-Rule. I think it does, and here is why.
What makes the case of Jill the Unrepentant Smoker so intriguing is that she deliberately
desires smoking, yet she does not autonomously desire smoking. She's considered whether or not she
should want to smoke, and she settled on wanting to smoke. If she had weighed the alternatives of
wanting to smoke versus not and settled on not wanting to smoke, she would have found herself in
Jack's shoes. Remember that Jack wants to smoke but does not want to want to smoke. Jack, we said,
does not smoke autonomously, but Jill does. Even though she does not autonomously desire to smoke,
Jill's smoking is autonomous because she deliberately desires to smoke. Despite not (yet) having an
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account of deliberation, I think it is clear that deliberately desiring and believing is all that is required to
account for Autonomy as Self-Rule.
4.8 Recursive Autonomous Action Theory (RAAT)
We are now in position to extend Recursive Action Theory (RAT) to include the axiom of
autonomy so as to get Recursive Autonomous Action Theory (RAAT).
Base Clause
Ax 1 : A's deliberately u-ing at t is an action.
Inductive Clause
Ax2: If [A's u-ing at t is an action, and either (A v-ed at t* by u-ing at t, or A u-ed at t by
v-ing at t*)], then A's v-ing at t* is an action.
Closure Clause
Ax3: Nothing else is an action.
Transitivity Axiom
Ax4: If the v-ing at t* was by the u-ing at t, and the u-ing at t was by a w-ing at
t
A
,
then the v-ing at t* was by the w-ing at tA .
Axiom of Autonomy
Ax5: A autonomously v's at t* by u-ing at t iff
i) A deliberately desires v-ing at t*
ii) A deliberately believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero
degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p,
and
iii) If it were not the case that A desired v-ing at t* or A believed that v-
ing at t* was probable to degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p, then
A would not have u-ed at t, and, if A had not u-ed at t, A would not
have v-ed at t*.
To be sure, RAAT places a great deal of weight on deliberation, belief, and desire. It remains to be
seen whether they are up to the task.
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CHAPTER 5
DELIBERATION
5.1 Looking Ahead
Recursive Autonomous Action Theory, RAAT, has been developed for the single purpose of
demonstrating that machines can in principle be autonomous agents. Up to now I have not said
anything about what it takes to show this. But our destination is clear; now is the time take stock of
what we have and what we yet need.
So far I have been operating on the bland assumption that accounts of autonomous agency and
machines are required if a defensible judgment is to be made on whether or not machines can in
principle be autonomous agents. This is correct as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. To see
why, and to see what more is needed, consider the goal:
Machines can in principle be autonomous agents.
Note that the ‘in principle' bit is doing some important work here. It rules out the reading of
Machines can be autonomous agents,
whereby my car one day decides where it wants to go.
At root we have a scope problem. Do we say that machines can be autonomous agents in the
sense that there exists a machine such that possibly it is an autonomous agent, or do we say that
machines can be autonomous agents in the sense that there exists a possible machine such that it is an
autonomous agent? I grant that the former is an interesting claim. Surely the computer scientist is in
the position of assessing whether or not an actual machine has, with a certain amount of tinkering, the
capacity to act autonomously - leaving my car alone, thank you very much.
My principal concern, however, is not to show that some actual machine has the capacity for
autonomous agency. As much as I envy computer scientists their laboratories, my interest is largely
theoretical. I want to argue that machines can be autonomous agents by showing that there exists a
possible machine which is an autonomous agent. Thus, contrary to all the skeptical arguments, there is
nothing in principle about being a machine which rules out being an autonomous agent. So the modal
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operator takes wide scope: “possibly, there is an autonomous machine agent”, as opposed to “there is a
possibly autonomous machine agent”. 1
Tidying up the modality by adopting the standard device of possible worlds semantics, we have
an embedded existence claim: there is some possible world w such that, for some physical system x, x
is a machine at w and x has the capacity to act autonomously at x.2 Once we know what we have to
show, the rest is elementary proof theory. All(!) that needs to be done is to show that there is a
physical system at some possible world that meets a set of conditions which jointly suffice for being a
machine and meets a set of conditions which jointly suffice for having the capacity to act
autonomously. 3
Suppose for a moment that I've got an (actual) physical system, call him Pete, capable of all
sorts of complicated behavior. The skeptic is satisfied that Pete is a machine; I’ve successfully shown
that Pete meets a set of conditions which jointly suffice for being a machine. Furthermore, the skeptic
is happy with RAAT. RAAT correctly tells us that an organism with the capacity to believe, desire, and
act deliberately has the capacity act autonomously. So if Pete has the capacity to believe, desire, and
If, symbolically, the claim that there is an autonomous machine agent is rendered as
3x(Mx a Ax),
then the claim that possibly, there is an autonomous machine agent is unambiguously
03x(Mx a Ax),
whereas the claim that machines can be autonomous agents is ambiguous between
03x(Mx a Ax)
and
3x(Mx a OAx),
which is what the ‘in principle' bit is supposed to rule out.
‘Physical system' is used as a neutral term to refer to either biological organisms or
machines. That is, the class of physical systems contains the class of biological
organisms and the class of machines - and probably other things besides.
To wit, what we need is an existence proof. As with most existence proofs, it’s easier
said than done.
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act deliberately, then he has the capacity to act autonomously, all of which begs a singularly importanl
question: What could posstbly convince the skeptic that Pete has the capac.ty to believe, desire, and act
deliberately?
5.2 Autonomous Agency on the Cheap
Dennett (1981, 1987) thinks that he has a way of convincing the skeptic. Dennett, recall,
distinguishes between the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional stance. These are
‘stances' in the sense that the observer, whose interest is largely that of prediction, might adopt them in
trying to predict the behavior of a physical system; Dennett sometimes calls these ‘strategies' (1987, pp.
16-17). Thus,
Consider the physical strategy, or physical stance; if you want to
predict the behavior of a system, determine its physical constitution
(perhaps all the way down to the microphysical level) and the
physical nature of the impingements upon it, and use your knowledge
of the laws of physics to predict the outcome for any input...
Sometimes... it is more effective to switch from the physical stance
to what I call the design stance, where one ignores the actual
(possibly messy) details of the physical constitution of an object, and,
on the assumption that it has a certain design, predicts that it will
behave as it is designed to behave under various circumstances...
Sometimes even the design stance is practically inaccessible, and
then there is yet another stance or strategy one can adopt: the
intentional stance. Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the
object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you
figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the
world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to
have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this
rational agent will act to further its goals in light of its beliefs.
(1987, pp. 16-17)
So assuming that the skeptic does not have direct access to Pete’s insides or to Pete's
designer/builder, the skeptic's only recourse is to attribute beliefs, desires, and a certain modicum of
rationality so as to predict Pete's behavior. This sounds innocuous, until one pays attention to the fact
that the usefulness of attributions of beliefs, desires, and rationality to the skeptic in predicting Pete's
behavior imply, for Dennett, that Pete has beliefs, desires, and is rational. It's no property or relation of
Pete's that he has beliefs, desires, or is rational. The skeptic is mistaken to look for any such property;
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be satisfied rather that Pete is a rational believer and desirer only insofar as attributions of belief, desire,
and rationality are predictively useful.
A hard-nosed skeptic will not be satisfied by Dennett's proposal. “A cop out!”, the skeptic will
no doubt say. After all, predictive success does not track truth: Ptolemy could predict planetary motion
just as well as Copernicus, but Copernicus was on to the truth. Of course, Dennett's point is that there
is no truth to belief, desire, and rationality attribution beyond predictive role, but the existence of such a
role is enough for Dennett to call himself “a sort of realist” (Dennett, 1987, p. 40) about belief, desire,
and other predictively useful creatures. Yet the skeptic has a response to Dennett that is decisive.
”My problem is to figure out whether or not this machine we've anthropomorphically named
‘Pete’ is capable of autonomous action. I don't know how Pete is put together, and I know nothing
about how Pete is designed to behave. Of course, I can attribute beliefs, desires, and a modest amount
of rationality to Pete and use those attributions to predict his behavior. It seems to work most of the
time.
“But now you, Dennett, come along and say, “ Voila
!
Pete has beliefs, desires, and rationality
just because you can predict his behavior on the basis of attributing beliefs, desires, and rationality.”
Somehow you want me to believe that beliefs and desires are observer-dependent properties, even
though it would not be true of me that I either believe or dis-believe what you ask me to believe if there
were never anyone in a position to observe me and predict what I will conclude.
‘The problem is this: On your account a tornado has beliefs and desires because there are
meteorologically unsophisticated observers who (correctly!) predict that a tornado will ‘attack’ a trailer-
park in its path because it takes vicious delight in smashing mobile-homes to smithereens. For all we
know I am just like the tornado watchers. Someone who is more technically sophisticated than I might
scoff at the notion that Pete has beliefs and desires, just as I scoff at the notion that the tornado has
beliefs and desires.
“Whatever beliefs and desires are, they are surely not observer-dependent properties. To put it
bluntly, your way of handling the matter is no better than the financial expert who explains, “I'm going
to tell you a foolproof way to make a million bucks. First, you get a million bucks. Then,...” Like it
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or not, there is some hard, honest work to be done. I'm satisfied that Pete is a machine because I've
been given sufficient conditions for being a machine and I can verify that Pete meets these conditions.
What I must have are sufficient conditions for having beliefs, desires, and acting deliberately if I am to
verify that Pete is capable of autonomous action.”
5.3 Paying the Price for Autonomous Agency
I intend to do the hard work that the skeptic thinks should be done. To meet the skeptic's
demands, I have to provide accounts of belief, desire, and deliberate action. In particular, I have to
locate and defend a set necessary and sufficient conditions on deliberate action, belief, and desire.
The indefinite article “a” in “a set of necessary sufficient conditions” is there for a reason,
incidentally. There are no doubt many, many sets of truth-functionally equivalent conditions on, say,
belief. I only need one. But there is a serious constraint on which one I can pick. Since I am
concerned to show that machines can be autonomous agents, I have to pick conditions that don't
prejudice the case for or against machines. A set of conditions which jointly suffice for belief yet
presuppose that belief is token-identical to a brain state - where a ‘brain' is understood to be about 8
pounds of neuro-dynamic matter the typical human slogs around - will not do, since machines don't
have brains. Thus, it would be at best fruitless and at worst self-defeating for me to spend any time
worrying over current debates on how it is that human agents believe, desire, or deliberate, except to the
extent that those debates carry implications beyond the fray of anthro-specific philosophical debates.
Call this the ‘Generality Constraint'.
There is a further constraint that has been implicit throughout. Philosophers have a
disconcerting tendency to paint in broad and sometimes gappy strokes. The presumption, I suppose, is
that details are tedious, unimportant, and trivially obtained. Be sure to get the big picture right, and the
rest will naturally fall into place. The rest couldn't help but fall into place, if the big picture is right.
But how do we know whether the big picture is right, when the details aren't all worked out? If the big
picture is going to founder, it will founder on the details. So develop the details as clearly and carefully
as one can, and let the big picture take care of itself. Call this the ‘Precision Constraint'. All it comes
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to is this: wherever possible, one's assumptions ought to be logically clear and, as much as possible,
mathematically tractable.
5.4 Deliberate Action
In casting about for a set of conditions on deliberate action, it is useful to begin with examples
and generalize from there. There is substantial agreement that humans have the capacity for deliberate
action, so, bearing the Generality Constraint in mind, let us begin with a series of examples of deliberate
human action to see if we can uncover some antecedents to deliberate action.
5.4.1 Chess
Surely the paragon of deliberate action is a move in chess. My queen is threatened. I have no
recourse but to sacrifice a rook. It pains me to sacrifice my last rook, but I got myself into this pickle:
one audacious move too many, I suppose. So I sacrifice my rook to save the queen. I go on to lose the
game, of course, but that's not important right now. What is important is that I quite deliberately move
my rook into harms way. I deliberately move my rook with the intention of rescuing the queen from
my opponent's threatening bishop. A tragic turn of events, but there you have it.
Given this description of events, what is it that makes the sacrificing of my rook a deliberate
action on my part? I am presented with two alternatives: I can either sacrifice my rook or move some
other piece. If I move some other piece, I will surely lose my queen. Other things being equal, it's far
better to lose a rook than to lose a queen in chess. So I shouldn't move some other piece; I should
sacrifice the rook. Antecedent to my sacrificing the rook are my deliberations about the alternatives.
At any turn in a game of chess, there are a finite number of pieces on the board, and each
piece has a finite set of alternative moves. Since the same is true of the other side, the game gains
considerable depth as alternative moves are considered relative to possible counter-moves, which are
then considered relative to possible counter-counter-moves. Really proficient chess players are able to
map out moves and their alternatives 5 and 6 turns in advance. Deliberately doing something in chess,
like deliberately sacrificing a rook, presupposes often complex deliberations on the part of the player.
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Unpacking a turn in chess, we find that a player, human or otherw.se, is presented with a finite
number of moves. The player’s ultimate goal is checkmate, although forcing a draw is possible. Each
move must be evaluated for its consequences. Late in the game, consequences hopefully include
checkmating one's opponent or, second-best, forcing a draw. Early in the game, consequences might
include positioning for dominance of the middle-board or forcing an important sacrifice. The player
compares alternative moves according to their consequences and plays the move believed to be most
likely to lead to the desired consequence.
Antecedent to deliberate action in a game of chess is deliberation. Deliberation, in this case,
involves a careful comparison of alternatives, as measured by the perceived likelihood of a desired
outcome, such that, by so deliberating, the agent makes the ‘best’ move of the 'best' piece, as the agent
determines by considering the alternatives.
5.4.2 Archery
I notch an arrow on my trusty seventy-pound bow. Forty yards away sits a five foot high wall
of haybales. Four feet up on this wall is an eighteen-inch target: a red circle inside a white circle inside
a red circle. The leaves on the trees are barely moving. Good. There's not much wind. I take a few
deep breaths and picture my arrow slicing through the air and slamming into the heart of the target. My
index and middle finger cradle the arrow’s notch as I grip the bowstring. The key is to keep a light
touch, even while drawing back a full seventy pounds of force. I take a last breath, raise the bow,
slowly but firmly pulling back, all the while sighting along the length of the perfectly straight, machined
aluminum arrow. Muscles bunching up in my shoulder and back, I let go the arrow, and watch it thunk
into the center of the target. Success! I deliberately release the arrow with the intention of hitting the
bullseye, and I hit the bullseye.
With chess we found that a plausible antecedent to a deliberate move is deliberation. What are
the antecedents of my deliberately releasing the arrow? Unlike chess, there is only one thing to do: hit
the bullseye. To the extent that there are not any alternatives to be considered, deliberately releasing an
arrow does not appear to leave room for antecedent deliberation. No decisions need to be made except
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to aim and release the arrow. Aiming, however, is not quite so simple as just lining up the arrow tip-to-
ta.l with the target, unless one is standing a mere foot or so from the target. Many features of the
environment must be factored into aiming the arrow. At the very least, one must account for the
distance from archer to target, since the arrow will not fly straight but will, rather, tend to slow and
drop. Thus, one must aim slightly higher than the target to be sure of hitting the target. Clearly,
matters are complicated by local wind conditions.
What the archer is doing in aiming and letting-loose the arrow is not so different from what the
chess-player is doing in assessing alternatives and moving a piece. In fact, since there are an infinite
number of alternative aims to take, the archer in a sense has it much harder than the chess player, who
enjoys only a finite number of alternative moves. Of course, the likelihood of the arrow hitting the
target diminishes dramatically as the archer aims to the vertical or straight down. There is thus a
sweet-spot which the archer must find that is located somewhere quite near the target. Like the chess-
player, the archer need not consider every alternative.
Deliberation in the case of the archer turns out to be quite similar to deliberation in the case of
the chess-player. The archer assesses the local environment and tries to find the sweet-spot for aiming
and letting-fly the arrow. By deliberating, the agent releases the arrow and, hopefully, hits the target.
As with chess, it seems that a plausible antecedent to deliberate action is deliberation.
5.4.3 Tennis
Not surprisingly, I once again lose the serve. My heartless, vicious opponent lofts the ball and
slams down on it with her racket. The ball sounds a loud ‘thock’ as it is compressed by the force of the
serve. It launches off her racket at a terrific speed. I'm not altogether sure NASA could do a better
job. But somehow, I manage to get myself over to where the ball is headed. I actually manage to get
the ball back over the net. It's not so much that I strike the ball with my racket; I thrust my racket
forward, it gets in the way of the ball, and, the laws of physics being what they are, the ball heads back
the direction it came. It may not be well-aimed, but I'm so happy I got the ball back over the net I miss
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.he return altogether. No matter. I deliberately thrus, ou, my racket with the intention of returning the
serve and, much to my astonishment, I return the serve.
Unlike a leisurely game of chess and archery, tennis, as we have seen, does not allow much
lime lor deliberation. Indeed, it might be thought that tennis does not involve deliberation at all. But
the back-and-forth volleys of tennis are clearly deliberate.
Deliberation, as the term is ordinarily employed, involves the conscious assessment of
alternatives and concludes with what the agent believes to be the best action given the perceived-
alternatives. As we learned from earlier calculations, the tennis player barely has time to move to
intercept the ball. The time the tennis player has available for assessing his or her opponent's position
and the best trajectory upon which to send the ball so as to force the opponent to miss a return strains
the ordinary conception of deliberation. Perhaps now we have an instance of deliberate action with no
antecedent deliberation.
What seems to be going on is that the player, through repetition, gains reflexes which are then
employed in the course of a volley. That is to say, there is no deliberation per se, where deliberation is
construed as the conscious assessment of alternatives and consequent action. Rather, the player with the
best-tuned and fastest reflexes wins the game.
Two points should be made. First, a tennis game cannot wholly be a function of reflexes; there
is some direction to how the volleys play out. To be sure, reflexes are important, but strategy is
equally important. Second, there is no reason to think that the activity of deliberating requires much
time. A great many comparisons of alternatives can be made on the basis of experience. Speed chess
is, after all, possible, and archery has been, historically, quite useful on the battlefield.
I deliberately thrust out my racket to intercept the serve because I fleetingly thought that it was
the best, maybe the only, way to return the serve. That thought, it seems to me, should count as
deliberation under any reasonable understanding of deliberation. As with chess and archery,
deliberations are antecedent to deliberate actions in tennis.
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5.4.4 Closing the Door
Segerberg (1982) points out that deliberations can be astonishingly minimal. There are some
noisy students outside my class. Interested in keeping my students' attention focused on the problem at
hand, I shut the door. I deliberately shut the door, but I don’t worry about the details.
This is a typical example of a kind of action that we perform every
day; actions of this kind make up a considerable portion of our lives.
The deliberation involved is minimal: I wish to close the door, there
is no overriding consideration to the contrary, and so an intention to
close the door (somehow) forms. Performance is unproblematic -
closing doors I know something about... One may say that I have a
routine lor closing this door, and whenever I am closing this door in
the normal way I just did, it is this routine I am running. The
routine is not easy to describe, perhaps not even possible to describe.
But if you were here, it would be easy to show you: this is how I do
it. Normally I do it without thinking, sometimes without being aware
of doing it. Compare me with the neighbor's one-and-a-half-year-old
who might also be able to close the door but who has not yet
developed a routine for doing it: he would go about it laboriously,
tackling this task with the freshness of a young and untried mind, as
yet a tabula rasa as far as closing doors is concerned, (p. 233)
With respect to human agents, repetitive tasks are typically off-loaded to sub-processes which handle all
the particulars. Thus my deliberations are minimal in the sense that they need not include any thought
about how to close the door. My only thought is whether to close the door, and, given the noisy
students, closing the door is quickly concluded. As in previous examples, deliberation is once again
about the comparison of alternative actions. But given what Segerberg has dubbed ‘routines’, the
alternatives are few: either close the door or don't. I suspect that the vast majority of human actions
have by-histories which initiate in a deliberate action whose antecedent deliberations consist merely of
considering the simple alternatives of act or not. Antecedent deliberations need not be a complicated or
lengthy affair.
5.4.5 Little Johnny's Mischief
Are deliberate actions always preceded by deliberations? Cowan (1969) thinks not.
We all know, of course, that we may, without deliberation, either act
deliberately or deliberately act. When Little Mary cries in righteous
indignation “Little Johnny deliberately ate my bon bon,” she is
claiming that his act was not inadvertent, she is ruling out mistake
and accident, but she is certainly not denying that he may have acted
on impulse and quite thoughtlessly. Johnny may eat deliberately
either Mary's bon bon or his own. He will then lick slowly and
delicately around the edges and munch the crumbs first, pretending
that they are all that is left. But he may very well thus eat
deliberately still without any deliberation whatsoever. However
much he deliberates, on the other hand, Johnny will not, in general,
be able deliberately to eat, as opposed to eating deliberately, his own
bon bon, as opposed to Mary's—unless, per chance, he has been
forbidden to eat his own before dinner or some such thing, (p. 53)
The idea that 'we all know, of course,' that a deliberate act need not presuppose the agent's deliberations,
certainly contradicts my case that deliberate action presupposes deliberation. Do we all know this?
Cowan and I appear to be using “deliberate” quite differently. Cowan implicitly draws a
distinction between deliberately doing something and doing something deliberately. Presumably, doing
something deliberately involves doing something in a careful or slow manner: “Johnny may eat
deliberately either Mary s bon bon or his own. He will then lick slowly and delicately around the edges
and munch the crumbs first, pretending that they are all that is left.” Doing something deliberately is,
apparently, all about how one performs an action one has already set out to perform. In this case, it's
how Johnny embellishes his campaign to pester his sister. In any case, this is not an interesting sense
of “deliberate”.
I want to know why Cowan thinks that Johnny can deliberately eat Mary's bon bon without
thereby having antecedently deliberated. Cowan's idea seems to be that it can be true that
Johnny deliberately ate Mary's bon bon,
at the same time that it is true that
Johnny ate Mary's bon bon on impulse,
which rules out Johnny's having deliberated, if doing something on impulse is incompatible with
deliberating about doing something. Note the strength of Cowan's claim: it must be the case that
Johnny cannot deliberately eat his own bon bon unless he has been forbidden to do so. Cowan's idea, I
suspect, is that since there are no countervailing reasons for not eating his own bon bon, then whenever
he does so he must do it purely on impulse.
To the contrary, I point out that Johnny has (at least) the options of eating his own bon bon or
not. Assuming that Johnny has a bon bon in his hand, believes that what he has in his hand is a bon
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bon, and is not being pushed or shoved, then his eating it or not presupposes his having deeded to eat
it. But his having decided to eat it presupposes his having considered, however briefly, whether or not
to eat it. I count such considerations as deliberations.
Cowan s conception of deliberately doing something is peculiar in any case. There's no reason
to think that doing something on impulse is incompatible with deliberation. Just because we don't have
a good or well thought-out reason for doing what we do does not imply that we have no reason. Would
it come as any surprise to discover that Johnny’s (deliberate!) eating of Mary's bon bon is consistent
with other behavior on Johnny’s part? That Johnny has certain beliefs about the importance of teasing
sisters?
Cowan's conception of deliberation presupposes what is perhaps best called conscious planning
on the agent’s part. I cast the deliberation net much wider. Even in the case of human agents, we may
not be aware of the deliberations backing our deliberate actions. Johnny may not be fully aware of why
he torments his sister. But some day she hopes he will be. An agent may not be conscious of
antecedent deliberations. It may even be a liability when there is an advantage to acting quickly. Speed
is often of the essence in acting. Johnny may have a standing mental directive of sorts which says,
when an oppoitunity is open to tease Mary, act upon it. All that Johnny has to do is see an opportunity,
and he acts on it. The upshot is that deliberation as I conceive it does not require much thought at all,
and it certainly does not require any conscious thought. While deliberation requires the assessment of
alternatives, it does not, contrary to Cowan, require the conscious assessment of alternatives. Choices
made which culminate in a particular action need not be made consciously. They are pre-established, so
to speak, perhaps as a result of an agent's beliefs about which the agent is unaware.
5.4.6 The Hot Stove
Return for a moment to the idea that the speed of an action is at a premium. According to
RAAT every action has a by-history which includes a deliberate action, and the previous examples
appear to make the case that, prior to any deliberate action, the agent deliberates. The speed at which
an agent can act, then, is bounded by the speed at which the agent can deliberate. Is there any limit on
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the speed of deliberat.on? The answer depends on the agent, but it is instructive to consider human
agents.
Since a neuron spike requires about a millisecond, human deliberation is a lengthy affair. For
the sake of comparison, a single tennis volley occurs in about a second, while speed chess takes about
ten seconds per turn. But consider the man from Chapter 3 (p. 73) who touches a hot stove he thinks is
cold and jerks his hand away. As we found, and despite the man's protestations to the contrary, he did
not deliberately act to save himself from being burnt. His arm did. His arm's movement was not his
action since it did not occur by his deliberately doing anything, despite his own perceptions after the
fact. Deliberation can be quick; often all the elements necessary for an act of deliberation all the
relevant beliefs and desires, for instance, are there ‘to be had’, as it were. Yet constraints on human
neural response time place constraints on just how quickly human deliberation, and hence human
deliberate action, can take place.
5.4.7 A Dinosaur's Brains
The tact that human agents are hardwired for certain advantageous responses warrants a brief
digression into the problem of agent identity. To bring the problem into sharper focus, consider that
stegosaurus had two brains. Well, not really. It used to be thought that stegosaurus had two brains.
Its brain was about the size of a walnut, which is awfully small for a two-ton animal. It was also found
to have a spinal cavity in the pelvic region that was many times larger than its cranial cavity, so the
hypothesis was that this spinal cavity contained a second brain:
Behold the mighty dinosaur,
Famous in prehistoric lore,
Not only for his power and strength
But for his intellectual length.
You will observe by these remains
The creature had two sets of brains -
One in his head (the usual place),
The other at his spinal base.
Thus he could reason a priori
As well as a posteriori.
No problem bothered him a bit
He made both head and tail of it.
So wise was he, so wise and solemn,
Each thought filled just a spinal column.
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If one brain found the pressure strong
It passed a few ideas along.
If something slipped his forward mind
’Twas rescued by the one behind.
And if in error he was caught
He had a saving afterthought.
As he thought twice before he spoke
He had no judgement to revoke.
Thus he could think without congestion
Upon both sides of every question.
Oh, gaze upon this model beast,
Defunct ten million years at least.
- Bert L. Taylor (Fastovsky and Weishampel, 1996, p. 128)
The two-brains hypothesis is now thought to be false. It turns out that even mammals have a mass of
nerves at the base of the spinal column which is believed to help coordinate muscles. The large size of
the stegosaurus cavity suggests only that it required a great deal of coordination.
But suppose it were the case that the stegosaurus in fact had two brains. We can certainly
imagine an organism with two brains. Suppose further that without one or the other brain, the organism
would be an autonomous agent. That is, each brain alone independently suffices for autonomous
agency. What shall we say about the organism’s behavior? Should we say that it (singular) is acting
autonomously ? Or do we have two coordinated yet independent agents in one organism, so that it
would only make sense to say that they are acting autonomously? But if they are acting autonomously,
does that not imply distinct actions? Note that the problem resurfaces if the human mind is composed
of homunculi, each autonomously performing various functions. The lesson is that agents cannot in
general be identified with organisms. The problem is that, as yet, we have no principled way to identify
agents.
Since the search for antecedents to deliberate action is moving back from action to agent, we
should expect to be able to say something intelligent about agent-identity in the final analysis. Nor is
agent-identity a mere side problem: a sensible account of autonomous agency must be able to
discriminate between agents. To the Generality and Precision Constraints, then, let us add the Identity
Constraint.
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5.5 Recap
Examples of human deliberate action appear to bear out the thesis that deliberation is, at least, a
necessary condition to deliberate action. As Segerberg puts it, “Two stages are discernable in deliberate
action, deliberation and performance.” (1982, p. 233) Perhaps this is not surprising. The question now
is whether a sufficiently detailed investigation of deliberation - under, of course, the Generality,
Precision, and Identity Constraints - will reveal additional conditions which suffice for deliberate action.
5.6 Deliberation
It might be thought that a full theory of deliberation is readily at hand. After all, there is a
substantial literature in the field of Practical Reasoning, and there are a number of important debates and
technical results in the field of Decision Theory. Wherever possible, one wants to avoid doing work
that has already been done.
5.6. 1 What Practical Reasoning and Decision Theory Don't Provide
A few questions are worth posing. Exactly what are theorists interested in practical reasoning
up to? What is the aim of Decision Theory? And what is the relationship between Practical Reasoning
and Decision Theory? When in doubt, consult a dictionary. Under “Practical Reasoning” in the
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, we are told that practical reasoning is the
...inferential process by which considerations for or against
envisioned courses of action are brought to bear on the formation and
execution of intention. Important issues concerning practical
reasoning include how it relates to theoretical reasoning, whether it is
a causal process, and how it can be evaluated. (Audi, 1995, p. 635)
Decision theory, on the other hand, is
...the theory of rational decision. The basic idea (probably Pascal's)
was published at the end of Arnaud's Port-Royal Loigc (1662): “To
judge what one must do to obtain a good or avoid an evil one must
consider not only the good and the evil in itself but also the
probability of its happening or not happening, and view geometrically
the proportion that all these things have together.” ...Received
wisdom counts decision theory clearly false as a description of
human behavior, seeing its proper status as a normative. (Audi,
1995, pp. 179-181)
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One might plausibly infer from these definitions that the distinction between Practical Reasoning and
Decision Theory is the distinction between a largely descriptive field of study and a largely prescriptive
field of study, respectively. On this somewhat simplistic view, Practical Reasoning seeks to account for
the ways in which actual, presumably human, agents assess alternatives and come to act on the basis of
those assessments, while Decision Theory seeks to develop the standard by which a given assessment of
alternatives may be said to have succeeded or failed. Thus, Decision Theory prescribes the correct
choice (or choices) among alternatives, while Practical Reasoning tells us how we actually, no-doubt
failingly, go about making our choices.
As I say, this is far too simplistic a picture. Each field ranges from descriptive to prescriptive
enterprises. In Decision Theory, debates rage over whether or not a theory's implications are pre-
theoretically acceptable at the same time that psychologists and social scientists conduct research into
the preferences and choice-making procedures of various human populations, and all of them believe
that they are working in the field of Decision Theory. In Practical Reasoning, criticisms are levied
against those who propose accounts of practical reasoning which allow for fallacious reasoning on the
grounds that practical reasoning is not about description, yet both groups label their accounts “Practical
Reasoning”. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy notwithstanding, Practical Reasoning cannot be
distinguished from Decision Theory on the basis of the descriptive/prescriptive divide.
What, then, is the distinction between Practical Reasoning and Decision Theory? I don't think
any hard-and-fast distinction can be drawn. There are a few possible differences, but nothing terribly
important. Those working in Practical Reasoning appear to be particularly concerned with the
connection between reasoning and resulting activity. Following Aristotle's work on Practical Syllogisms,
they also seem to view the process of assessing alternatives to action along the lines of a deductive
inference. Decision theorists, on the other hand, focus more on the assessment of alternatives than on
the relationship between the conclusion of assessment and action. In other respects, Practical Reasoning
and Decision Theory are very much the same enterprise.
Neither enterprise can be taken off the shelf and plugged directly into my work, however. The
Generality Constraint requires that the conditions on deliberate action not be specific to some particular
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kind of agent, and yet since we are interested in real or possible agents, the sufficient conditions on
deliberate action must not be normative. To be useful for my project, the conditions must be at once
universal and descriptive.
As normative or prescriptive enterprises, Practical Reasoning and Decision Theory have little to
offer. If one were actually building an autonomous agent, then presumably the prescriptive results of
Practical Reasoning and Decision would be of special interest, at least to the extent that one would want
to build the best autonomous agent one could. But that does not help me. What I want to know is,
what is a characteristic of deliberation such that any possible agent exemplifying the characteristic will
have the capacity for deliberate action?
Seen as descriptive endeavors, on the other hand, Practical Reasoning and Decision Theory are
generally concerned with describing how actual - read “human” - agents deliberate. Much of what
social scientists working in Decision Theory do involves understanding just how human agents in
various situations go about choosing alternatives. In Practical Reasoning, the test of the descriptive
power of a given theory usually involves consulting imagined or hypothetical situations involving human
agents; a theory of practical reasoning is successfully descriptive provided it describes the practical
inferences of human agents. This seems nearer the mark, and it is surely a good place to start when
looking for examples, provided that one bears in mind the Generality Constraint: specific results about
human agents must be abstracted out from the final account.
5.6. 1.1 Examples of Deliberation
The chess, archery, tennis, and door-closing examples, considered previously as examples of
deliberate action, double quite well as examples of deliberation. Consider the deliberate actions as they
were described in the examples:
• I deliberately move my rook with the intention of rescuing the queen from my
opponent's threatening bishop.
• I deliberately release the arrow with the intention of hitting the bullseye.
• I deliberately thrust out my racket with the intention of returning the serve.
118
1 deli berately shut the door with the intention of keeping my students' attention focused
on the problem at hand.
Each statement classifies the rook moving, arrow releasing, racket thrusting, and door shutting actions as
deliberate. What is it, naively, that makes each action deliberate? The obvious answer I have been
pressing has been that each deliberate action is the result of antecedent deliberations. So far the obvious
answer says very little. Closer attention must be paid to what the deliberate actions share in common.
The problem of what to do in the chess example is interesting because it is so well-defined.
There are always a finite number of alternatives, and each piece has a certain value depending on its
context and its range of possible moves. In the case in which I find my queen threatened, there are
surely other alternatives available to me. But the queen is valuable in this context. If I wish to have a
chance at even a draw, I must do what I can to save her. My rook is also valuable, of course, but not
as much, in my estimation, as the queen. Given these overriding constraints, I have a finite number of
alternatives branching out from the initial alternative of saving the queen or not. If I wish to save the
queen, then I must sacrifice the rook, as there is no other piece available to stand in for the rook, and
there is no greater threat presently available for me to use against my opponent to force him to take the
heat off my queen. So if I am to save the queen, I must sacrifice my rook. But in order to sacrifice
my rook, I must move him from his present square to a square intermediate between my queen and my
opponent s bishop. It I don't save the queen, then a number of other alternatives are available - perhaps
some that I don't even see. Even though the number may be large, it is still finite, and a fuller
description of the game at hand would allow for a detailed, albeit lengthy, discussion of all the available
options I find.
The problem of what to do in the archery example is much less well-defined. There are an
indefinite number of alternatives. Point the arrow slightly this way, slightly that way, and so on. Still,
the fact that the alternatives in archery are not as nicely specific as in the chess example should not be
taken as evidence that there are no alternatives. It is not entirely by chance that I hit the bullseye. I do
get credit for being a good marksman. For that very reason I have always been puzzled as to why the
dice-thrower in a game of craps is applauded, and sometimes even tipped, for ‘throwing well'. In games
of pure chance like craps, the only alternatives are whether or not to play: not so archery. The
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existence of poorly defined or indefinitely many alternatives should not be taken as evidence that there
are no genuine alternatives.
The problem of what to do in the tennis example is at least as complicated as in the archery
example for exactly the same reasons. Indeed, any of what might be called 'ballistic' activities—tennis,
archery, basketball, golf, tank warfare, or what have you—will tend to have indefinitely many
alternatives. But the speed at which tennis is played serves to delimit my alternatives significantly. I
don t have time to take a careful swing. At best I can thrust out my racket at a certain angle, and the
possible range ot angles necessary for getting the ball back over the net is sufficiently large that the
alternatives come to not thrusting out my racket, thrusting out my racket at an adequate angle, or
thrusting out my racket at an inadequate angle. Even thought there may be many ill-defined
alternatives, the context in which those alternatives are evaluated may require paring them down rather
quickly to some manageable subset.
As I suggested earlier, the vast majority of deliberate actions are like door closing in the sense
that the antecedent deliberations only compare two alternatives: whether to shut the door, or not. But
those are very clearly alternatives. The lack of many alternatives should not be taken as evidence that
no deliberation is involved. The choice remains.
What appears to be common to the deliberations antecedent to each of the deliberate actions is
the comparison of alternatives. Differing in each case is the number of alternatives, the extent to which
each alternative is clearly distinguishable from the other, and the speed at which relevant comparisons
must be made. But those differences merely serve to underscore the basic conception of deliberation I
am promoting: deliberation insofar as it functions as the general antecedent to deliberate action always
involves a comparison of alternatives. That is,
• Where there is no comparison of alternatives, there is no deliberation.
Where there is no deliberation, there is no deliberate action.
120
5.6.2 Comparing Alternatives
Consider the simplest of the examples: shutting the door. Surely my alternatives are not just to
shut the door or not. But telling noisy students outside my classroom to be quiet doesn't usually work,
since their idea of quiet is still too loud. I suppose I could cancel class, but class-time is simply too
valuable to waste on such nuisances. So my options appear to be quite limited. Either I shut the door
or not. It is a cool fall day, so shutting the door should not make for a stuffy room. If I were to shut
the door, which is a reasonable sound-barrier, I would likely achieve my end of minimizing lecture
distractions. With few or no reasons against shutting the door and good reasons for shutting the door, I
shut the door.
Yet suppose that, unbeknownst to me, the students in the hall are there at the request of their
professor, perhaps as part of a class-room exercise. A nice alternative presents itself: simply ask the
professor to put the students someplace else. Nonetheless, since I don’t even know that the students are
part of a class, the alternative does not present itself to me. Thus, it is not an alternative for me.
The door-shutting example is altogether ordinary. But I think it illustrates the key features of
alternative comparison.
a. Alternatives are compared according to some end the agent desires.
b. In the process of comparison, alternatives are eliminated and/or ranked according
to the agent's perception of their value in seeing the agent's goal realized against a
backdrop of competing desires - i.e., if the room were hot, I might be less
inclined to close the door.
c. The reasoning employed in the comparison of alternatives is necessarily modal: if
I do this, then such-and-such might happen.
d. Alternatives are agent-relative in the sense that they are possible for the agent only
insofar as it is aware of them.
Honoring the Precision Constraint requires an account of alternatives such that values can be attached to
them. This is no small matter, and the task is greatly complicated by (d). Let us, then, set about doing
this in stages. For now, suspend (d); suppose that we have an agent, Omniscient Agent, or O.A. for
short. O.A. is special because he is omniscient. O.A. knows exactly what he can and cannot do. At
any given time he knows the full catalogue of his alternatives. What are O. A.'s deliberations like?
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At any given time t, O.A. has a complete list of alternative actions. An action is on the list
only if O.A. can perform the action at t-we might say they are 'O. A.-possible' actions. The list is
exhaustive, in the sense that every possible alternative action occurs on the list, and at least one of the
actions on the list must be performed. Note that in order to be exhaustive, the list must always include
the alternative “do nothing”. So that the list is manageable, it must only contain those actions which
O.A. can do at t. An action open to O.A. at t + one hour would not count as an alternative at t.
Moreover, to be an alternative each entry on the list must be distinct from any other entry on the list: no
duplicates are allowed, even if it is the same action under a different description. The list is therefore
exclusive in the sense that there are no two entries on the list such O.A. can perform both at t. In sum,
what O.A. has at t is an exclusive and exhaustive list of O.A.-possible actions, which is about as far as
we can take a decidedly informal account.
5.6.2. 1 O.A. -Possibility
O.A. is omniscient; he is not omnipotent. It is not the case that every possible alternative
action occurs on O.A.'s list, since some actions are beyond his abilities. To be sure, O.A.'s abilities
have everything to do with what counts as an O.A.-possibility. Yet I am not concerned with O.A.'s
abilities here. Instead, I want to get a reasonably firm grasp on the concept of O.A.-possibility. When
we say that it is possible for O.A. to, for instance, close the door, what do we mean by that statement?
Fortunately, the semantics of modal operators like “possible” or “necessary” are reasonably
well-established and provide a particularly elegant way of understanding O.A.-possibility. (Hughes and
Cresswell, 1996; Loux, 1979) Briefly,
“Possibly, P” is true iff, for some possible world w, “P” is true at w,
and
“Necessarily, P” is true iff, for every possible world w, “P” is true at w.
The statement that
Possibly, O.A. closes the door
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is true just in case there is a possible world where O.A. closes the door. Thus, an action is O.A.-
possible just in there is a possible world where O.A. performs the action.
To enrich the picture, let us make the plausible assumption that there is a primitive similarity
relation on possible worlds. We shall say that a possible world is closer to the actual world than
another if it has a greater similarity to the actual world. We now a choice to make: either the similarity
relation imposes a partial ordering on possible worlds, or it imposes a total ordering. If partial, then two
or more worlds may be equally close to the actual world. If total, then no two worlds are equally close
to the actual world. Here's an easy way to picture the difference: If we think of the actual world as the
origin of a graph and possible worlds as orbiting about this origin, then a total ordering of possible
worlds strings them out in such a way that no two share the same orbit, whereas a partial ordering
allows for shared orbits. (Figure 5.1) Lewis (1973, pp. 48-50) prefers a partial ordering on possible
worlds, perhaps for good reason. It seems intuitively clear that two possible worlds may be equally
similar to the actual world and yet not be identical. Still, a total ordering is less complicated, so I
follow Stalnaker (1968) and suppose that no two possible worlds share an orbit. Note that this
assumption is made purely for the sake of simplicity; my account of deliberation may be suitably
redrawn in terms of partially ordered possible worlds, if need be.
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5. 6. 2.2 Counterfactual Reasoning
The advantage of employing possible world semantics is not especially obvious until one recalls
that comparing alternative courses of action is essentially an exercise in counterfactual analysis. It is
not enough that O.A. knows he can shut the door. He must know what he seeks to achieve by shutting
the door, and he must be able to compare how well shutting the door achieves that end versus other
alternative actions. Such reasoning is counterfactual reasoning - reasoning about what would or might
happen were some course of action taken. 4
Normally, counterfactuals are analyzed in terms of possible worlds.
If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q
is true just in case the nearest P-world (the nearest world at which “P” is true) is also a Q-world. Note
that we can say “the nearest world” because we have assumed that the similarity relation gives a total
ordering on the class of possible worlds. 5
It may be objected that the reasoning is clearly not counterfactual, because
counterfactual reasoning involves reasoning about what would be the case if some fact
obtained which does not. Perhaps so, but possible courses of action do not obtain at
the actual world prior to their being done. So, strictly speaking, the antecedents of
counterfactuals describing courses of action are false. In any case, there is no reason
to think that the antecedents of counterfactuals must be false. As Lewis (1973) puts it,
Counterfactuals with true antecedents - counterfactuals that are not
counterfactual - are not automatically false, nor do they lack truth value.
This stipulation does not seem to me at all artificial. Granted, the
counterfactual constructions in English do carry some sort of presupposition
that the antecedent is false. It is some sort of mistake to use them unless the
speaker does take the antecedent to be false, and some sort of mishap to use
them when the speaker wrongly takes the antecedent to be false. But there is
no reason to suppose that every sort of presupposition failure must produce
falsity or a truth-value gap. Some or all sorts of presupposition, and in
particular the presupposition that the antecedent of a counterfactual is false,
may be mere matters of conversational implicature, without any effect on
truth conditions, (p. 3)
In the case of a partial ordering,
If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q
is true just in case any P-world which is not a Q-world is further than some P-world
which is a also Q-world. If we assume that there is a lower bound on how close a
possible world can be to the actual world, this simplifies to the statement that all the
nearest P-Worlds are Q-worlds.
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To be sure, an agent in the position of being able to reason in terms of ‘would’ counterfactuals
is a very fortunate agent indeed. Normally, we don't know with any kind of certainty what would
happen gl ven an action on our part, unless we are conducting a well-confirmed experiment of some sort
- e.g., sitting on the surface of the earth and dropping a pen to see if it will fall. Mixed with our own
uncertainties is the chaos found so often in nature. Nature itself often resists prediction beyond
statistical generalization. To account for the vagaries of nature and an agent’s expected lack of
information, we ought to focus on a weaker kind of counterfactual:
If it were the case that P, then it might be the case that Q.
Under a total ordering of possible worlds, we can say that statements of this form—‘might’
counterfactuals—are true just in case some P-world is also a Q-world. Of course, this is to read ‘might’
in the sense of ‘bare possibility’. Surely ‘might’ comes in many different flavors. The less distance we
have to travel out from the actual world to find a P-world which is also a Q-world, the stronger the
flavor of ‘might’ - i.e., the more likely it will be the case that Q given P.
Getting back to examples, let us suppose that O.A. is a professor in much the same situation as
I find myself. Like me, O.A. seeks to minimize distractions. Unlike me, he is omniscient, so he knows
all his alternatives at t. Many alternatives are completely irrelevant to the chore of minimizing
distractions. He knows he could, for instance, jump up on the table and dance a jig, something which
would never cross my mind. Or he could run screaming from the classroom. Any genuine alternative is
allowed in O.A.’s list of alternatives. But only some of these alternatives are relevant to minimizing
distractions, while some, like dancing a jig, would surely have just the opposite effect. Of the relevant
alternatives, let us consider only shutting the door, asking the noisy students to be quiet, or asking their
professor to put them someplace else. O.A. is sure that if he were to shut the door, distractions might
be minimized. He is sure that if he were to speak to the students, distractions might be minimized. He
is also sure that if he were to speak to the students, distractions might be minimized.
Suppose further that O.A. has no more reason against doing one than the other. He’s equally
happy to close the door, speak to the students, or speak to their professor. Then his puzzle is to figure
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out Which of the three alternatives is most likely to minimize distractions. Of course, it's not much of a
puzzle: O.A. is omniscient, after all.
Associated with each action is the class of possible worlds wherein O.A. performs the action .6
The door-shutting class of possible worlds contains all and only those worlds where O.A. shuts the door.
The speak-to-students class of possible worlds contains all and only those worlds where O.A. speaks to
the students. And the speak-to-professor class of possible worlds contains all and only those possible
worlds where O.A. speaks to the professor. Each class of possible worlds is ordered by similarity: some
worlds are more similar, or closer, than other possible worlds within a given class. Somewhere along
the line of door-shutting worlds, there is one where distractions are also minimized. Somewhere along
the line of speak-to-student worlds, there is one where distractions are minimized. Somewhere along
the line of speak-to-professor worlds, there is one where distractions are minimized.
We can conceive of O.A. s deliberation as the problem of determining which of the three
worlds is closest to the actual world—and thus most likely. Since the speak-to-student which is a
minimize distraction world also involves, we should not be surprised to find, either sudden fainting or
inexplicable muteness, that world is surely a considerable distance from the actual world. Since the
speak-to-professor and minimize distraction world also includes the cooperation of the professor, it
seems that this world, while not as distant as the speak-to-students and minimize distraction world, is
nonetheless further than the door-shutting and minimize distraction world. Hence, by elimination, the
best alternative, the one most likely to achieve O.A.'s end, is for him to shut the door.
Naturally, other considerations might have altered the ranking of the worlds. On an especially
hot day, distraction would not be minimized, since a stuffy, hot room is at least as bad as a noisy one.
Or maybe O.A. suffers from claustrophobia whenever he is in a room with a shut door, so he dreads
this alternative and would take it only as a last resort. By assuming earlier that O.A. was equally happy
with each of the alternatives, I artificially suspended any consideration of the relative value of an
alternative so as to reduce the problem to one of merely determining which alternative is most likely to
achieve O.A.'s end. In truth, situations where the only consideration is which alternative will most
6 At t, specifically. But for the rest of this I assume an implied “at t”.
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expeditiously lead to a desired end are rare. Human agents, at any rate, also evaluate alternatives in
terms ot additional factors. Some alternatives are less desirable than others simply because the actions
they involve are less pleasurable. Even if some non-human agents do not have such prejudices, the fact
that human agents do should be countenanced by my (general) account of deliberation. For the same
reason, it turns out that there are surprisingly many ways of determining which may be the ‘best'
alternative, and that is as it should be if the account is indeed general. More on choosing the best
alternative shortly.
5.6.2. 3 A Picture of Alternatives, Exclusivity, and Exhaustion
A particularly elegant picture of alternatives emerges when we recall that the class of possible
worlds at which a given agent performs a given action may be usefully identified with the proposition
that the agent performs the action. The proposition that O.A. shuts the door just is, by definition, the
class of possible worlds in which he shuts the door. Making use of this identification allows us to
construct a fairly intuitive picture of deliberation. Imagine an agent at the actual world. At any given
time, radiating out from the agent like spokes on a wagon wheel are all the agent’s alternatives,
represented as strings of possible worlds which are (totally) ordered by the similarity relation. But only
some of these alternatives are relevant to achieving the agent's desire, in the sense that only some of the
alternatives contain worlds wherein the agent's desire is satisfied. Thus, the agent need only compare
spokes on a segment of the wheel, as in Figure 5.2 below.
Note, too, that we have a neat way of understanding how alternatives are exclusive and
exhaustive. The agent's alternatives are exclusive in the sense that spokes never intersect: no possible
world finds itself in two alternatives, or, equivalently, the intersection of any two alternatives (set of
possible worlds) is empty. And the agent's alternatives are exhaustive in the sense that one of the
possible worlds will be actual.
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Alternatives
Figure 5.2. Exclusive and Exhaustive Alternatives
5. 6. 2. 3.1 Genuine vs. Perceived Alternatives
O.A. is special because he is omniscient. At any given time, he is perfectly aware of all of his
alternatives. O.A. is unique because what he perceives to be his alternatives are his alternatives, and
vice versa. It is easy to imagine a dim-witted agent which has alternatives it doesn't know it has and,
worse yet, believes it has alternatives which it does not. Examples are not all that hard to find among
human agents, so I won't go into them here. Suffice it to say that a distinction must be drawn between
an agent's ‘genuine’ alternatives and its ‘perceived' alternatives.
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human agents, so I won't go into them here, Suffiee it to say that a distinction must be drawn between
an agent's 'genuine' alternatives and its ‘perceived’ alternatives.
An agent s genuine alternatives, as I have been conceiving them, are a set of propositions
(understood as sets of possible worlds) that the agent perform some action which are time-identical,
exclusive, and exhaustive. To say that an agent perceive an alternative to be such is just to say that the
agent believes that the action is open to it, even if the action is not specified amongst the agent's
genuine alternatives. In general, an agent's perceived alternatives are just what the agent believes, at
any given time, are its genuine alternatives.
5-6. 2.4 Choosing the Best Alternative
Being aware of one's alternatives is only the first step. The second step is to evaluate
perceived alternatives so as to determine what to do. This is where my interests begin to coincide with
some of the more normative research themes in Decision Theory, with the caveat that I do not take
sides. I want to meet the Generality Constraint; any way of choosing an alternative is as good as any
other from my perspective. The advantage of the account of alternatives I have put forward is that it is
compatible with any choice technique. To make the point, I will briefly describe a few. Bear in mind
that I am not promoting any of these as a good or even reasonable way to choose between alternatives.
Some, I expect, would result in a hopelessly ineffective agent.
5. 6.2.4.1 Most Likely Method
With a single goal in mind, an agent may employ a strategy whereby the alternative chosen is
simply the most likely to achieve that end. In the framework I’ve constructed, the agent selects the
alternative which contains the nearest goal-world over any other alternative. In cases of ties between
alternatives, the agent flips a coin, employs some other random determining process, or adds in
additional ‘sub-goals' to the equation.
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5. 6.2.4.2 Least Likely Method
A distinct approach would be to choose the alternative which is least likely to not result in the
goal. The alternative in which one must go the furthest-out to get to a non-goal world is the option of
choice, even if the nearest goal-world is actually further out than on some other alternative.
5. 6. 2.4. 3 Qualitative Ranking
Using prior experience, an agent might order alternatives based on preferences for actions
which ignore the likelihood of the goal (almost) altogether. The goal must, of course, occur at some
world in the alternative, which is not saying very much. The agent's preferences may be based on how
pleasant or unpleasant an action was found to be in the past, assuming the agent is capable of pleasure
and displeasure.
5. 6.2.4.4 Qualitative Likelihood Method
Given a preference ranking of alternatives based solely on prior experience, an agent might
very well weigh preferences for alternatives against the likelihood of an alternative resulting in the
desired goal. This is something of a combination of the Most Likely Method with Qualitative Ranking.
I suspect something like it is how human agent's actually go about making decisions, but that is for
social psychologists to pursue. In any case, it may be that a less-likely alternative will be chosen, given
strong preferences against a more-likely alternative.
5. 6. 2.4.5 Highest Probability Method
The Most Likely Method asks the agent to make rough, ‘more likely/less likely' judgments.
Imagine an agent that has the ability to make precise judgments by assessing precise numeric
probabilities. Selecting the action(s) with the highest probability of having the desired outcome would
be simple for such an agent, although an agent employing this strategy would doubtless choose much
the same as an agent employing the Most Likely Method.
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5.6.24.6 Total Probability Method
A more sophisticated variant on the Highest Probability Method, the Total Probability Method
again requires that an agent have the capacity to assess precise probability values. But where the agent
employing the Highest Probability Method only uses the numbers to establish which is the closest
alternative-and-goal world, the agent who employs the Total Probability Method assesses the probability
that an alternative will result in the desired goal versus the probability that it will not. Thus at least two
worlds are considered in each alternative: the nearest goal-world and the nearest non-goal-world. (More
complicated divisions of what is to be achieved would result in more, perhaps many more, worlds being
considered.) An alternative wherein the non-goal world is closer to the actual world than the goal-world
may be rejected even if the goal-world is closer than any other alternative's nearest goal-world.
5.6.24.7 Desirability Method
At times an agent may forgo considerations of probability altogether. Instead, each outcome is
assessed a value, and the alternative which accrues the greatest total value is the alternative chosen, ties
notwithstanding. Such agents are like lottery players, since they ignore the probability of an outcome
altogether.
5.6.24.8 Total Desirability Method
An agent might also combine the last two methods to determine the value of an alternative by
multiplying the desirability of each outcome by its probability under a given alternative and summing
the result to get a total desirability measure of the alternative. This, in effect, is how analysis goes in
Bayesian Decision Theory.
5. 6. 2.5 Deliberate, Even If Poorly
All of the above methods for alternative choice assume that, on some understanding of ‘best',
the best alternative ought to be taken. It may, however, be ‘better’, long run, to choose the next best
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alternative at each opportunity. This, at least, is what the Prisoner's Dilemma appears to demonstrate.7
In any case, I trust that I have made a strong case for having met the Generality Constraint. The upshot
is that, at root, deliberation is a matter of comparing alternatives. It matters not how alternatives are
compared, only that they are compared. Agents are still agents, we should all hope, even when they
deliberate poorly or employ poor strategies for comparing alternatives.
5.6.3 Forming Intentions
Deliberation, insofar as it is understood as the comparison of alternatives, backs deliberate
action in the sense that without deliberation there is no hope of deliberate action. Alone, deliberation is
at least a necessary condition on deliberate action. My hope from the outset, however, has been to
develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for deliberate action. Surely deliberation is one of
the more important antecedents of deliberate action. What further conditions must obtain which,
together with deliberation, suffice for deliberate action?
A common claim heard in Practical Reasoning circles (Aune, 1990) is that merely deciding that
an alternative is at least as good as any other does not suffice for acting on the alternative. I might
decide that it would be best to shut the door, but not shut the door. A further step is needed. Once I
judge that shutting the door is best, I must form the intention to shut the door. Once the intention is
formed, I will then proceed to shut the door. An intention of this sort might be expressed by the
statement
I will shut the door.
Deliberation and deliberate action are thereby mediated by the formation of an appropriate intention.
I take issue with the view that deliberation and deliberate action are mediated by intention
formation. First, I do not see how the formation of intention manages to bridge the gap between
deliberation and action. The problem, recall, is to link the result of deliberation - to wit, the judgment
An interesting research program would involve putting agents in similar contexts but
have them employ differing methods to see which method actually comes out ahead. I
suspect that evolution has taken care to get human agents to a place where our
strategies are usually effective.
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that an action is best - with the subsequent performance of the action. There is an apparent gap
between judging that it would be best to do x and doing x. Presumably, forming the intention to do x is
supposed to bridge this gap, because in forming the intention to do x the agent chooses to do x. But
surely there is a similar gap between judging that it would be best to do x and choosing to do x. How
should we fill that gap? By forming an intention to form an intention?
Second, even if it were the case that human agents mediated all deliberation and deliberation
action with intention formation, there is no reason to think that every possible agent must do so.
Remember that efficiency is a deliberative virtue. An agent normally has very little time to act.
Pausing to form an intention to act prior to every deliberate act would make for a rather slow agent. A
quicker agent would, presumably, have the judgment of their deliberations coupled directly to action.
However that might be worked out, it seems plausible to suppose - especially given my concern that the
formation of intention does nothing to fill the gap - that a possible agent does not employ intention
formation to act.
A case in point: I don’t think even human agents always mediate their deliberations and their
actions by forming intentions, if they ever do. I have a glass of water on my desk. I feel a sudden
thirst, so I take a drink of water. My taking a drink of water was never, to my mind at least, mediated
by any intention formation. I simply did it. When I say “I simply did it”, I don't mean that I did not
consider, however briefly, whether or not to take a drink. It crossed my mind that I could get a cold
water from the fridge. In other words, I compared alternatives. I deliberated, even if it was only for a
split second. But settling on taking a drink of this water coincided exactly, so far as I’m concerned,
with my taking a drink of water. Introspectively, there was no light between the judging and the doing.
If the formation of intentions does not bridge the gap, and if even human agents do not
necessarily form intentions, then how do we account for the apparent gap between judging best and
acting accordingly? Perhaps the problem is that we see a gap where there is none. According to the
received view, deliberation insofar as it pertains to action always concludes with the judgment that some
alternative is at least as good as any other alternative. It is one thing to make the judgment, quite
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another to act on the judgment - voila, a gap! Yet notice that a subtle assumption has been introduced:
deliberation concludes with an ‘at least as good as’ or ‘better than the rest' judgment.
Ever since Aristotle introduced the Practical Syllogism, deliberation has been placed, for the
most part, within the framework of deductive inference. The statement that
This alternative is at least as good as any other alternative
is deductively tractable. It has well-behaved, two-valued truth conditions. That seems to be an
excellent place to draw the line between deliberation and non-deliberative pursuits, since drawing the
line any later is apparently logically illicit. Suppose deliberation concluded with the formation of
intention, (which would be one way, at least, of closing the gap between judgment and intention, even if
it did nothing to close the gap between intention and action.) My intention to shut the door is not true
or false. At best, we can follow Aune's lead (1986) and say that my intention is bivalent in the sense
that it is either realized or unrealized. If deliberation concludes with some statement that is true or
false, then it seems that intentions are not fit to be conclusions of deliberation. How can something
which has no truth value per se be inferred?
I suspect that this problem is an historical artifact, due in large measure to the aristotelian
heritage enjoyed by Practical Reasoning. Interestingly, Aune is worried about closing the gap between
judgment and intention, and he thinks he has a way of extending deliberation to the formation of
intention.
Suppose we grant that volitional statements do express intentions and
that intentions have some special values. What could such values
be? The only plausible answer I know of is that they are realized
(=/?) or unrealized (=(/), since we naturally think of intentions as
realized or not. If we accept this suggestion, we can quickly see that
a volitional statement has the value R just when its corresponding
indicative is true. Thus, “I will do A” is R just when “I shall do A”
is T (or true). Given this, there is no need (as far as logic is
concerned) to distinguish the values R and T (or U and F, = falsity).
If we assign a volitional statement the semantical value of its
corresponding indicative, the implications that would otherwise be
calculable by reference to ^-preservation can be immediately
determined by ordinary assertoric logic. From this perspective, the
difference between the volitional “I will do A” and the indicative “I
shall do A” is comparable, logically, to that between “p and q” and
“p but q” or even “p although q.” Empirically and (perhaps)
expressively different statement forms are regarded as logically
indiscernable. (1986, p. 310)
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Aune's suggestion amounts to this: the conclusion of deliberation may as well be taken to be
the formation of intention, since all that is required for a thing to enter into such reasoning is that it be
boolean - i.e., isomorphic to a two-valued algebra. Thus, there is no gap between judgment and
intention, since it is a simple matter of deductive inference to get from a judgment to an intention.
Why stop there? If, logically speaking, the formation of intention can be countenanced within
the framework of deliberation alone, then why not subsequent action as well? Just as Aune holds that
intentions are two-valued, we can hold that actions are two-valued: actions themselves conclude
deliberations (when they result in action), since actions are either performed (=P) or not-performed
(-A0. But if the conclusion of deliberation is extended to include actions, then there appears to be no
need to detour through intentions. More to the point, the apparent gap between judging and acting
evaporates if actions are directly inferred in deliberation, and deliberation alone suffices for deliberate
action, since an action concluding deliberation is a deliberate action. Put this (quite natural) way, there
is no problem with finding additional conditions which, when added to deliberation, will suffice for
deliberate action. Properly construed, deliberation itself is fully sufficient.
5.6.4 The Logic of Deliberation
The question of where deliberation concludes raises further questions about the logic of
deliberation. For example, thus far it has been assumed that deliberative logic is two- valued, which may
well be a prejudice on our part. Unfortunately, I cannot say much about the logic of deliberation
without violating the Generality Constraint. One can easily imagine agents that employ two-valued,
three-valued, many-valued, or even fuzzy logic. Relevance logic seems interesting, as does modal and
intuitionist logic. A given agent might not even employ deductive logic at all: inductive or analogic
reasoning may do just as well. More could be said only when the details of a particular agent's
deliberative process are provided.
In all of this we should bear in mind the distinction between what an agent actually does in
deliberating about what to do and how we represent what the agent is doing. How an agent actually
deliberates may not be easily represented by ordinary, numbered-line deductive proofs. How an agent,
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even a human agent, actually deliberates may do great violence to our notion of proper deliberation.
That is one reason why I have been operating at such an abstract level in my discussion of deliberation.
At most we can say that deliberation is the comparison of alternatives, which necessarily involves
counterfactual reasoning, by some one or more methods, whereby an action is sometimes concluded.
The picture of deliberation I’ve put forward is intended to be a fully general framework upon which the
antecedents of the deliberate actions of particular agents may be hung. The details of deliberation must
still be developed, but many of those details are agent-specific.
5.7 The Axiom of Deliberation
With the understanding that actions are suitable objects of inference, it is possible to give
agent-neutral, strategy-neutral, and normativity-neutral necessary and sufficient conditions on deliberate
action. Loosely, an agent's action is deliberate just in case the action concludes the agent's deliberations.
At its most general, deliberation involves the evaluation of perceived alternatives by some standard or
other. Hence, to RAAT we add
Axiom of Deliberation
A deliberately u’s at t iff A infers u-ing at t from
i. A’s belief that u-ing at t is an alternative to v-ing at t, w-ing at t,...
and
ii. A’s desire to u at t at least as much as v-ing at t, w-ing at t,...
5.8 Following up on the Identity Constraint: A Postscript
Earlier I suggested that we should be able to say something intelligent about agent identity once
we have discovered sufficient conditions on deliberate action. Since deliberation alone suffices for
deliberate action, it should come as no surprise that agent-identity tracks the identity of the deliberator.
For instance, suppose that some dinosaurs really did have two brains. Assuming brains are where
deliberations are conducted, then what we really have is one organism that is composed out of two
agents - provided that the deliberations are not shared or spread across the two brains. If, as
the poem
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suggests, each brain handled its own end of the dinosaur independently of the other brain, then we have
in effect two agents joined at the middle. Surely such a creature might find itself trying to back up and
go forward at the same time, which, perhaps, is also why agent-identity normally coincides with
organism-identity. Nature favors creatures that compete with each other; she frowns on creatures that
compete all by themselves.
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CHAPTER 6
BELIEF AND DESIRE
6.1 The Roots of Agency
How does an agent reason about alternatives? I am not asking about the strategy or logic an
agent might employ in reasoning about alternatives. As we have seen, strategy and logic can be
expected to vary across the range of possible agents; perhaps those differences are the only meaningful
way to distinguish between types of agents. No, the question I want to answer is, what, precisely, are
the underlying capacities an agent must have to be able to reason about alternatives?
Our best clue lies in deliberation. Any agent must have the capacity to compare alternatives in
a goal-directed fashion. Note the two parts to this: alternative-comparison and goal-direction.
6.1.1 Conceiving the Possible
An agent’s ability to compare alternatives presupposes the ability to contrast what it believes
might be the outcome it an action is taken. Loosely speaking, any agent must be able to conceive the
possible.
Understanding how an agent conceives the possible cannot be more difficult than understanding
how it conceives the actual, since conceiving the possible and conceiving the actual are not distinct
abilities. Consider that the agent may well be mistaken in conceiving either the actual or the possible.
That is, facts may be actual or they may be possible, and the agent might mistake either one. Hence the
ability to conceive the possible is no different than the ability to conceive the actual, since mistaken
beliefs about what is actual turn out to be correct beliefs about what is possible. In terms of possible
worlds, a false belief that Elvis is still alive at the actual world is true at some, no doubt distant,
possible world. The ability to form beliefs about what is possible differs from the ability to form beliefs
about what is actual only to the extent that the agent identifies the belief about what is possible as being
about what is possible, instead of as being about what is actual.
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We have our first line of attack on the roots of agency: An agent must be able to compare
alternatives, which presupposes its capacity to conceive of how things might be. Yet the ability to
conceive of how things might be is in principle no different than the ability to conceive of how things
are. Since the latter is usually understood in terms of the ability to form beliefs, understanding that
ability is where we shall shortly begin.
6.1.2 ...and Wanting to Make it Actual
An agent does not just have the capacity to form beliefs about what is possible, since a putative
agent would have no capacity to act all if it did not have some basis for comparing alternatives. The
usual way of understanding an agent's basis for comparison is in terms of the agent's desires: an agent
acts as it does because it has certain beliefs and certain desires.
What is it for an agent to have a desire? Presumably, having a desire is just like having a
belief about what is possible, except that in the case of having a belief about what is possible, the agent
is merely assenting to the possibility - as in, “yes, I agree that is possible” - as opposed to consenting
to the possibility - as in, “yes, I would like that to be actual”. Surely, though, the full story of wanting
to make a possibility actual is much more complicated than the shade of a difference between assent and
consent. Our second line of attack on the roots of agency examines what it is for an agent to want to
make the possible actual.
6.2 Belief
As with deliberation, I am interested in belief only insofar as it pertains to action. I suppose a
case might be made that belief is a much broader concept than, say, that minimum that is presupposed
by the agent's capacity to compare alternatives. Yet of what relevance is religious belief to the question
of whether or not to run a red light? Does a belief in the existence of gluons have any implication
whatsoever for deciding what play to see? I’ll agree that some clever person could conjure up contexts
where one’s belief in the existence of gluons is relevant to an assessment of alternatives. Perhaps my
peculiar interest in belief really does extend to belief as the term is generally employed. In any case, it
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IS important to note that ‘belief as I use the term is restricted to just so much as is required to
understand agency.
6.2.1 Criteria of Adequacy
The Generality and Precision Constraints, it goes without saying, are still in force. Sufficient
conditions on belief must be precisely statable and sufficiently general so that no prejudice is imported
which would bar certain kinds of agents from the debate. Of course, some prejudicing may be
legitimate if the restrictions are defensible - i.e., such that an organism failing to meet the sufficient
conditions would not be an agent.
To the Generality and Precision Constraints, let us add the Explanation Constraint. Adequate
sufficient conditions on belief should explain those features of belief which are relevant to agency:
• How is it that belief underwrites an agent's capacity to evaluate alternatives?
• How is it that a finite agent can have an indefinite number of beliefs?
• How is it that beliefs can be correct or incorrect with respect to both the actual
and the possible?
6.2.2 Preview
The volume of philosophical work on belief might be thought to make my job easier. It
doesn’t. Too many disagreements, points of departure, and subsidiary agendas make distilling out some
coherent line of thought a daunting task, as a quick perusal of Bogdan’s (1986a, p. 4) picture of the
debates reveals. Indeed, there are so many directions from which to enter the debates that it becomes
nearly impossible to do so in a way which fairly accounts for all the disagreements, departures, and
agendas.
Despite the variety and depth of work on belief, three approaches to belief are central. 1 The
Linguistic Approach requires that necessary and sufficient conditions on belief be given in terms of the
They are central in the same sense in which red, green, and blue are central in color
theory: just as every color is either one of the three or a composite of two or more,
every theory of belief is either one of the central three or a composite of those three.
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agent's relationship to linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities. The Dispositional Approach requires that
necessary and sufficient conditions on belief be given in terms of the agent's disposition to behave in
certain ways. The Picture Approach, lastly, requires that necessary and sufficient conditions on belief
be given in terms of the agent's relationship to a representation. For the reasons discussed in Appendix
B, I take the Picture Approach.
6.2.3 The Picture Approach
On the picture approach, an agent's beliefs either are or substantially involve mental
representations. The idea is that having a belief about the world is a matter of representing the world in
one way or another. A crude example: If Molly believes that the cat is sunning itself in the cat-tree,
then she has a mental picture of the cat on the cat-tree with the sun shining through the window.2 There
is a certain intuitive plausibility to the Picture Approach that is reinforced by a well-known semantic
peculiarity of belief ascriptions. One cannot infer
Alan believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn
from
Alan believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn,
A cat-tree, for those who are not cat-fans, is not exactly a tree. Rather, it is a big
piece of carpeted furniture with ledges and climbs and perches that particularly
indulgent cat owners sometimes like to spend lots of money buying or building. They
are usually set up in front of large windows so house-cats can have the illusion of
world-mastery. Not that it's always an illusion.
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despite the fact that "Samuel Clemens” and “Mark Twain” are co-referential terms
.
3 Alan may very
well agree that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn while vigorously denying that Samuel Clemens
wrote anything.
Similarly, one cannot infer that
Alan believes that squirrels have kidneys
from
Alan believes that squirrels have hearts,
even though the property ot having a kidney is co-extensive with the property of having a heart .4 Alan
may acknowledge that squirrels have hearts, but scoff at the idea that squirrels have kidneys. The belief
context is referentially opaque because the ordinary substitution of co-referential terms and co-extensive
properties, which is perfectly licit in other contexts, mysteriously fails in belief contexts.
The mystery is at least partially solved if we suppose that Alan's beliefs about Samuel Clemens,
aka Mark Twain, involve Alan's having a conception of Samuel Clemmens or representing Samuel
Clemens to himself.
Assuming, of course, that
Alan believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn
is taken in its de dicto, as opposed to de re, sense. That is to say, the inference could
be drawn if the statement that
Alan believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn
was taken to be the statement that
Alan believes, ofSamuel Clemens, that he wrote Huckleberry Finn
and the statement that
Alan believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn
was taken to be the statement that
Alan believes, ofMark Twain, that he wrote Huckleberry Finn,
since these de re readings place “Samuel Clemens” and “Mark Twain” outside the
belief context - i.e., what follows “that” in “Alan believes that”.
Again, assuming a de dicto reading of the statements.
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Substitution of “Samuel Clemens” for “Mark Twain” in
Alan believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn
fails because Alan represents Mark Twain as having written Huckleberry Finn and, of the various
representations he has that involve representations of Samuel Clemens (he may have none), the
representation of Samuel Clemens as having written Huckleberry Finn is not among them. An agent's
beliefs, therefore, are associated with representations the agent has of the objects and properties about
which the agent has the beliefs.5
Philosophers are no less swayed by intuitive plausibility than anyone else; the problem of
giving an account of mental representation has been pursued with great vigor in the literature (Stich and
Warfield, 1994). Mental representation alone is not belief, however, since Molly may well conceive or
picture the cat as sunning itself on the cat-tree and yet not believe that the cat is sunning itself on the
cat-tree.
6 She must somehow affirm or hold it to be the case that the cat is sunning itself on the cat-
tree. Any account of belief taking the Picture Approach must therefore be two-factored; it must account
I use the phrase “associated representation” as a ploy to avoid an important
controversy. Fregean theories of reference, or theories of mediated reference, hold that
a term's reference is mediated by its sense (or how the object is conceived or
understood). Theories of direct reference hold that there is no such mediation: “Mark
Twain simply refers to Samuel Clemens, without the involvement of how Samuel
Clemens is conceived. The divide between mediated reference theories and direct
reference theories may be neatly straddled by remaining agnostic on whether or not the
representations associated with beliefs mediate reference. Perhaps some agents refer to
objects via the ways in which they represent those objects while others do not. The
debate over mediated versus direct reference is a debate over whether humans are
agents of the former or the latter kind. I am inclined to think that the representations
human agents make to themselves in some way mediates reference, since otherwise the
mystery of the referential opacity of belief contexts would remain a mystery. But I
may well be mistaken. At the very least, it seems plausible to suppose that there could
be agents that do not employ representations to mediate reference. On the other hand,
it is very hard to imagine an agent that does not associate representations with beliefs.
Indeed, since deliberation presupposes the comparison of alternatives, and since the
comparison of alternatives presupposes the agent's ability to conceive of how things
might be, agency presupposes the capacity for representation - much more on this
argument later. The point to be emphasized here is that I am taking no stand on how
the agent uses associated representation with respect to reference.
See Appendix B for a discussion of the distinction between merely conceiving that x is
F and believing that x is F.
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for the agent's representattons and the agent's altitudes towards those representations. Work on mental
representation is helpful, but it is by no means the whole story on belief.
Surprisingly, I have not found a single source for an account of belief that takes the Picture
Approach. Representation is, apparently, thought to be more challenging than attitude, since it receives
the lion’s share of the philosophical interest. Nonetheless, I think I can stitch together an account of
belief from three independent sources:
From Cummins (1996), I extract a framework that explains how beliefs can be correct or
in error about the actual and the possible and explains how belief underwrites deliberation.
From Bogdan (1986b), I extract a framework that accounts for the agent's belief-attitude
and explains just how it is that a finite agent can have an indefinite number of beliefs.
• From Swoyer (1991), I appropriate a formal apparatus that is both mathematically tractable
and sufficiently robust to flesh-out the framework built up from Cummins and Bogdan.
6.2.4 Cummins
The framework we require from Cummins is given early and quickly in “Representations,
Targets, and Attitudes” (1996, pp. 5-22). His stated goal is to try and understand how (mental)
representations can be in error. But I suspect, happily, that there is a hidden agenda. Here and there,
Cummins discusses the role of mental representation in cognition, which turns out to be very much like
our deliberation. Indeed, I was delighted to see that he begins the entire project with a chess-playing
example. Error comes first for Cummins, but he is keen to understand how mental representation
underwrites deliberation.
Picking up where Cummins begins, and supposing that we have some vague feel for what a
representation is, what is representational error? “The obvious way to think of representational error, as
Jerry Fodor once said to me in conversation, is this: Error occurs when a representation is applied to
something it is not true of, for example, when one applies a representation of a horse to a cow.”
(Cummins, 1996, p. 8.) A representation represents something, but it may well not represent what it is
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supposed to represent. There is a gap between what a representatton represents and what it is supposed
to represent, and that gap suffices for representational error. To get a handle on the gap, Cummins
introduces some terminology.
Agent's don't have, construct, oxform representations, they token them.7 Tokening a
representation presupposes that there is something, actual or possible, to be represented. The target of a
tokened representation is what the representation is supposed to represent, while the content of a
tokened representation is what the representation actually represents. Cummins does not put it quite this
way, but if R is a tokened representation, then we can think of there being a content function C and a
target function T such that C(R) is the content of a given tokening of R and T(R) is the target of a
given tokening of R. An application of R to T(R) is correct, or not in error, just in case T(R) = C(R).
The possibility that T(R) * C(R) accounts for error.
For example, I token a representation of the cat sunning itself on the cat-tree when told that
that is what the cat is doing now. The target of this representation is what the cat is doing now. The
content of this representation is the cat sunning itself on the cat tree. If the target and the content of my
representation coincide, then my use of my representation of the cat sunning itself in the cat-tree now is
correct because the cat is now sunning itself in the cat-tree. Were the cat in the kitchen having a bite to
eat, then the target of my representation - what the cat is doing now - would be of the cat eating in the
kitchen, while the content of my representation is still of the cat sunning itself in the cat-tree. Hence
my use of the representation I have constructed — okay, tokened - is in error; I'm using my
representation of the cat sunning itself in the cat-tree to represent what the cat is doing now, but the cat
is now getting a bite to eat in the kitchen (and no doubt chuckling to itself.) Again, the content of my
Even though it is grammatically legitimate, I dislike using ‘token' as a verb. 1 find the
idea of tokening a representation murky. Presumably, what the agent does in tokening
a representation is to form a representation. Yet “tokens a representation” suggests,
misleadingly, that the representation is something distinct from what the agent actually
constructs. Perhaps the idea is that there is an abstract representation type, of which
the agent then forms a token or just tokens, for short. Or maybe the idea is that a
single agent can put together the ‘same' representation on two different occasions -
twice tokening a given representation. I've tried replacing ‘tokens' with ‘constructs' or
‘forms', ‘tokened' with ‘constructed' or ‘formed', and ‘tokening' ‘construction' or
‘formation
1
. It works amazingly well. But Cummins preference is for ‘tokening', so I
follow his lead.
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representation is wha, the representation is actually about, and the target of my representat.on is what
the representation is supposed to be about. Recall how Fodor put it: "Error occurs when a
representation is applied to something it is not true of...".
The distinction in this formulation between what a representation is
applied to and what it is true of is precisely the distinction between a
representation s target and its content. The crucial point is that what
determines what a representation is true of must be independent of
what determines what it is applied to, otherwise error is problematic.
It follows from this that a theory of representational content—
a
theory that says what it is for R to be true o/[C(R)]—is only part of
the story about representation. We require, in addition, a theory of
target fixation, a theory that says what it is for R to be applied to
[T(R)]. Since the target of tokening a representation is, as it were,
the thing the representation is intended to represent, I shall say that
representations mean (or represent) their contents, but that a use of a
representation intends its target. Intentionality is thus different from
meaning
; the former is part of the theory of targets, while the latter is
part of the theory of representational content. Using this
terminology, we can say that representational error occurs when there
is a mismatch between what a representation means and what its use
intends. The intentional content of [R] is therefore not the actual
content of [R] at all, but, rather, the intended content of some use of
[R]. (Cummins, 1996, p. 8.)
An account of mental representation must explain how the use of a tokened representation R acquires its
target T(R) as well as explaining how the representation has the content C(R) it has. If Cummins is
right, understanding mental representation in such a way as to make sense of error is at least twice as
difficult as previously thought. But what, exactly, is error, and why is it so important?
6.2.4. 1 Kermit's Mistake
I find that a well-developed concrete example helps in understanding error. Frogs depend
primarily on vision for hunting and evading predators on land. As it happens, the frog's visual
apparatus has been extensively studied (Lettvin, et. al., 2000). The apparatus consists of about 1 million
receptors (rods and cones), 2.5 to 3.5 million connecting neurons, and .5 million ganglion cells. Thus
the path from receptor to ganglion is not one-to-one. Curiously, a single receptor has synaptic paths to
many ganglion cells, and a single ganglion cell has synaptic paths from many receptors. Why is this a
curiosity?
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If the frog's field of vision were to be presented to the frog’s brain as a simple matrix of point-
light intensities corresponding even remotely to the distribution of receptors, there would have to be
something approximating a one-to-one relationship between the receptors and the ganglion cells. The
frog’s eye is thus not merely a sensor whose input is interpreted by the frog's brain; either we have a
complete mess, or something much more subtle is going in frog vision. An important clue is found in
the shape of the branching dendrites from the ganglion cells; the ganglion cells can be differentiated into
several different types by the morphology of their dendrites. The different types of ganglion cells have
different operational characteristics. Four operational characteristics have been verified experimentally
(Lettvin, et. al., 2000):
Sustained Contrast Detection
Ganglion cells with this operational characteristic fire immediately and continue firing
when a sharp-edged object that is either lighter or darker than the background is
moved into the frog's field of vision. The firing is largely independent of the general
illumination.
Net Convexity Detection
Moving a small object into the frog's field of vision results in a firing from ganglion
cells with this operational characteristic. Moving the object into the field causes a
sustained firing, while moving the object through the field results in a corresponding
on-off firing.
Moving Edge Detection
The leading and trailing edges of larger objects moving across the frog's visual field
fire ganglion cells with this operational characteristic in an on-off-on-off pattern which
has a frequency roughly correlated with the velocity of the object.
Net Dimming Detection
A change in illumination fires ganglion cells with this operational characteristic. The
less the total illumination, the more sensitive these cells are to changes in illumination.
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The upshot is that the frog has four kinds of what we might as well call detectors that appear to be
adapted to specific purposes.
The operations thus have much more the flavor of perception than of
sensation if that distinction has any meaning now. That is to say that
the language in which they are best described is the language of
complex abstractions from the visual image. We have been tempted,
for example, to call the convexity detectors “bug perceivers.” Such a
fiber (operation 2) responds best when a dark object, smaller than a
receptive field, enters that field, stops, and moves about intermittently
thereafter. The response is not affected if the lighting changes or if
’
the background (say a picture of grass and flowers) is moving, and is
not there if only the background, moving or still, is in the field.
Could one better describe a system for detecting an accessible bu<>^
(Lettvin, et. al„ 2000, p. 395.)
The example I have in mind involves these ‘bug detectors’. Suppose Kermit is sitting on a lilly
pad. A fly lands on the pad in front of Kermit. The fly zig-zags for a moment as flies often do, and
Kermit promptly slurps up the fly. If the biological evidence is correct, Kermit's bug detectors are
tiring vigorously all the while the fly is in Kermit's visual field. Presumably, Kermit's bug detectors
form a representation of a bug in Kermit’s vicinity which Kermit uses in conjunction with the other
detectors tor localization and slurping activities. The target of Kermit's tokened fly-representation is
determined by the functioning of Kermit's bug detectors, while the content of the tokened fly-
representation is determined in part by the type of representation of which Kermit's bug detectors have
formed a token - a bug, in particular. Cummins (1996) dubs such detectors intenders.
Think of cognitive systems as incorporating mechanisms whose
function is to represent certain things. For example, the function of a
simple visual system might be to represent the local spatial
layout—the relative sizes, shapes, and distances of objects from one
another and from the observer. When this mechanism constructs a
representation, the target of the representation it constructs is the
current local spatial layout, whatever that happens to be. So the
representational function of the mechanism, together with the current
state of the world, determines what the current target is. I call
mechanisms like this - mechanisms with specified representational
functions - intenders, for the mind's contribution to intentional
content, that is, to target fixation, is determined by the
representational functions of such mechanisms. Perceptual systems
are intenders in this sense, and they have more primitive intenders as
components. The visual system, for example, might have intenders
whose business is to represent corners or edges [...or bugs, as the
case may be.] (pp. 8-9.)
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An intender fixes a representation’s target, but the target it fixes need not be the content of the
representation. Using Cummins' terminology, Kermifs bug detectors are bug intenders
,
and bug
mtenders aren t perfect. If they were, they would form a bug-representation when and only when there
is actually a bug in Kermit’s visual field. Suppose we tie a dark bit of fuzz on the end of a hair-thin
line and jerk the fuzz into Kermifs visual field. Predictably, Kermit slurps the fuzz. Kermit's bug
intenders token a representation that has a bug as it's content, but the target they fix for the tokened
representation is a piece of fuzz. 8
Shall we say that Kermifs tokened representation is in error? As natural as this may sound, it
is a mistake to think that representations per se are subject to error. A token of the same bug
representation type in another context - a context in which there really is a bug in front of Kermit -
would not be in error. As Cummins puts it, “[t]he same representation can be error in one intender (or
in one intention, as we might say), but not in another.” (1996, p. 10.) For Kermit, the error is not in the
representation itself. Rather, the error is in the functioning of the bug intender. The bug intender
targets a piece of fuzz as a bug. Oops.
Rod Grupen has argued in conversation that the content of Kermifs representation is
certainly not a bug, since a frog clearly fails to have the conceptual capacities to grasp
a concept as complex as bugness. Marcus (1993) discusses the problem this way:
It is of interest to note that Ramsey (1990, p. 40) allows a sense of ‘belief in
which we may, using his curious example, attribute a belief to a chicken who
has acquired an aversion to eating a species of caterpillar on account of prior
unpleasant experiences. We surely cannot attribute to the chicken the belief
that the caterpillar is poisonous, but surely we will not go too far afield if we
attribute the belief that the caterpillar is not for eating. And, indeed, if
presented with a caterpillar that had the appearance of the despised kind but
was in fact of an edible kind, the chicken would be mistaken about its
edibility, (pp. 236-237.)
Grupen could just as well argue that the concept of being not for eating is far to
complex for an animal as sublimely stupid as a chicken, and I would have to agree.
Yet there is a distinction to be drawn between the content of a representation and the
way in which we describe that content. It may be that our description is far richer
than the content, but that is not a problem unique to the attribution of beliefs to non-
human animals or, perhaps, machines. My description of the content of a child's
mental representation is doubtless richer than the child's undeveloped cognitive
capacities would allow, yet that fact does not stymie my ability to explain the child's
actions.
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It would be correct to say that Kermit's bug intender has misrepresented the piece of fuzz as a
bug, but we must be careful to avoid confusing misrepresentation with representing falsely. It is
tempting to suppose that “Kermit's bug intender has misrepresented the piece of fuzz as a bug” is
equivalent to "Kermit’s bug intender has falsely represented the piece of fuzz as a bug.”
But this is a confusion of misrepresentation and falsehood. Once we
see that targets are determined by intenders and not by the
representations they token, we are in a position to see that error is
distinct from falsehood. Suppose E tokens r when it needs to
represent x as F, but that r represents x as G. This is error even if x
really is G, so falsehood is not a necessary condition of error.
Moreover, failing to represent x as F when x's being F is the target is
error even if x is not F. Where is it written that a system needs only
to represent the facts? Often—in hypothetical reasoning, for
example—2 will need to represent x as F even though x is not F.
Falsehood in the goal box is normal; tokening truths in the goal box
is a kind of pathology.9 (Cummins, 1996, p. 11.)
Cummins' example prompts a brief digression. Recall my assertion that Cummins' framework
will explain how belief underwrites deliberation: What Cummins calls ‘hypothetical reasoning' is central
to deliberation as I conceive it - i.e., at the most general level as the goal-directed comparison of
alternatives. To compare alternatives, the agent must have the capacity to conceive both the actual and
the possible. But this entails having the ability to represent things, not as they are, but as they might
be, where it is understood that the agent (or the agent's relevant deliberative intenders - more on this
later) may very well misrepresent the actual or the possible or both. The distinction between target and
content thus grounds the agent's capacity to compare alternatives by making room for error and,
critically for my project, representation of the possible. 10
Back on the topic of error and falsity, an implication of Cummins' distinction between target
and content is that truth virtually drops out of consideration, since “a representation of the proposition
that p will be error when the target is the proposition that q , regardless of the truth values of p and q."
More simply, desires are directed towards what might be, not what is. Kermit: “I want
a fly.” Miss Piggy: “But you have a fly.” Kermit: “I know, but I still want one.”
Miss Piggy: “You're weird.”
So far as I'm concerned, the real importance of Cummins' work on mental
representation lies in its implications for deliberation. Error is fascinating and
important, especially for my project. But there would be no point in pursuing
Cummins' line if it did not support deliberation.
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(Cummins, 1996, p. 12.) Since error in representation is not equivalent to representing falsely, truth is
not the opposite of error.
An embarrassing consequence of the fact that truth is not the
opposite of error is the realization that we have no word for the
opposite of error. I propose to call it correctness. A representation
has been correctly applied when it hits its target. If r represents a
proposition, then an application of r is correct if it hits the target
proposition (assuming the target is a proposition). Since the target
proposition can be a false proposition, the question of whether r is
correctly applied is orthogonal to the question of whether it is true.
If r represents an object or property, then an application of r is
correct it it is satisfied by the target object or property. Since targets
need not be actual, correctness is orthogonal to satisfaction by
something in the real world. (Cummins, 1996, p. 12.)
6. 2.4.2 Representations and Attitudes
Kermit's bug intenders mistakenly apply a representation of a bug to a piece of fuzz. Since a
representation alone is not in error, we must be careful to distinguish the application of a representation
from the representation itself. The application of a representation to a target is the function of a
relevant intender. Cognitively, the representation itself does nothing. Contrary to the intuitive account
with which we began, an agent's belief is not an attitude taken by the agent towards a mental
representation. Rather, the distinction between representation and application lets us see that the agent's
attitude is towards the application of the representation token. “[Ojnce we have the distinction between
representations and their applications before us, it is clear that attitudes should be treated as relations to
applications, not as relations to representations.” (Cummins, 1996, p. 14.)
Cummins' point is obvious in Kermit's case. Assuming that Kermit has the capacity for belief
- i.e., having representation-token forming intenders is, presumably, not alone sufficient for having
beliefs - we might ascribe to Kermit the following de re belief:
Kermit believes, of the piece of fuzz, that it is a bug.
The ascription, however, relates Kermit to an application of his tokened bug-representation. Belief does
not relate him to his tokened bug-representation simpliciter
,
nor would it make any sense to, since his
tokened bug-representation has content but no target. It follows that the content of a belief is not the
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content of the tokened representation. Instead, the content of a belief is the content of the applicatton of
the tokened representation to a target. The content of Kermit's belief is that that is a bug.
For Cummins, attitudes are distinguished by nothing more nor less than the cognitive roles or
functions of applications. An application of Kermit’s tokened bug-representation to the bit of fuzz is a
belief provided that the application functions in Kermit's cognition as a belief. Similarly, an application
of Kermit’s tokened bug-representation to an empty but possibly bug-filled lilly pad is a desire provided
that the application functions in Kermit's cognition as a desire. Of course, this says amazingly little,
except that it helps focus attention on the idea that applications have cognitive functions. These
cognitive functions are surely at the heart of deliberation.
In any case, the relationship between attitude and mental representation is far more oblique than
we had initially supposed. Cummins (1996) summarizes the relationship in two points:
Attitudes are applications with a characteristic cognitive
function. The semantic content of an attitude is thus the
semantic content of its constituent application.
* Applications are the result of applying a [tokened]
representation to a target. The semantic content of an
application is that the representation hits the target, (p. 16.)
Our puzzle now is to understand the characteristic cognitive function of beliefs. How does an
application come to have the cognitive function characteristic of belief, when that same application
could have the cognitive function characteristic of desire? Cummins has provided a somewhat
imprecise, albeit rich framework for understanding how beliefs about the actual and the possible can be
in error and how belief grounds deliberation. But apart from some hand-waving about cognitive
function, Cummins does not give us much to go on with respect to attitude - in the end we have no
idea why Kermit believes that the bit of fuzz is a bug and doesn't merely entertain the notion.
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6.2.5 Bogdan
Beginning almost seamlessly where Cummins leaves off, Bogdan (1986b) describes the
problem Cummins does not solve.
The beginning of the story is familiar enough. A belief is a
mental form with a propositional content, that is, a formal structure
of some complexity which encodes some meaningful information that
such and such is so and so. This is the sense in which a belief is a
mental representation. A belief is also a mental representation with
some cognitive or behavioural business. So we can think of belief as
a functionfrom a content-encoding mental form to a cognitive or
behavioural role. Such a characterization fits the currently standard
notion of belief.
But we have a serious problem here. The problem is that the
standard notion of belief is incomplete and inadequate. It accounts
for much less than it should. As a result, it projects the wrong
picture of belief as a mental phenomenon. If belief is thought of as a
function from content to role, then understanding belief amounts to
understanding the nature of this function, which in turn means
understanding the constraints which shape it. What the standard
notion of belief fails to identify and explain are precisely the
conditions which shape the belief function, that is, the conditions in
which a content-encoding mental form comes to play a cognitive or
behavioural role and thus becomes a belief. This, obviously, is a
very critical failure, for the very essence of belief, that of being a
function from mental representation to causal role in cognition and
behaviour, is left totally unexplained. Nor is the failure much
noticed, let alone deplored. It is standard procedure in current
literature on belief to say that a belief is a representation-in-a role
without any thought being given to how the two aspects,
representation and role, come together in the first place. When we
ask, what is it about a mental representation that makes it a belief?,
the standard answer is, its playing a role. But that is to beg the
question. For, again, what I am asking is, what is it about a mental
representation that makes it play a role in the first place? (pp. 149-
150)
Clearly, Bogdan's conception of belief content is too coarse given Cummins' analysis. 11 Nevertheless,
suitably translated Bogdan is asking exactly the right question of Cummins: What is it for an application
to have the cognitive function of a belief?
Bear in mind that Bogdan views belief as a relation to a representation, contrary to
Cummins' account of the distinction between application and representation. I'm not
interested in Bogdan's overly simplistic - in light of Cummins' work - analysis of
representation. What I want to learn from Bogdan is just how an application goes
from being an application simpliciter to a belief. If we're going to cook up beliefs
from applications, we need more ingredients than Cummins provides.
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There is an even better way to put the point. “A belief,” Ramsey wrote, “is a map of
neighboring space by which we steer ” (Ramsey, 1990, p. 146.) Cummins explains how we construct
maps of neighboring space; it's the ‘by which we steer’ bit that Cummins has left out.
A map, we can say, is a graphic structure meant to represent a
certain territory. It has only syntactic form and, given its purpose, it
is meant to have an intentional content, i.e. to represent (be about)
something. That is all a map is. The critical problem is: how is the
map going to do the steering? How, in particular, is a mental map
going to do its cognitive or behavioural steering? (Bogdan 1986b n
151.)
In order to solve the problem of belief fixation, we need to understand, metaphorically at least, the
process by which an application ends up contributing to the agent's navigation of the world.
6.2.5. 1 Tacit Belief
The problem of representational error provides much of the impetus for Cummins' account of
mental representation. Similarly, Bogdan's account of belief fixation is best understood as an attempt to
solve an equally troubling problem. Suppose I were to ask,
“Do you believe that 37,682 is greater than 1?”
“Yes,”
you would likely respond.
“Do you believe that 37,683 is greater than 1?”
“Of course.”
“How about 37,684? Do you believe that it is greater than 1?”
“Yes! Get on with it!”
Quite right. But now, did you believe that 37,682, 37,683, and 37,684 were all greater than 1 prior to
my asking ?
In a nutshell, the problem is that the number of things a human agent is able to believe far
outstrips the human mind's capacity for mental representation. At root it is an issue of scale: the human
mind is clearly finite, but it has the capacity to believe an indefinite number of things. The problem is
especially acute for those taking the Picture Approach to belief. If belief involves, however indirectly,
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mental representations that are somehow underwritten by the human brain, then how is it possible for
something with a finite storage capacity to store an indefinite, even infinite, number of representations? 12
The obvious solution is to draw a distinction between 'tacit' and ‘explicit’ belief. Ofcourse you
don't explicitly believe that 37,685 is greater than 1 (well, maybe you do now that it's in front of you.)
You implicitly or tacitly believed that. Thus, an alternative to explicit belief - which, presumably,
presupposes either conscious, remembered, or unconscious-but-nevertheless-present mental representation
- is tacit belief. If the distinction between tacit and explicit belief is a solution, then it must be the case
that an agent can have a tacit belief without having an associated mental representation. Your tacit
belief that 37,686 is greater than 1 is in some sense implicit in your other beliefs.
In what sense? As a potential but never represented implication of
some basic truths of arithmetic which I also happen to believe? This
will not do. First of all, it is not wise to extend the notion of belief to
tacit, unrepresented logical implications, for the simple reason that a
content which is not represented in some form is a content which
does not contain information, and belief is an attitude to information.
(Bogdan, 1986b, p. 172.)
Without representation there is no thing believed either tacitly or explicitly; where there is no content,
there is no belief. 13 The problem of having more beliefs than representations is not solved by the
distinction between tacit and explicit belief.
6.2. 5.2 Bogdan's Solution
What if we don't have tacit beliefs at all? Suppose I ask of Sam, “Do you believe that 37,687
is greater than 1?”, and Sam says “Yes, of course.” Since Sam believes that 37,687 is greater than 1,
we jump to the conclusion that Sam has the belief that 37,687 is greater than 1. But in what sense does
One of the advantages touted for the Dispositional Approach is that it easily allows for
an indefinite number of beliefs in terms of counterfactual behavior. But allowing for
an indefinite number of beliefs does nothing to explain how a finite agent has a
indefinite number of beliefs. See Appendix B for more on this.
I think this is a sound argument, but it is not the first argument to come to mind.
After years of teaching logic, I am certain that the beliefs of human agents are not
closed under logical implication. Ascribing beliefs based on other beliefs and logical
implication only results in frustration given the way people - myself included - often
reason. Except in the case of an exquisitely rational agent (Mr. Spock, perhaps), an
account of tacit belief will not be had on the basis of logical implication.
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Sam have this belief? Surely it is not in the sense that Sam has, and has had his whole life, a relevant
representation, since in that case we wind right back with the problem of Sam not having enough room
in his head for all the representations he would need for all his beliefs. 14 Perhaps Sam has the belief in
the sense that heformed the belief. Maybe Sam didn't believe that 37,687 is greater than 1 prior to my
asking. He only came to believe it after being prompted by my question. Later on, in the absence of
relevant prompting, he'll no longer believe that 37,687 is greater than 1. Such, in effect, is Bogdan's
solution.
One must grant that Bogdan's solution solves our problem. An agent with finite cognitive
resources has the capacity to form an indefinite number of beliefs so long as the beliefs are formed on
the fly, as it were, while deliberating. Yet this is surely an extraordinary solution. How could someone
presently believe that 37,687 is greater than 1 and later not believe that 37,687 is greater than 1?
Although Bogdan does not take up this particular puzzle, I think an answer is at hand if we bear in
mind that A's not believing that p is not equivalent to A's believing that not p. Still, the idea that beliefs
are transient, fleeting creatures in our mental forest is counter-intuitive to say the least: introspection
tells us that beliefs are more like boulders and trees in the forest - we, at least, don't seem able to
change or alter them. 15
Even though we don't have the details of Bogdan's solution before us for inspection, I think the
counter-intuitive pall over his solution can be dispelled by some observations. First, something can be
unalterable without being static. Global warming is presently unalterable; it is by no means static. In
the same vein, we do come to believe things we did not believe before, and we sometimes come to
reject beliefs we formerly had. Maybe we can't change our beliefs willy-nilly, but they are not so static
as that fact would suggest.
Assuming, again, that the brain somehow underwrites the mind's cognitive functions.
Bogdan appears to concede the lack of an intuitive basis for his solution in a footnote:
“I want to thank my friends at Tulane and the University of New Orleans, and
particularly Harvey Green and Norton Nelkin, for asking tough questions, making
many observations and shaking their heads in disbelief.” (1986b, p. 184.)
156
Second, if we buy into the Picture Approach as taken by Cummins, then we are already primed
for the transience of belief. The applications which form the content of beliefs are made by intenders,
and intenders construct or token representations on the fly. It should come as no surprise that belief
inherits the transience of its content, regardless of how an application comes to function as a belief.
Third, deliberative resources, including memory, are at a premium for any (finite) agent since
deliberations must be as efficient as possible. Remember that deliberations are capped by the time
between the initiation of deliberation and the time at which one of the alternatives must be implemented.
Deliberations which take longer than this interval are simply pointless. 16 Forming beliefs as needed is
clearly more efficient than storing vast numbers of beliefs. But the process of belief formation is more
than efficient: it is necessary for agency. Situated agents - agents, that is to say, which are situated in
an environment - must have the capacity to incorporate new information into their deliberations. 17 In
short, agents must have the capacity to learn.
Fourth, and finally, the example question “Do you believe that 38,688 is greater than 1” is
extremely simple mathematically speaking. Not much is needed to realize that 38,689 is greater than 1.
It is almost automatic. It may be that 'seeing', and thus believing, that 38,690 is greater than 1 is so
immediate that we are introspectively inclined to say that we have always believed it to be the case.
But suppose I ask a slightly harder question: “Do you believe that f(x) = x2 + x + 2 is greater than 1 for
all real x?” Even if you were well versed in quadratic equations, it would still take a moment to find
out if f(x) has a minimum less than or equal to 1. At least some quick mental calculations are required.
Your coming to believe that 38,691 is greater than 1 differs from your belief that f(x) is greater
than 1 for all real x in degree of complication, but it is not different in kind. Both beliefs presuppose a
kind of mental performance - in this case, mathematical performance. It is through this performance
16 We take up this important topic in the next chapter under the guise of Complexity
Theory when we take up the concept of machinehood.
17
Is there such a thing as an unsituated agent? I am not sure. Certainly it is hard to
conceive of such a thing, especially if 'environment' is extended to include mental as
well as physical landscape, since an agent without a physical landscape has no body
and so cannot perform physical actions, but perhaps it could be said to have the
capacity for mental actions. In the end the puzzle turns on what we mean by
‘environment’; it is by no means a trivial or unimportant puzzle.
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that you come to have those beliefs. And just as you come to have those beliefs via their formation,
you will not long from now stop having those beliefs unless you work hard to comm.t to memory that
38,691 is greater than 1 and f(x) = x 2 + x + 2 is greater than 1 for all real x. Yet even if you did
commit these beliefs to memory, perhaps through the use of some ingenious mnemonic device, it is not
the beliefs per se that you are memorizing. Rather, it is a representation having the content that 38,691
is greater than 1 and a representation having the content that f(x) = x2 + x + 2 is greater than 1 for all
real x which you are committing to memory. So stored, applications involving these representations are
quickly and easily brought in to function as beliefs as need be. But what gets stored is not belief. 18
Moreover, considerations of efficiency apply to these representations just as much as to belief;
committing representations like these to memory is about as inefficient as one can imagine. Most of the
time, it is better to be able to form the relevant representations as needed than to store vast amounts of
peculiar and normally irrelevant information in terms of efficiency. 19
For all these reasons, intuitions counter to Bogdan's proposal should be seriously re-assessed if
not discarded altogether. Beliefs are simply not the static relations we normally take them to be. They
are transitory in the sense that they are formed as needed and dissolve under the pressure of other
demands on cognitive resources. It follows that an answer to the question of how these relations are
formed will likewise answer the question with which we began: How is it that an application takes on
the functional role of a belief? To be sure, more detail is wanted on Bogdan's solution to see just how
the answer is supposed to go, but note in advance that while Bogdan’s interests are implicitly restricted
to human agents, his solution is fully generalizable to any finite agent since the kinds of constraints on
More on just how this works when we consider the details of Bogdan's solution.
Which is precisely the rational behind getting students to understand a topic as
opposed to making them memorize facts about the topic. An autobiographical note: 1
am grateful that I've forgotten much of what I had to memorize while in public school
in Kansas. One geography teacher - who was so only to fill in the hours between
coaching wrestling - required us to memorize the two letter county abbreviations on
automobile license tags: his idea, presumably, of a geography lesson. It was at once a
horrifying and useless experience, one which I'm sure many others could match with
their own stories. I'm dismayed that I now recall that ‘DG' refers to Douglas County -
an inefficient utilization of memory if ever there were one.
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the cognitive resources of human agents also constrain the cognitive resources of any finite agent to a
greater or lesser degree.
6.2.5. 3 A Parametric Model of Belief Formation
Our goal is to spell out Bogdan's solution in enough detail that some usable picture of belief
formation will emerge to explain how an application goes from being a mere application to a belief. I
have to confess in advance that, while I find Bogdan’s article (1986b) insightful, interesting, and useful,
I also find it very hard to understand in places. For example, Bogdan's favorite slogan is that “belief
tracks information”. But he nowhere explains what he means by information, except obliquely insofar
as he gives examples of belief formation. Consequently I am going to engage in freshman exegesis:
expect lots of quotes, extractions which stay close to the surface, and the altogether necessary disclaimer
that Bogdan is in no way responsible for what I eventually make of his ideas.
Bogdan's work on belief formation precedes Cummins' work on mental representation, so
Bogdan's conception of mental representation is relatively simple. The content of a belief is a mental
representation schematically denoted by “Rep(s,m)’\ “There are... three dimensions to the standard
notion of belief: a syntactic form, s, an intentional content or meaning, m, and a cognitive or
behavioural role, r. Belief... can be conceptualized as a function from a mental representation to a role.
To put it schematically: BEL = Rep (s,m) (r)" (1986b, p. 15 1). 20
Bogdan claims that the root intuition behind his solution to the problem of how beliefs are
formed is shared by many philosophers: the content of a belief comes to function as a belief by a
It may be remembered that “BEL: Rep(s,m) —> (/-)” is a general way of defining a
function, although I'm not at all clear why Bogdan writes the formula with parentheses
around V. Remove the parentheses to see that, so defined, ‘BEL 1 denotes a function
that maps representations - which, even though Bogdan does not bother to explicitly
define them, are apparently also functions - onto cognitive and behavioral roles such
that, in more familiar terms,
BEL (Rep(s,m)) = r
Belief, then, is precisely what we expect it to be: the cognitive/behavioral function of a
mental representation. Well, almost. We of course expect it to have a domain of
applications, not mental representations. But that will correction will be made shortly.
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process of integration with other attitudes. “Suppose it is true, as many philosophers think, that a
mental representation becomes a belief by attitudinal integration with other beliefs, plans, and intentions,
among other things” (Bogdan, 1986b, p. 152.). Explaining how a belief is formed, then, requires an
explanation of how other attitudes latch onto content. As it stands, no such explanation is forthcoming,
since the content of Rep(s,m) alone does not suffice to hook other attitudes.
Imagine the existing mental attitudes being some sort of ‘readers’ of
incoming representations, programmed to look for some properties
which make those representations candidates for belief. What are
those attitudes looking for? It cannot be only 5 and m. This means
that the formal and intentional dimensions cannot fully characterize a
belief content. It looks as if there must be something more to a
content to attract and engage other mental attitudes so that that
content moves into a role position and acquires a doxastic status.
The map metaphor can provide a clue. A map is not going to do
the steering just by being a map, i.e. a Rep(s). Nor is it going to do
the steering just by being made, or meant, to represent some territory
and thus guide the steering, i.e. by being a Rep(s,m). Something
more is needed. Not, trivially, a map reader but, rather, a traveller
who knows where he is and where he is going, besides having some
more specific objectives and expectations. It takes this locational
information to make the map guide the steering. (Bogdan, 1986b p
152.)
Bogdan's argument sounds more like beating a metaphor to death than a substantive argument. Why,
we want to know, does the representational content not suffice to hook attitudes so as to be raised to the
level of a belief? After all, what could be more relevant than the content of the representation?
At this point Bogdan would be justified in complaining that I have misrepresented his proposal.
His view is that the content of a representation does indeed suffice to hook other attitudes; it is the
syntactic form s and the semantic meaning m of the representation alone that do not suffice to capture
the attention of other attitudes. Yet that is just the point I have been making all along. I can apprehend
the syntax and semantics of
The circus will be in town tonight
without believing at all that the circus will be in town tonight. Bogdan’s proposal is that something
more must be included in the content of a representation: Rep(s,/») cannot be the argument of the belief
function. To make the point, Bogdan adds a placeholder to his formula for a representation,
Rep(^,m,o).
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Other attitudes converge on Rep(j,m,D) and use whatever goes in the box as a hook to raise Rep(i,m,D)
to the level of a belief.
Bogdan has some fairly well-developed ideas of what should be put in the box. A number of
parameters combine to provide what he calls incremental INFormation, or CINF for short. Bogdan runs
down a list of candidate parameters for CINF. Here are a few.
6.2. 5. 3.1 Theme
In the context of a deliberating agent, there is at any given moment a focus or area of interest.
To an agent deliberating about whether to stop or try to make a yellow light, information about the time
of day or what station the radio happens to be on is irrelevant. The theme of an agent's deliberations
determine the relevance of a given representation to further deliberations. “Believing must emerge from
within a theme if, as earlier anticipated, belief is not any available representation but rather one ‘read’
for specific information on which other mental resources (attitudes, inferences, etc.) converge.”
(Bogdan, 1986b, p. 156.)
6. 2. 5. 3.2 Issue
Within a theme there is a decision to be made or a “problem to be solved”. (Bogdan, 1986b, p.
156.) Representations which are not relevant to settling the issue at hand are not candidates for belief,
while issue-relevant representations presumably are.
[An issue] may be a problem to be solved, a question to be
answered, a decision to be made, a plan to be formulated, and so on.
I would argue that most if not all of our beliefs are issue-bound, in
some sense or another. This is because, I think, beliefs are formed or
activated in a matrix of thoughts, inferences, intentions, and other
processes and attitudes, and those in turn are formed, activated, and
brought together in contexts of problem-solving, deciding, or acting,
hence, when the organism faces some issue.” (p. 156.)
6. 2. 5. 3. 3 Given Information
In the context of having an issue to be resolved, an agent can be expected to rely upon a
background of information in the form of relevant (prior) beliefs. The parameter of Given Information
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is nothing more than “the background knowledge (whatever its source) deemed relevant to the issue in
question.” (p. 156.)
6. 2. 5. 3.4 Projection
In addition to the background knowledge provided by the Given Information parameter,
alternatives to the representation under consideration are also proposed, or as Bogdan puts it, “the mind
not only summons relevant beliefs to act as given information but also, relative to them and other
constraints, projects a number of alternative candidates for the solution.” (p. 156.)
6. 2. 5. 3.5 Evaluation
The ability to choose between a representation with respect to belief and its projected
alternatives presupposes an evaluation metric of some sort.
[The Evaluation parameter] provides standards against which both
projected alternatives and the candidate accepted are measured with
respect to plausibility and likelihood. If a candidate for a solution to
an issue is deemed implausible or unlikely, the organism may be
instructed to suspend belief, search for additional information, or start
all over again. The projection and evaluation parameters become
evident in contexts where we have to, or want to, quantify the
strength of our beliefs by specifying both stakes and alternatives.
Scepticism, for example, provides such a context, (pp. 156-157.)
6.2. 5.4 A Plenitude of Parameters
Bogdan mentions a few other parameters, but I think this list gives the flavor of what Bogdan
has in mind. Apparently the idea is that these and other parameters combine to dictate whether or not a
given representation is latched onto by other attitudes and subsequently raised to the functional level of
a belief. Bogdan appears to be willing to admit additional parameters into his scheme for belief
formation, although he also seems to be committed to these parameters as forming a core set. In this I
think he is mistaken.
Suppose that beliefs are indeed formed or fixed by way of a set of parameters (in a way as yet
unexplained by either Bogdan or myself.) Why should we think that these parameters in particular
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should be included in the set? Why should we even think that there is just one set? The set that
Bogdan provides is useful for purposes of illustration, but other sets of parameters are surely available.
For example, we ordinarily trust our representations provided by our sense of vision. “I'll
believe it when I see it! That Missouri is the ‘Show Me' State attests as much to the advertised
skeptical nature of its inhabitants as to the presumed veracity of our visual apparatus. What we think
we see is what is the case, or so the thought must go if what we see is to be trusted for purposes of
belief. Nonetheless, our perception is a complex reconstruction - a re-presentation, if you will - by our
visual cortex of scant sensory stimuli (reference). The set of parameters upon which other attitudes
converge to raise a visual representation to the functional status of a belief may contain just the
parameter of source: the history of a representation in terms of how it was generated - in this example,
its genesis in the visual cortex—dictates whether or not the representation is primed for functioning as a
belief. 21
Not only should we expect different types of representation to have distinct types of belief-
parameters, we should expect different deliberative processes to employ different belief-parameters, and
we should expect different kinds of agents to employ altogether distinct kinds of belief-parameters. It
may be that types of agent are distinguished by differences in deliberative strategy and differences in
belief-parameters. Nor should we expect belief-parameters to be static. Surely for some agents
strategies for raising representations to the level of belief are learned
,
perhaps by a process of trial and
error in terms of success or failure of intended actions.
A full account of the range of belief-parameters is beyond me at this point. A worthy research
project would be to develop just such an account and use it to classify types of agents, which would
presumably spawn empirical research programs to determine the efficacy of different belief-parameters
for situated agents. For now I am happy to put these projects on my ‘to-do' list, since what is important
I would hazard a guess that this is why hallucinogenic drugs are thought to be such
fun. One's representation of the walls as breathing or the coyote as talking would be
quite exciting since the source of the representation tags it to be taken up as a belief
for the deliberative process.
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to my present purposes is not which parameters operate with respect to belief but that they so operate.
The crucial question remains. How do belief parameters fulfill their role?
6.2.5.5 Making Beliefs out of Representations
I want to return to Bogdan’s puzzling but oft-used catch phrase, ‘belief tracks information'.
Here (Bogdan, 1986b) are some examples:
• If belief tracks information, it must track such a multi-dimensional configuration of
representations as is required to specify CINF. (p. 160)
•
...if belief tracks information, then (I want to show) it tracks incremental information and
does so occurrently. (p. 160)
•
...the point remains that the process is more likely to track the shaping of information than
that of syntactic form, semantic aboutness, or meaning, (p. 161)
•
...belief tracks information and its content is fixed, in party, by parameters of
incrementation... (p. 162)
• The argument has been that the belief attitude tracks this sort of information, not just its
syntactic and intentional encoding - or rather tracks the last two only insofar as they carry
some incremental information, (p. 179)
Assuredly, 1 am not being intentionally obtuse on this point. I honestly have had some trouble
understanding what Bogdan means by belief tracking information. I think I have a way of explaining
what Bogdan is saying here, but I suspect it's not what he has in mind. No matter. With apologies to
Bogdan, the explanation I've hit on fits my project too well to worry about other interpretations.
Bogdan never defines CINF, so the question of what incremental information is supposed to be
is left open. But change the emphasis: suppose what Bogdan is talking about is incremental
information. We may be onto something. After all, doesn't belief comes in degrees , and aren't degrees
something which can be incremented?
Maybe there are some things we believe outright and wholeheartedly. But what we believe we
ordinarily believe to some degree or other. I'm fairly certain that it will rain this afternoon, but I m not
completely certain. I believe that I will have twenty four students in my Intro to Philosophy course this
semester, but my confidence is low since I suspect I'll be inundated with last minute adds. What
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increments, or tracks, is not the belief per se. Rather, it is the degree of belief, and I can well imagine
a scheme by which the degree of a belief is a function of various parameters.
The statement that belief tracks information is somewhat misleading. It is better to say that the
degree of one’s belief is a function of relevant parameters. The emerging picture of belief-formation is
illuminating. Drop CINF altogether; it does no work on this view. Instead, replace it with a degree-of-
belief variable - ‘b\ for instance. Every representation has an associated ‘b’ value, which is a function
of a given set of belief-parameters. 22 Even representations which are merely representations and do not
function as a belief will have a 'b' value, but the value will be zero. In fact, stipulate that 0 <b< 1.
For a representation to function as a belief, it's associated ‘b' value must be non-zero. Of course, a
representation's ‘b
'
value is nothing more than the degree of belief for which the associated
representation constitutes the content of the belief. By defining the 'b' value in such a way as to include
zero, we make room for the difference between belief that p and merely entertaining that p. 23
To be sure, the ‘b ’ value associated with a given representation may seem like technical slight-
of-hand. But keep in mind that the 'b' value is a function of parameters that, if Bogdan is right, have
everything to do with other attitudes engaging a representation in such a way that it is raised to the
functional level of a belief. Essentially all I've done is flesh out Bogdan's sparse formal account so as
Strictly speaking, representations don't have 'b' values, applications do. We begin
integrating Bogdan and Cummins shortly.
Of course it might be objected that a zero degree of belief is not merely entertaining
the representation; it is disbelieving. There is some initial plausibility to this counter.
As one's confidence in a belief decreases - as, that is to say, the degree of one's belief
descends to zero - one expects minimal confidence that p to verge on increasing
confidence that not-p. But the assertion “I don't believe that p” is ambiguous: “I
believe that not-p” versus “I neither believe nor disbelieve that p.” The latter would
have a ‘b' value of zero attached to the representation that p, while the former would
attach a non-zero (positive!) degree of belief to the representation that not-p. To have
a representation that p to belief-degree zero is to not have any belief-attitude towards p
whatsoever. Equivalently, a representation with a belief-degree of zero has no
cognitive or behavioral role of the sort characteristic of belief.
Perhaps u,b' value” is preferable to “degree of belief’, since “degree of belief’ seems
to imply belief. When talking about a representation without consideration as to its
cognitive/behavioral role, I will employ “‘b' value”. For non-zero 'b' values - i.e.,
values indicating that the representation has been raised to the level of a belief - I will
use “degree of belief’.
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to make sense of what I take to be his key insight: beliefs are formed from representations in the
process of deliberation by hooking already present attitudes (including beliefs and desires) in virtue of
associated parameters. The difference I've made is technical for the sake of clarity.
6. 2. 5.5.1 Kermit's Beliefs
Let us revisit Kermit, who is patiently sitting on his lily-pad. 24 A plump fly lands on the pad in
front of Kermit. Kermit's bug-intenders form or token a representation of a bug and apply it to the fly,
thus generating an application having the content that that is a bug. So far the fly-application (FA) is
merely an application. Whether or not FA is raised to the functional level of a belief depends on
whether or not it has any features that Kermit's current attitudes - his desire for flies, for instance - can
use as hooks.
It is possible to tell a very complicated story about how FA is raised to the cognitive and
behavioral (fly slurping) role of belief by using Bogdan's parameters. But Kermit, it must be
remembered, is a frog. Bogdan's parameters are developed specifically for human agents. Surely
nothing so complicated is going on with Kermit. 25 My guess is that Kermit is from Gullible, Missouri:
he only believes what he sees, and he believes everything he sees. Recalling the Source parameter I
described above, let us suppose that the only parameter serving to hook his attitudes is an application's
source - in particular, its source in having been generated by a visual intender.
Associated with FA is a 'b' value, which we may represent by subscripting ‘b' to ‘FA', as in
FA,
FA's 'b' value is a function of the Source parameter alone. Thus,
( 1 if FA was generated by a visual intender,
b = 1
( 0 otherwise
I dispense with Bogdan's ‘representations' and revert to Cummins’ ‘applications'. It is
time now anyway to begin the integration of Cummins and Bogdan.
Assuming, of course, that Kermit is capable of belief in the first place.
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Of course, this formula would have to be generalized to account for any of Kermit's applications. But it
suffices for this example.
At present Kermit neither believes nor disbelieves FA. We represent this by attaching a 'b'
value of zero to FA. FA0 is, therefore, merely an application; as yet no attitudes in Kermit's cognitive
processes are onto the application. But, according to the Source parameter, Kermit's other attitudes are
on the look-out for applications generated by visual intenders. Applications without a visual-intender
pedigree are simply passed over. But having such a pedigree serves as a hook to Kermit's attitudes,
which then latch quite firmly onto the application and, in so doing, engage it in the function of a
belief.-6 We represent this process by assigning FA a degree-of-belief of 1.
6. 2. 5. 5. 2 It's Not Easy being Green...
Interestingly, as I have characterized him Kermit is incapable of believing that something is not
the case. For Kermit, only applications generated by visual intenders are admitted as beliefs. But visual
intenders never, presumably, generate an application to the effect that, say, a fly is not on the lily pad.
A visual intender can, of course, mistakenly token a bug to represent a piece of fuzz so that Kermit will,
in believing that that is a bug, mistake a piece of fuzz for a bug. But mistaking a piece of fuzz for a
bug is altogether different than forming the belief that there is no bug on the lily pad.
At the same time, all other applications are passed over by Kermit's attitudes. They each have
‘b ' values of zero, just in virtue of not having the required source. Kermit does not believe any of these
applications, which implies nothing so far as believing that not p is concerned, since ‘does not believe
that p' is ambiguous: in the first sense, ‘does not believe that p' implies ‘believes that not p\ whereas in
the second sense ‘does not believe that p implies ‘neither believes nor disbelieves that p. In this case,
Kermit believes every application that is generated by a visual application - which cannot show how
things are not - and neither believes nor disbelieves any other application.
In most cases the relevance of an agent's attitudes to an application's being raised to
the level of a belief will be much more transparent, since many parameters can be
expected to refer to already present attitudes. For example, Bogdan's Theme parameter
specifies that the content of the application under consideration be, roughly speaking,
on the same topic as already believed applications.
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In point of fact I don't have a fly in front of me. Not being a frog, I am happy about this fact.
I do have a keyboard and a monitor in front of me, but no fly. But how do I form a negative belief - a
belief to the effect that there is no fly in front of me? How is it that I can do something Kermit
cannot? My visual intenders serve to reconstruct my visual field by generating a continuous stream of
applications. They won't show me that there is no fly in front of me, any more that they would generate
an application that there is no pink elephant in front of me. But I can well imagine a fly in front of me.
That is to say, I apparently have an intender that can token a possible fly: a representation of a fly's
being in front of me targeted at a nearby possible world. I can conceive the possible, and in so doing
differentiate between what is the case and what is not, but might be, the case. I believe that there is no
fly in fiont of me because, having the ability to conceive the possible, I know what it would be for there
to be a fly in front of me, and nothing my visual intenders are generating is consistent with what would
be the case if there were a fly in front of me.
Even if Kermit had an intender that generated an application of a tokened representation of a
fly to a nearby possible world, the intender would not be visual, and thus would be passed over for
belief because of Kermit's utter dependence on the Source parameter. It is not enough to say that
Kermit's deliberations are handicapped. To the extent that deliberations consist of comparing
alternatives and comparing alternatives presupposes the ability to conceive of how things might be,
Kermit cannot be said to deliberate at all. But then no behavior of his is an action! His fly slurping
behavior is a mere re-action elicited by the formation of a bug application by a visual intender. It is no
different, in principle, than the leg-kicking behavior I exhibit in the doctor's office upon getting smacked
in just the right place by a rubber mallet. By only believing what he sees and believing everything he
sees, it follows, sadly, that Kermit is not an agent . 27
A note to frog-lovers everywhere: I am not maintaining that frogs are so primitive as
to be, like Kermit, completely dependent on the Source parameter. Apart from
appreciating that they come in many forms and colors and are rapidly disappearing, I
know very little about frogs. Could the existence of additional parameters be
discovered experimentally? I think so, but that is a project best left to biologists.
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6.2. 5.6 A Metaphor for Parametric Belief Formation
Kermit makes it clear that the parameters involved in belief formation are the properties and
relations of applications - in particular, the relations of applications to other applications which already
function as beliefs. Applications emerge from their intenders to function as beliefs in virtue of these
properties and relations. The process strangely resembles the process of cellular intra- and inter-
communication.
A recent survey article in Scientific American details some findings on cellular
communication. The discussion is fascinating and, with excellent illustrations, visually intriguing; I
won't go into it here in the detail it deserves. Suffice it to say that cells send signals by distributing
'messenger' molecules to nearby cells which have cell-wall penetrating ‘receptor' molecules. Crudely
put, messengers and receptors connect by having reciprocal shapes - a ball in a cup, for instance -
which is sometimes described as a lock-and-key mechanism. Once a messenger has attached to a
receptor, molecules inside the cell attach to the receptor at that end which eventuates in the production
of a particular protein. For example, one cell might produce a hormone (one of the kinds of messenger
molecules) which is received by a nearby cell, and the nearby cell in turn produces the same hormone
as a result, thus spreading the ‘message’ further.
Think of a mere application - an application with a zero 'b' value - as a cell prior to any
messenger stimulation. Relative to its environment, the cell is not functioning in any way other than by
sustaining itself. (Likewise, the mere application does not function in any particular way relative to its
mental environment.) But then a molecular lock is made by a messenger on the cell's surface, internal
mechanisms begin chugging along, and the cell assumes a functional role in its environment. Similarly,
other applications lock onto the mere application by having specific ‘shapes' or properties. Applications
functioning as beliefs might, depending on the properties, signal the mere application to begin
functioning as a belief. What is required to 'activate' the belief functioning of an application is
determined by the 'b' value, which is itself a possibly very complex function of parameters.
See http://www.sciam.com/2000/0600issue/0600pawson.html.
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6.2.6 Swoyer
In what have doubtless been over-broad strokes we have considered how belief underwrites
deliberation, how a finite agent can have an indefinite number of beliefs, and how beliefs can be correct
and incorrect with respect to the actual and the possible. Still, the devil is in the details. I have, for
instance, been far too loose with my use of the term ‘representation’. Hopefully, my uses of
representation’ have been strongly grounded in intuition. But we as yet have no idea how it is that a
representation represents its target.
Swoyer (1991) is interested in the problem of how representations represent at its most general
level. Mental, mathematical, linguistic, model, and pictorial representations are all included in the
general problem of representation. The key, he thinks, is the similarity between the structure of the
representation and what it represents.
[For example,] similarity of structure explains why the mathematics
of the positive real numbers applies to physical objects and their
lengths as follows. We begin with empirical facts involving physical
objects and use our measurement scale as a bridge to their numerical
surrogates or proxies. We then mobilize logic and the mathematical
theory of the positive real numbers to infer that further numerical
facts obtain. Finally, once our calculations are complete, we make
the return trip to a conclusion about the original physical objects and
their lengths.
This example suggests a general model for structural representation:
the pattern of relations among the constituents of the represented
phenomenon is mirrored by the pattern of relations among the
constituents of the representation itself. And because the
arrangements of things in the representation are like shadows cast by
the things they portray, we can encode information about the original
situation as information about the representation. Much of this
information is preserved in inferences about the constituents of the
representation, so it can be transformed back into information about
the original situation. And this justifies surrogative reasoning, since
if we begin with true premises about the object of representation, our
detour through the representation itself will eventually wind its way
back to a true conclusion about the original object, (p. 452)
As we shall see, representations ground an agent's capacity to conceive the possible in much the same
way they ground what Swoyer has dubbed ‘surrogative reasoning'. To get a handle on structural
similarity, though, we need a reasonably precise formulation of structural representation.
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6.2.6. 1 The Fussy Details
The first step is get clear about what it is that represents and what is represented. To that end,
define an intensional relational system (IRS) in step-by-step fashion as follows.29
Step 1 :
• Let lA be a set of individuals.
• Let be a set of first order relations (including properties).
• Let '91'3 be a set of second-order relations. 30
Step 2 :
• Define the full domain of relations to be the union of-W and S<RA • = /9IA u
• Define the total domain to be the union of the full domain of relations, 9t\ and f.
• Define an extension function v such that v maps the relations in the full domain of
relations to their extensions.
Step 3 :
• Define the IRS A to be the ordered quadruple:
A = (
I
A
,
fiRA
,
v
)
such that at least two of the adjacent sets IA
,
f<RA
,
and SCRA are non-empty. 31
Next, we get clear on how a representation represents by defining embedded isomorphism
,
also in step-
by-step fashion.
Swoyer calls it an “intensional relational system” because he constructs it out of
properties and relations, as opposed to their extensional cousin sets, with, I might add,
good reason. A representation of a creature in terms of its having a heart would
otherwise be indistinguishable from a representation of a creature in terms of its
having a kidney, since chordate and renate are coextensive but clearly distinct
properties (to borrow Quine's (1980, p. 21) splendid example.)
Second-order relations are the relations between and properties of first-order relations
and properties—e.g., blue is a color and canary yellow is lighter than forest green.
First-order relations and properties are what one expects them to be: the relations and
properties of objects or individuals—e.g., the sweater is blue and the sweater is on top
of the table.
Granted, the formalism is ugly. As yet I don't want to deviate too far from Swoyer's
account. Swoyer drops superscripts where ambiguity is not a problem, which helps.
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Step 4 :
• Let the order o of the elements of IA be 0.
• Let the rank r of the elements of IA be 0.
• Let the rank of one-place relations (properties) be 1, the rank of two-place
relations be 2, the rank of three place relations be 3, etc.
Step 5 :
• Define the type of any element in the total domain of an IRS to be the ordered
pair (o , r).
32
• Define the similarity type of two IRS's: For any two IRS's A and fi, A and B are
the same similarity type if, and only if, there exists a one-one function F from the
full domain of A onto the full domain of B such that F preserves type: i.e., if F(x)
= y and the type of x is (o, r), then the type of y is (o, r).
Step 6 :
• Define an isomorphism : Any two IRS’s A and B are isomorphic if, and only if,
they are of the same similarity type and there exists a function c that maps the
total domain of A one-one and onto the total domain of B and preserves type and
structure of the relations in A. For example, in the case of first-order relations c
preserves the structure of the relations in A just in case, for each i
n) e l
A
and
every relation R e fSiA of type (1, n),
i„) e 7? if and only if (ciij,... c(/J) e
v
c(R). 33
• Define an embedded isomorphism to be a mapping which is exactly like an
isomorphism except that it is not onto.
The upshot of all this is that an IRS A represents another IRS B by A's being a structural representation
of B. And A is a structural representation of B if there exists an embedded isomorphism from A into
B.
m
So, for example, the type of the first-order, three-place relation ‘is between’ is (1,3).
Swoyer has a nice way of explaining what this means. “The intuitive force of [first-
order structure preservation] is that a group of individuals (taken in a given order)
from the first relational system stand in the relation R exactly when their surrogates in
the second system (taken in the same order) stand in the surrogate of R." (1996, p.
456)
Swoyer, it should be mentioned, goes on to develop a much more complicated account
of structural representation so as to account for linguistic representation, which the
concept of embedded isomorphism does not, he thinks, accommodate. Cummins,
however, argues (1996, p. Ill) that this is an unnecessary step on Swoyer's part. For
the sake of simplicity and brevity I shall (provisionally) side with Cummins.
172
There are various ways to relax the requirement of embedded isomorphism so as to obtain a
more general account of structural representation. Swoyer (1991, pp. 470-471) discusses a number of
alternatives and the rationale behind each. I endorse all of his proposals, although one in particular is
important for my argument: we do not require that the representing IRS be of the same similarity type
as the represented IRS. Thus the agent's representing resources need not be as rich as the environment
it seeks to represent.
Prior to grounding the synthesis of Cummins and Bogdan's work on belief in Swoyer’s notion
of structural representation, it should be noted that there are a few problems left to be solved with
respect to embedded isomorphisms. For instance, Cummins (1996, p. 97) correctly points out that
where there is one isomorphism there are likely to be many. Saying that a representation represents one
system only, then, requires specifying a particular isomorphism between the two. This is problematic
for Cummins if the representation is thought to contain all the information needed to specify its target.
There is more work to be done, but I think what we have here suffices for my purposes.
6.2.7 ...The Sum of its Parts
It is now time to put Cummins and Bogdan together with Swoyer. Cummins, recall,
distinguishes between a representation and it's target. To draw this distinction formally we need to
know the whereabouts of the representation and the whereabouts of its target. Let the location of an
IRS be an ordered pair (r, w), where r is the space-time region and w is the possible or actual world at
which the IRS is satisfied. We say that an IRS is satisfied if all the relations in the full domain of
relations of the IRS are satisfied by the individuals and relations in the total domain of the IRS - e.g., if
G is a one-place first-order relation in the full domain of relation of an IRS A, then G is satisfied just in
case there exists an individual i e lA such that i has the property G.
Targets are easy: a target is an IRS T at an agent-relative location t. An application, P, is
formed by an intender as follows. First, the intender forms a mental representation, which is also an
IRS Mm . The location m ofM consists of the duration and spatial region of the representation (usually
somewhere in the organism) and, if we are talking about an actual organism, then the only world in the
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world-set is the actual world, a. Otherwise m does no work here. Next, the intender targets T with M.
Thus, P is an ordered pair (Mm , t). Making good on Cummins’ insight, we can say that the application
is in error - it ‘misses' its target
—
just in case Mm is not a structural representation of the IRS T that is
satisfied at t - i.e., there is no embedded isomorphism from Mm into T.
With intenders like Kermit's bug-intender, targets are always at the actual world. For intenders
whose job it is to enable the organism to conceive the possible, the location of the intended target will
include worlds other than the actual world.. In this sense, targets can be either actual or possible. It
follows that Swoyer's surrogative reasoning is the basis for the agent's capacity to deliberate, since the
agent has thereby the ability to conceive possibilities and thus consider alternatives.
This is as far as Cummins and Swoyer take us. Bogdan ties up the account by explaining how
P functions as a belief. As I described earlier, P is formed with a belief index, b
,
which is initially 0.
Hence P0 is a mere application - one that does not function as a belief. But P0 has a number of
properties and relations we have dubbed, following Bogdan, P0 ’s ‘parameters’. A function of these
parameters determines the value of b, which is really a way of representing how an agent's attitudes
hook onto P0 and thereby raise it to the level of a belief. Because different agents will employ different
parametric functions, perhaps even for different applications, I cannot be any more specific than this.
Again, the devil is in the details, but the details in this case depend entirely on the agent in question.
6.2.8 Conditions on Belief
The objective all along has been to give necessary and sufficient conditions on belief. At long
last we are in position to do so. Following up on the integration of our three theorists, we shall say that
The Axiom of Belief
A believes that P to degree b iff A's application that Ph is such that the value, b, of A's
parametric belief function relative to P is greater than 0.
I grant that this is absurdly simple given all that has gone before. But that is precisely why it is so
simple. Most of the hard work has gone into understanding the concept of an application and the
concept of a parametric belief function.
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6.3 Desire
Having an account of how an application comes to function as a belief ought to give us a hint
as to how the same application can function as a desire. Indeed, conditions on desire virtually fall out
of all the work we've done on belief. Perhaps that should not be surprising. After all, desire is just
another functional role lor an application to play. Knowing how an application comes to play one
functional role provides something of a road-map for other functional roles.
Along with a belief index, let us suppose that an application also has a desire index.
Furthermore, let us suppose that there is a parametric desire function much like the parametric belief
function. Instead of Ph , we have Phd . d, presumably, ranges over some bounded interval of positive
and negative real numbers. This represents the value the agent places on the content of the application.
For example, the agent might value getting a new car greatly, so a high positive value would be given
for d in the corresponding application. Or an agent might greatly dis-value getting her new car into an
accident, so an equidistant negative value would be given for d.
The parameters of the desire function will, of course, differ substantially from the belief
function. Applications ripe for uptake as beliefs attract other applications already serving as beliefs.
Likewise, applications that might function as desires attract other applications already functioning as
desires according to agent-specific parameters. For example, an agent might have the Inheritance
desire-parameter: If x is desirable to a certain degree, and y leads to x, then y is desirable to the same
degree. According to this parameter, means inherit the value of their ends.
If desire really does mirror belief in just being another functional role for applications, then we
can give necessary and sufficient conditions on desire that are strictly analogous to the conditions on
belief.
The Axiom of Desire
A desires that P to degree d if A's application that Pbd is such that the value, d, of A's
parametric desire function relative to P is nonzero.
Just as an application with a zero 'b' value is a mere application with respect to belief - i.e., it does not
function as a belief - an application with a zero 'd' value is a mere application with respect to desire.
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It follows that a single application can function as a desire, a belief, or as both. This accords
nicely with intuition. I believe that it is possible for me to have a new computer at the same time that I
desire having a new computer. Applications, then, are neutral with respect to their functional roles. Or,
better, applications are symmetric with respect to their functional roles. They function as beliefs just as
well as they function as desires, and whether a given application functions as a belief or a desire, or
both, depends on the agent's parametric belief function and parametric desire function. The same
approach could be employed in giving accounts of other attitudes like hope or fear. Yet if RAAT is
correct, all we need for autonomous agency are sufficient conditions on belief and sufficient conditions
on desire.
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CHAPTER 7
MECHANISM
7.1 A First Pass at Machines
What is a machine? Bok gives a handy example.
Inanimate objects are entirely passive, acted upon rather than acting.
A car's brake lever, for example, does not in any sense initiate that
car's stopping: when the brake pedal is depressed, the brake lever
must engage the brake. It might be said to contribute to that car's
stopping simply by existing in the form it does: if the lever were not
there, or were not connected to the brake, or were made not of metal
but of elastic bands, depressing the brake pedal would not stop the
car. But the lever did not cause itself to exist in this form: it did not
choose to manifest itself as just this brake lever or cause itself to
have just these properties. Its existence, properties, and subsequent
motions are all wholly determined by events that occur elsewhere,
and to whose eventual effects it makes no independent contribution.
(1998, p. 14)
A lever is surely the simplest example of a machine. Forget the complications of its application to
braking a car: the wheel cylinders, the hydraulic lines, the pump, and the vacuum power assist. All that
is important for this example is the lever itself. A force exerted on one side of the lever results in a
proportional force on the other side of the lever. In more abstract terms, “[I]ts existence, properties, and
subsequent motions are all wholly determined by events that occur elsewhere, and to whose eventual
effects it makes no independent contribution.”
Bok’s conception of a machine fits nicely with how machines are traditionally understood:
machines in principle make no independent contribution to their environment. Whether simple or
complicated, they merely serve as links in a casual chain. Press the brake lever, and, other things being
equal, the car will de-accelerate. If it were true, Bok's conception would be seriously problematic for
my argument. No machine could be an autonomous agent on her conception, since autonomous agents
have the capacity to make independent contributions to their causal environment - according to a fairly
straightfoward interpretation of RAAT.
A somewhat less-than-satisfactory response would be to point out that Bok's conception of a
machine unfairly prejudices the case against autonomous machine agency. Fortunately, this response is
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unnecessary. Apart from being unfair to machines, Bok's conception is seriously misguided, as the
following thought-experiment demonstrates.
First, take a quarter and make it easy to read by painting one side white and the other black.
Stipulate that the black side is ‘heads' and the white side is ‘tails'. Second, construct a coin
tosser/reader
.
1
Third, attach the output of the tosser/reader (suitably amplified) to a latching solenoid
that directs the force from the brake lever either to the car's brake pump or its accelerator via a
secondary mini-lever. Finally, weld a lever-switch to the brake lever so that, just as the brake is
depressed, the tosser/reader tosses the coin, reads the result, and accordingly either accelerates or de-
accelerates the car as force is applied by the driver.
To be sure, this is a very poor idea for a practical joke. But an afternoon in a garage would
suffice to show the error in Bok’s conception of a machine. For here we have a machine which clearly
makes an independent contribution to its causal environment. Granted, our brake system's contribution
is purely stochastic. Yet as the poor driver would quickly discover, a stochastic contribution is an
independent contribution nonetheless. The thesis that a machine must make no independent contribution
to its causal environment is simply false . 2
The thought-experiment refutes Bok's conception of machines only if the coin-flipping brake
system is a machine. I'm utterly confident that it is, but upon what do I base my confidence? Waxing
Aristotelian, there appear to be four possibilities . 3 Either the sadistic brake system is a machine because
It wouldn't be hard. Take a solenoid and weld a metal disk to the plunger. Make sure
the disk has a diameter at least twice that of the coin. Paint the facing side of the disk
flat black, and cover the whole affair with a clear plastic dome. Now illuminate the
dome with a lamp of constant luminosity. Attach a light-detector - a light detecting
transistor will do - so that the level of current is proportional to the amount of
reflected light from the dome. The coin is flipped by ‘popping’ the solenoid. For
heads there is no current change from the light-detector, for tails there is an increase in
current flow. I'm sure less complicated solutions are possible, but this will do.
Even though it gets us no nearer an account of machines, it is possible to recast our
ultimate question. A machine can be so constructed as to make a stochastic
contribution to its causal environment; can a machine be constructed which has the
capacity to make a deliberative contribution to its causal environment?
‘Waxing Aristotelian', I say, because Aristotle had a fascination with neat, four-fold
divisions and these divisions not-so-accidentally mimic his division of causes into
material, efficient, final, and formal causes.
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1) It is built out of certain materials - specifically steel, copper, and plastic;
2) It is constructed by me;
3) It is designed to (randomly) accelerate or de-accelerate the car;
or
4) It is constructed and thus operates according to a detailed recipe. 4
7.1.1 Machines are Metal and Plastic
The intuition here is akin to the old science fiction idea that one can always distinguish
anthropomorphic robots from people because robots are shiny. So as to allow for the occasional rusting
machine, let us say that, for some class of materials A/,
x is a machine just in case x is made out one or more elements of M.
All that remains is to discover those materials for M that are distinctive of machines. Metal and plastic
are fine examples. Yet I have been privileged to see working antique clocks with wooden escapements;
in certain situations, organic materials are as useful as metal and plastic. 5 Nor must the organic
materials be, for want of a better word, dead. So-called ‘bio-chips' integrate living cells with a
semiconductor substrate to create a machine.
The trouble with trying to differentiate machines by the material out of which they are made is
that any material whatsoever can be used in the construction of a machine. Even liquids and gasses
have their place in hydraulic and pneumatic machines. M turns out to include every known material,
including organic and living materials. There is nothing distinctive about M, hence it cannot be used to
distinguish between machines and non-machines.
Or, in Aristotelian terms, the brake is a machine because it either has a unique
material cause
,
a unique efficient cause, a unique final cause, or a unique formal
cause, respectively.
The museum at Old Sturbridge Village in Sturbridge, Massachusetts, has an extensive
collection of 17 th
,
18
th
,
and 19th century clocks, many of which are kept in working
order.
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7. 1 .2 Machines are Made
Perhaps the key is not that machines are made out of a certain material, but that machines are
made at all. The idea is intriguing. Machines are such solely in virtue of their unique genesis: we can
always tell machines apart from non-machines just by comparing origins. Unfortunately, the idea is also
something of a quagmire. We cannot say that
x is a machine just in case x is made by some person or some group of people,
since there are machines that make machines. 6 We should also resist the temptation to hold that
* is a machine just in case x is made,
even though it is true that machines have makers, since many made things are not machines. I make a
drink or a proposal, but I don’t know of anyone whose pre-theoretic intuition would include drinks or
proposals in the class of machines. If there is a clever way to carve out the class of machines by the
principle of their simply having been made, I don’t see it.
7.1.3 A Machine is Made for a Purpose
Maybe the point is neither that a machine is made of special materials nor that a machine is
made simpliciter but that a machine is made for some purpose. Bok's brake lever is made for the
purpose of de-accelerating a car. Our random-brake system is apparently made to terrify. Either way,
there is a purpose to the machine. Perhaps the class of machines can be obtained in virtue of their
unique teleological status:
x is a machine just in case there is some purpose for which x was made.
Unfortunately, we must reject this account, and, fortunately, we can reject this account. We
must reject this account since it precludes the possibility of autonomous machine agency. One of the
intuitions guiding RAAT is that an autonomous agent's purposes are its own, yet this account mentions
only the machine builder's purpose. The account unfairly prejudices the case against autonomous
machine agency. On the other hand, we can safely reject this account because it runs afoul of the same
problems as the previous account. I make a drink with a purpose such that the drink should satisfy the
6 Machine tools, for example.
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purpose. I make a proposal with a purpose such that the proposal should satisfy the purpose. In short,
we can reject this account because it requires that we classify as machines 'thing's which clearly are not.
7.1.4 Machines are Algorithmically Specifiable
Elimination leaves us with the idea that machines have a unique property: intuitively, a machine
is such that it is possible to give recipe for it. To illustrate, consider that I gave the example of the
random-brake by describing in some reasonable detail how one might go about constructing it. I gave a
recipe, in other words, such that if the recipe were followed, the resulting system would have specific
functional characteristics. Let us say that anything that can be built according to such a recipe is
algorithmically specifiable.
Our previous counter-example would seem to undermine this proposal, since bread is likewise
made according to a recipe. It is important, however, to stress that the sort of recipe I have in mind
does not essentially pertain to building the machine. Algorithmic specificity bears specifically on
functional characteristics, and only in some cases will the construction of a machine suffice to determine
its functional characteristics. Call such machines 'simple'. A simple machine is like Bok's brake lever
or our random-brake. Theirfunction is determined entirely by their composition. To understand the
function of the random-brake, it suffices to review its blueprint.
Not all machines are simple. Some are ‘complex', in the sense that one could not determine
their function merely by reviewing their blueprints. More than design specifications are required, since
the function of a complex machine is not solely determined by how it is built. The Von Neumann-
architecture computer - what, in essence, we all have on our desks - is a superb example. Changing
outputs according to inputs according to serially-read instructions makes for a complex machine whose
function can be altered depending on its instructions. This is nothing more than the familiar virtue that
a computer can serve as a word-processor, a graphics-processor, or a sound-processor, depending for the
most part on its instruction set or program. Knowing the design of a complex machine turns out to be
of only peripheral importance in establishing its functional characteristics. What is important is the
program.
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Machines are unique in that their functional characteristics can be specified by an algorithm or
recipe. In the case of simple machines, algorithmic specification is given by design specification. In
the case of complex machines, algorithmic specification is given by design and instruction specification.
In either case, it is possible to determine function by giving a recipe or algorithm. Bread is safely ruled
out, because even though bread may play a role in physiological function, it itself has no functional
characteristic. Let us say, then, that
x is a machine just in case x is a physical system such that jc's functional
characteristics are algorithmically specifiable. 7
7.2 Computability
Algorithmic specificity has been studied in great detail in the guise of Computability Theory -
the same Computability Theory, incidentally, which forms the mathematical foundation of Computer
Science. Computability Theory, along with its sister Complexity Theory, spells out just which functions
are algorithmically specifiable or ‘computable’ and how much time and material it takes to actually
compute them. If being a physical system with algorithmically specifiable functional characteristics is
necessary and sufficient for being a machine, and if algorithmic specificity is co-extensive with
computability, then Computability Theory and Complexity Theory determine the range of logically
possible machines and the range of practically possible machines, respectively.
I have already argued for my account of machines, if only by elimination, and the uniqueness
of the class of algorithmically specifiable functions depends upon the widely accepted Church-Turing
Thesis, which I shall discuss and endorse shortly. 8 Hence a review of the principle results of
Computability Theory and Complexity Theory will see us well on our way to an argument for the
possibility of autonomous machine agency.9
As always, I leave ‘physical system' as an undefined primitive.
A positive argument for my account of machines emerges from a summary
presentation of computability theory.
Accordingly, our question may now be cast in its final form: Is autonomous agency
computable? If so, then the icing on the cake would be to show that autonomous
machine agents are not merely logically possible, they are indeed practically possible.
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7.2.1 A Very Simple Complex Machine
Imagine a linear tape that stretches off indefinitely in either direction in some otherwise
featureless landscape. Regular lines are drawn across the width of the tape. Call the spaces between
the lines cells . Each cell is either blank or has an ‘X 1 marked on it, and trundling along the tape is a
contraption resembling a small boxcar. The boxcar moves in fits: it starts on a cell, moves to an
adjacent cell, and stops. Indeed, there are only four things the boxcar can do. It can move one cell to
the left or one cell to the right, it can erase an ‘X' if there is one on the cell beneath it, and it can write
an 'X' if the cell is blank.
The boxcar itself need not be closed to inspection. 10 Opening the top might reveal a system of
gears and levers which looks for all the world like the guts of a player-piano. Running through the
gears would be an instruction tape of some finite length. The instruction tape would have cutouts to
determine the next step, where ‘the next step' includes the next position of the internal gearing and
whether the boxcar writes an ‘X 1
,
erases an ‘X’, or moves to an adjacent cell, depending on both the
position of the gears and whether or not the current cell had an ‘X'.“ We can therefore describe each
step by a simple quadruple. Let each of q l5 q 2 ,..., q n . be a unique position or ‘state' of the gears.
12
Suppose 'X' denotes the operation of writing an X, ‘B’ (for ‘blank') denotes the operation of erasing an
X, ‘L' denotes moving to the left one cell, and ‘R’ denotes moving to the right one cell. Then the set of
quadruples,
q,BXq,, q,XRq,, q2XBq2 , q 2BRq3 , q 3BXq 3 , q 3XRq4 , q4XBq4 , q4BRq5 ,
Taking the bull by the horns, the task of the next (and last) chapter will be to show
that autonomous agency is computable and not sufficiently complex to exclude the
construction of an actual autonomous machine agent for experimental purposes.
Eyebrows would doubtless be raised at having a black box in the heart of an account
of mechanism.
To be sure, it would greatly simplify matters to replace all the gears with a little man
perched over a hole in the floor. (He's holding a pencil and an eraser and reading a
list of instructions.) But, anxious to avoid even a hint of circularity in my final
argument, I think it best to leave out any hidden agents or ‘humonculi'.
Discretizing time, of course.
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describe a situation in which the boxcar, in state will be sitting directly to the right of four squares
which alternate X, blank, X, blank. A graphical description such as the one in figure 7.1 is equally
complete and simpler to follow. 13
X:B B : X X:B
Figure 7.1. A Turing Machine
7.2.2 Turing Machines
The instruction tape, the boxcar, and the linear tape upon which it operates together make up a
simple variant of the Turing Machine. 14 To be sure, there is nothing special about blanks and X's. In
some incarnations, Turing Machines read and write l’s and 0’s. Any string of characters - or any
sequence of strings of characters separated by blanks - are fodder for a properly configured Turing
Machine. A few conventions prove useful if we are to get a handle on the gamut of Turing Machines.
First, a Turing Machine is in an initial configuration when, and only when, it is reading the left-most
Here, though, ‘X' and ‘B' are doing double-duty: each denotes what is being ‘read’ if it
occurs to the left of the colon and what should be ‘written 1 if it is to the right. The
colon-separated pairs represent a ‘what-is-read' and ‘what-to-do’ pair. Since a given
cell is either blank or has an X marked on it, two arrows exit all but the last state.
The state-diagram makes vivid the TF_THEN_ELSE' logic buried in the set of
quadruples.
Turing first proposed the Turing Machine model of computation in “On Computable
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (Turing, 1936). It is
worth emphasizing that the boxcar alone is not ‘the Turing Machine' - a relatively
common conceptual error. Despite the fact that the boxcar carries the evident
machinery of the Turing Machine, the linear tape and the instructions must be
included.
Turing machines are superb computational models for two reasons. First, they satisfy
the requirements of theory by successfully computing the same class of functions
which are computable by other means (more on this later), and, second, they are
(intentionally) analogous to modern computing machinery. Think of the box-car gears
as your computer's CPU, the instruction-tape as its program, the initial sequence of
cells as its input, and what it leaves behind when it halts (if it halts!) as its output.
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character of the left-most string in a sequence of strings, and ‘q0 ’ denotes the state of the Turing
Machine in initial configuration. And second, a Turing Machine is in a final configuration when, and
only when, it halts on the right-most character of the right-most string of a sequence of strings. We
shall say that a Turing Machine which has achieved a final configuration has computed its input
,
where
its input is understood to be the sequence of strings from its initial configuration and its output is
understood to be the sequence of strings upon entering its final configuration. The idea behind these
conventions is simply that a Turing Machine should ‘read’ from left to write. 15
There are two ways in which a Turing Machine can fail to compute its input. A Turing
Machine can either halt in something other than final configuration or not halt at all. A Turing Machine
which tails to halt has one of two problems: either it is reading off in one or another direction
indefinitely, or it is in some endless, usually complicated, loop across a sequence of strings. Let us say
that a Turing Machine which halts in something other than final configuration has rejected its input. To
illustrate failure to compute, suppose that we want a Turing Machine that computes the difference
between two numbers. So as to favor a numerical frame of mind, replaces X's with l’s. The input to
the machine will be two strings of l’s separated by a single blank. Its output should be a single string
of l’s whose length is the difference of the first input string’s length by the second input string's length.
To compute 5 - 3, for example, we want a Turing Machine which takes as input
and outputs
11
One way to do this is to read right until the Turing Machine crosses the blank and gets to the
first character of the second string, erase, move back to the last character of the first string, erase, and
‘Operates’ is perhaps a better word. Typically, a Turing Machine which computes its
input will scurry back and forth across a sequence of strings, make changes along the
way, and sometimes even make reminder marks beyond the sequence of strings (to be
erased later) until it comes to a rest in its final configuration. In no way do these
conventions require that a Turing Machine scan each character in turn from left to
right, although, in the end, a Turing Machine which computes its input will have
scanned every character in the sequence of strings.
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repeat. 6 In effect, the Turing Machine nibbles each string equally from the inside out. The problem is
that once it has nibbled the third character of the first string, it will then read back to the right to find
that there is no next character in the second string (the second string having been nibbled entirely
away). Whereupon the Turing Machine will fail to compute because it will unendingly read to the right.
B : R B : L
Figure 7.2. A Non-Halting Turing Machine
A far better approach would be to have the Turing Machine read across the second string to the
last character, erase it, then back up to the first character of the first string, erase it, and repeat. The
Turing Machine thus nibbles from the outside in until it halts, in state q„ in final configuration -
whereupon it will have computed its input, as in Figure 7. 3. 17 But there is a problem with this Turing
Machine. Suppose that the first string in the input is shorter than the second string. The Turing
Machine will nibble away until the first string is entirely gone and halt in state q8 on the second blank
to the left of the remainder of the second string. Since the Turing Machine fails to halt in final
configuration, it rejects its input. The Turing Machine computes subtraction on the Natural Numbers
only.
18 The Integers, which include negative numbers, are beyond its purview. A more complicated
Turing Machine could, however, be constructed to handle subtraction on the Integers.
See figure 7.2.
Elegance is here sacrificed for linear readability. A much more elegant - i.e., one with
fewer states - Turing Machine that computes subtraction on the Natural Numbers is
possible.
Specifically, this Turing Machine computes subtraction for {
l
kBF
|
k > j > 0}, where
‘
l
kl denotes a string of k 1 ’s.
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Figure 7.3. A Halting Turing Machine
In summary, a Turing Machine fails compute when it loops endlessly (or wanders off
aimlessly) or when it fails to halt in standard configuration. Let us say that a function is Turing
Machine-computable just in case there is a Turing Machine that computes it.
7.2.3 A Brief Taxonomy of Turing Machines
As the previous examples demonstrate, Turing Machines can vary according to the characters
they can read. Such a difference between Turing Machines is not of any particular theoretical
importance, since a Turing Machine which reads l’s and blanks is essentially the same from a design
standpoint as a Turing Machine which reads the entire alphabet. The design is called an ‘infinite single-
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tape deterministic Turing Machine'. ig The Turing Machines are infinite single-tape for the obvious
reason that they accept input and provide output on a single linear tape of indefinite length. The Turing
Machines are also deterministic because their flow-charts exactly predict what they will do in a given
state while reading a given character. Equivalently, the Turing Machines are deterministic because they
behave in some way with probability 1 in any given configuration.
Because the length of tape in an infinite Turing Machine is indefinite - i.e., for any input, it is
as long in either direction as need be for the Turing Machine to compute the input, or fail to compute
the input, as the case may be — such Turing Machines effectively have an infinite memory capacity.
Turing Machines of this type are in principle an idealized model of computation; their finite variations
become important when we consider real-world limitations on memory.
A multi
-tape Turing Machine operates with more than one linear tape, and the variations within
this group are extensive. For instance, one type of multi-tape Turing Machine can read from one tape
and write to a second tape. Another type reads and writes to each of two tapes, while still another has a
third ‘memory’ tape upon which the Turing Machine makes reminder marks. In each case there is but
one boxcar shuttling across the parallel tapes. The boxcar can be made as wide as necessary to
accommodate as many tapes as needed.
It is possible, however, for a Turing Machine to include more than one boxcar. Consider that
all of the Turing Machines we’ve discussed so far have been constrained in a fairly obvious way: in any
state, there is at most one action specified for each character read (including blanks). When the Turing
Machine in Figure 6.3 is in state q, reading a 1, for instance, the boxcar moves right a cell. But
suppose we had a second choice: reading a 1 in state q,, move left a cell and enter state q 5 (Figure 7.4
shows the relevant bit.)
In this and the rest of the chapter I follow Michael Sipser’s excellent “Introduction to
the Theory of Computation” (Sipser, 1997).
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Figure 7.4. Closeup on a Halting Turing Machine
The Turing Machine reading 1 in q, has to choose between moving left to enter q5 and moving right to
enter q 4 . The obvious solution would be stochastic; flip a coin - heads go left, tails go right. 20 Since
employing this solution amounts to rejecting determinism altogether, we now have indeterministic
Turing Machines (sometimes called 'probabilistic' Turing Machines.) An indeterministic Turing
Machine no longer simply computes or rejects if it halts. Rather, it computes with some probability
such that, for indeterministic Turing Machine m which halts on input w,
Pr[m rejects w] = 1 - Pr[m computes w].
Handling the puzzle in Figure 7.4 with an indeterministic Turing Machine is, as I say, an
obvious solution. A non-obvious solution is to go ahead and choose both ways at once in a mechanistic
analogue of having your cake and eating it too. The idea is that upon entering q[ and reading 1, the
Turing Machine splits or spawns itself into two identical configurations. The Turing Machine is now
composed of two identical linear tapes, two identical instruction tapes, and two identical boxcars in the
same state. One might think of these as ‘child’ Turing Machines which belong to, or are a part of, the
original ‘parent’ Turing Machine. One child goes left, the other right. Other choices might occur later
for one or both of the children, so in theory the parent Turing Machine must be able to spawn as many
child Turing Machines as necessary to exhaust all the choices. The parent-child metaphor is useful, but
A vivid but crude example: one can easily implement a probability function that
assigns probabilities between choices according to previous choices and previous
states. The room for complication is enormous.
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it should be emphasized that we don't in fact have separate Turing Machines. Rather, we have a single
Turing Machine which has been cleverly designed to employ multiple tapes, boxcars, and instruction
tapes as needed. Such Turing Machines are nondeterministic
,
following Sipser (1997, pp. 138-140).
A nondeterministic (parent) Turing Machine which halts on an input if all of its children halt, computes
its input if any of its children do, and rejects its input if it halts but no child computes.22
7.2.4 The Church-Turing Thesis
Excluding indeterministic Turing Machines, the class of Turing-computable functions is
invariant across the range of Turing Machine designs. As a model of computation, Turing Machines are
thus quite robust. The natural question to ask at this stage is whether there exist any computable
functions which are not Turing-computable: do any otherwise computable functions escape Turing
Machines? More precisely, are there any comparably rigorous models of computation which can
compute a function not in turn computable by any Turing Machine? That there are no such models is
known as the Church-Turing Thesis: any computable function is Turing-computable. If true, the class
of Turing-computable functions is co-extensive with the class of functions computable by any rigorously
specifiable method. But if true, the Church-Turing Thesis is not provably true, inasmuch as there are an
inexhaustible number of ways to rigorously specify computation.23
To help conceptualize this solution, think of each choice as forming a branch in a tree.
Such Turing Machines ascend all the branches of the tree.
Nondeterministic Turing Machines are of great importance in both Computability and
Complexity Theory. Unlike indeterministic Turing Machines, however, every
nondeterministic Turing Machine has a deterministic Turing Machine equivalent (see
Sipser (1997, pp. 1 38-9) for a straightforward proof of this), so nondetermism is not
essential. As we shall see, the difference is in complexity.
But if false, the Church-Turing Thesis is provably false. One need only give a
function which is computable by some rigorously specifiable method and show that it
is not Turing-computable. That there are functions which are not Turing-computable
is guaranteed by the fact that there are non-denumerably many functions but only
denumerably many Turing-computable functions.
A classic example of this is the so-called ‘Halting Problem'. Following Boolos and
Jeffrey (1989, p. 28), let M,, M 2 , ... enumerate all single-tape infinite deterministic
Turing Machines which readjust 1 and blank. The function
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Nonetheless, the Church-Turing Thesis is bolstered by experience. Through elaborate proofs,
one discovers that all the Turing-computable functions are computable by other methods. For example,
Boolos and Jeffrey (1989, pp. 19-95) show that the class of Turing-computable functions is coextensive
with the class of Abacus-computable functions, which is also coextensive with the class of recursive
functions. Since the same class of functions is picked out no matter how the functions are computed,
the proposal that any computable function is Turing-computable takes on an aura of fact. At the very
least, strict agreement between all the methods of computation considered thus far is highly suggestive:
the class of computable functions is unique. As such, to return to my central point, it can be used as
the basis for an account of machines.
Note that my account of machines is not circular, since nothing about Turing Machines
presupposes my account any more than my account presupposes Turing Machines. Given Boolos and
Jeffrey s efforts, the entire discussion of Turing-computability could have been restated in terms of the
theory of recursive functions. One reason to favor Turing Machines, however, is that they are fairly
obvious to anyone accustomed to modern computers. Another reason is that they reinforce a positive
argument for my account of machines. Recall that I first gave a negative argument for my account by
showing that none its alternatives succeeds. Yet their losing does not imply that my account wins: it
may be that none make it across the finish line.
By any intuitive measure of machinehood, Turing Machines are machines. But we discover
that they compute a special class of functions which, given the Church-Turing Thesis, is computable by
any method whatsoever. Taking computability to be a hallmark of machines is not, therefore, a leap in
the dark. It is a step which is both intuitively and theoretically plausible, given the apparent uniqueness
of the class of computable functions and their computability by Turing Machines.
h(m,n) = 1 iff Mm , from initial configuration reading a string of n l’s, never
halts
is not Turing-computable. On the other hand, it is also not computable by any other
method yet discovered.
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7.3 Complexity
There are two senses in which autonomous machine agency is possible. It may be that
autonomous machine agency is logically but not physically possible. An autonomous machine agent is
logically possible if each of the functional characteristics presupposed by RAAT are computable. An
autonomous machine agent is merely or only logically possible if it would take more space than exists
in the universe to construct the machine or if the machine would take more time than the life of the
universe to compute any one of the functions required by autonomous agency. Coupled with my
account of machines, Computability Theory shows us which machines are logically possible by carving
out the class of computable functions which can be implemented by the machines. Complexity Theory,
on the other hand, shows us which machines are physically possible by describing spatial and temporal
bounds on computation. Since my goal is to show that autonomous machine agents are physically
possible, I close this chapter by reviewing some of the results from Complexity Theory.24
7.3.1 Temporal Complexity
The theory of Temporal Complexity asks a very simple question: how much time does a Turing
Machine require ? For a Turing Machine which fails to halt on its input the answer is an infinite amount
of time, so henceforth we shall only consider Turing Machines which halt on all inputs. Furthermore,
let us suppose that each operation - move left, move right, erase, write a character - takes no more and
no less time than any other operation. The amount of time a Turing Machine takes to halt on a given
input will then be exactly proportional to the number of operations it performs (or, more colloquially,
the number of steps it takes), which allows us to use the number of steps as an (integer) measure of
time.
One can imagine three approaches to analyzing Temporal Complexity. An optimist might be
inclined to conduct a best-case analysis to discover the least number of steps a Turing Machine takes on
Of course, my goal is to show that autonomous machine agency is practically possible,
and it may be that something is physically possible without being practically possible.
As we saw in previous chapters, autonomous action in many cases must be swift
action. There would be little point in pursuing the design of autonomous machine
agents if they required a million years to decide whether to move left or right.
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various input strings. A pessimist would be more interested in conducting a worst-case analysis so as to
find an upper bound on the number of steps. Finally, an average-case analysis might be conducted to
find out the average number of steps required. Following Sipser (1997, pp. 225ff), let us be pessimists
and define the running time of a deterministic Turing Machine as a function from the length of its input
to the maximum number of steps the Turing Machine takes to halt on its input.25 Where n is the length
of its input, the Turing Machine's running time is given by f(n). The pessimistic definition of running
time for a nondeterministic Turing Machine is only slightly more complicated. Let the running time//)
for a nondeterministic Turing Machine which halts on all inputs - specifically, every branch halts on
every input - be the maximum number of steps required on any branch of computation for any input of
length //. Thus the run-time of a nondeterministic Turing Machine (parent) is set to be the run-time of
its slowest child.26
In general, we expect/«) to be large for large n, since the longer the input, the greater the
number of steps a Turing Machine will require to either reject or compute the input. Taking our
pessimism to the next logical step, we reinterpret the question of how long a Turing Machine takes to
be the question, how quickly does/grow?
It turns out that/can grow either quickly or astonishingly quickly. Turing Machines which run
in polynomial time have running times that are polynomial functions of the length of their input: /n) =
hr* + 8n 2 + 6n + 21, for example, /grows fast, but not unmanageably fast. Turing Machines which
only differ in running time by some polynomial factor (n2
,
3/i
4
,
or what have you) are said to be
polynomially equivalent. Of course, 'only' differing by some polynomial factor may seem a cavalier
way to put it, since n6 grows much faster than n2 as n increases. But the differences between
polynomially equivalent Turing Machines are insignificant when compared to Turing Machines which
For purposes of comparison, an average-case analysis would define f(n) as the mean
run-time for inputs of length n, while a best-case analysis would define /n) as the
least run-time for inputs of length n. The utility of best-case analysis is unclear, so
attention is usually focused on worst or average cases.
Just how pessimistic is this definition? The parent Turing Machine has not finished
running until its slowest child halts, even when the slowest child ends up rejecting
while a much faster sibling has already computed and is impatiently twiddling its
thumbs.
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run in exponential time. Turing Machines which run in exponential time have running times that are
exponential functions of the length of their input: /n) = 3", for example, /grows astonishingly fast.
Consider that a modest input length of n = 100 results in a run-time of 10000 steps for a
Turing Machine which halts on the input in the polynomial time of/n) = n2
,
while a Turing Machine
requiring an exponential running time of/») = 2" would take 1.26765X1030 steps to halt on the same
input. Loosely speaking, functions which are computable in polynomial time are for the most part
manageable by ordinary computing machinery; functions which are only computable in exponential time
require at the very least strict limitations on input length if ordinary computing machinery is employed.27
A splendid example of a function requiring exponential running time is a brute-force search algorithm
which searches through an exponentially large space of solutions by examining - hence, ‘brute-force’ -
each and every possible solution.
The reason for constructing a taxonomy of Turing Machines now becomes apparent. Every
deterministic multi-tape Turing Machine which runs in polynomial time//) has an equivalent
deterministic single
-tape Turing Machine which runs in /(«) time (Sipser 1997, p. 232). 28
Deterministic multi-tape Turing Machines are thus polynomially equivalent to deterministic single-tape
Turing Machines which run in polynomial time. Not so for nondeterministic Turing Machines. Every
nondeterministic single-tape Turing Machine which runs in polynomial time/n) has an equivalent
deterministic single-tape Turing Machine which runs in 2A " ) time (Sipser 1997, p. 233). 29 Where there
is at most a polynomial difference in running time between single and multi-tape deterministic Turing
Machines which compute the same function, there is at most an exponential difference in running time
between single-tape deterministic Turing Machines and single-tape nondeterministic Turing Machines
By ‘ordinary’ computing machinery I just mean the standard Von Neumann (serial)
architecture machines with which anyone who has used a desktop computer is familiar.
Ignoring differences in constants, which we may safely ignore since any difference in
constant is swamped by difference in exponent for large input length.
Again ignoring differences in constant.
194
which compute the same function. 10 The upshot is that one's choice of computational model becomes
extremely important where temporal complexity is concerned. Choice of computational model is less
important where spatial complexity is concerned.
7.3.2 Spatial Complexity
Recall that our initial description of a Turing Machine involved a boxcar trundling to and fro
across a linear tape of indefinite length. The amount of space required by a Turing Machine is
understood to be the amount of tape (=number of cells) it requires to operate on a given input. Suppose
we have a deterministic Turing Machine which halts on all inputs, and suppose we are just as
pessimistic about spatial requirements as we are about temporal requirements. Then the running size or
spatial complexity of the Turing Machine is a function g from the length of any input n to the greatest
number of cells scanned. For example, a deterministic single-tape Turing Machine which reads n
unbroken l’s and halts on the right-most 1 has a running size of n + 2: g(n) = n + 2. 31
The (pessimistic) definition of running size for a nondeterministic Turing Machine parallels the
definition of running time. Suppose we have a nondeterministic Turing Machine such that all branches
halt on all inputs. Then the running time g(n) of the Turing Machine on input of length n is the greatest
number of cells scanned on any branch.
According to Savitch's Theorem (Sipser 1997, p. 279), the (possibly) extraordinary difference
in running time between nondeterministic Turing Machines and their deterministic counterparts is not
mirrored by a similar difference in running size, since any nondeterministic Turing Machine with a
running space of g(n) has an equivalent deterministic Turing machine with a running space of g
2
(n).
Where there is at most an exponential difference between deterministic and nondeterministic Turing
I say ‘at most' because a given deterministic multi-tape Turing Machine and a given
nondeterministic single-tape Turing Machine may only require polynomial time. It is
only in exceptional cases like brute-force search algorithms where the single-tape
deterministic Turing Machine takes exponentially longer than its nondeterministic
variant.
g(n) = n + 2 since the Turing Machine scans n l’s plus one blank plus the right-most
1 a second time.
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Machines in running time, there is at most a polynomial difference between deterministic and
nondeterministic Turing Machines in running size. Granted, a polynomial difference can be exceptional
when it comes to budgeting memory costs for running a particular algorithm. But such costs are
relatively minor when compared to the difference in processing costs between polynomial and
exponential-time algorithms.
7.4 Where We Are Now
Let us set aside all the details and take stock. I opened this chapter by asking, what is a
machine ? I now confidently declare that a machine is a physical system all of whose functional
characteristics are algorithmically specifiable such that they do not exceed relevant spatial and temporal
constraints. 32 My confidence tracks my confidence in the Church-Turing Thesis. Every reasonably
precise way of formulating a recipe or algorithm has been found to pick out the same class of functions.
If the Church-Turing Thesis is true (as evidence and intuition suggest), then the class of computable
functions is unique. That is to say, the class of functions which are computable by Turing Machines,
for a (by now) familiar example, is identical to the class of functions computable by any other method
of computation. It seems safe to employ this class as marker of machine-hood, and it seems reasonable
to do so in light of a rather strong intuition that Turing Machines are machines.
It might be objected that my account of machines is over-broad: it calls things machines that
clearly are not. For example, advances in mtra-cellular biochemistry suggest that all of the functions of
a single-celled organism are algorithmically specifiable and meet (necessarily tiny) spatio-temporal
constraints. 33 But, so the complaint goes, a paramecium is clearly not a machine, so the account fails.
I suspect that the objection rests on a fairly shallow conception of the difference between a
physical system which is a machine and a physical system which is not. According to this conception, a
physical system is not a machine if it is natural, while a physical system is a machine if it is in some
What counts as ‘relevant’ will, of course, depend on the physical characteristics and
environment of the physical system under consideration.
The fact that biochemistry presupposes this will not, presumably, deter the objector; so
much the worse for my account.
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sense artificial. A wrist-watch is artificial: it doesn't grow off a tree to be plucked by and packaged for
sale. The objector, in other-words, thinks that machines are to be differentiated by how they came to be
(thereby ignoring the problems I earlier identified with this view.) But why should we think that
systems that come to be as a result of purely natural processes are not machines? A wrist-watch tree is
at least a logical possibility, which should suffice to confound the objector on this score.
A more interesting objection would be to point out that it may very well turn out that every
physical system is a machine on my view. For what would it be to be a physical system which is not a
machine on my view? Clearly, such a system would have to have functional characteristics that fail to
be algorithmically specifiable within relevant spatio-temporal constraints. The claim has been made
(Penrose, 1990) that human persons are precisely such systems, since human creativity is something
which is - so the claim goes - necessarily intractable to algorithmic specification. While some might
find the prospect of being a (biological) machine disturbing, the chance that the class of machines might
turn out to wholly include the class of biological organisms does not tell against my account of
machines in the absence of any more precise or better defended conception of machines. Yet as I have
already argued, no such alternative accounts are forthcoming.
In any case, the groundwork for my argument that autonomous machine agency is (physically)
possible has been laid. RAAT uncovers the functional capacities any autonomous agent must enjoy. If
every functional characteristic presupposed by RAAT is algorithmically specifiable within reasonable
spatio-temporal constraints, then autonomous machine agency is physically possible.
197
CHAPTER 8
AUTONOMOUS MACHINE AGENCY
8.1 A Brief Review
Much ground has been covered in the preceding seven chapters. We have a theory of
autonomous agency that exposes the functional roots of autonomous agency: deliberation, belief, and
desire. We have an account of deliberation that explains how the autonomous agent makes a
contribution to its causal environment that is neither stochastic nor deterministic. We have
mathematically tractable accounts of belief and desire that explain how the deliberative capacity is
possible. Finally, we have a theory of mechanism that distinguishes between merely logically possible
machines and physically possible machines. All the elements are in place to argue that autonomous
machine agency is possible. Since the argument assumes a clear grasp of all these elements, let us
pause to take stock.
8.1.1 Chapters 1 and 2
In Chapter 1 I set out the problem: Situated Robotics stands in need of a foundation in the form
of a demonstration of the possibility of autonomous machine agents. In Chapter 2 I explained why
Situated Robotics has this problem by examining a number of skeptical arguments intended to show that
machines cannot be autonomous agents. The arguments came in two flavors: either machines cannot be
autonomous agents because they cannot be autonomous agents, or machines cannot be autonomous
agents because they cannot be agents at all.
Since I am interested in showing that autonomous machine agency is possible - as well as
showing that there are no convincing arguments against that possibility - I did not criticize any of the
arguments when I presented them. Upon completion of my argument for the possibility of autonomous
machine agents in this chapter, however, I revisit each of the skeptical arguments. In some cases the
arguments are obviously and uninterestingly flawed, while in other cases the flaws prove to be quite
instructive.
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8.1.2
Chapter 3
The first problem to be solved is also the most general: What is an agent? Since my goal is to
show that the class of autonomous agents overlaps the class of possible machines, even if only a tiny
bit, I concluded that at most I needed an extensional account of agents. That is, I required principles
which would merely allow me to distinguish agents from non-agents, as opposed to the more
challenging requirement of giving an explicit definition of ‘agent'. Assuming that something is an agent
just in case it has the capacity to act, the problem of distinguishing agents from non-agents translates
into the problem of distinguishing actions from non-actions, or mere occurrences. The first four axioms
of RAAT - specifically, the Base, Inductive, Closure, and Transitivity Axioms - together provide a non-
reductive, recursive, extensional account that allows us to distinguish between actions and mere
occurrences. The guiding intuition behind the four axioms, for which I argued at some length, is that
actions are distinct from mere occurrences inasmuch as they are uniquely derived from deliberation.
8.1.3 Chapter 4
More troublesome than agency was the task of distinguishing the subclass of autonomous
actions. The result of that effort is the Autonomy Axiom, which uncovers the distinguishing marks of
autonomous actions. The literature proved to be oddly helpful in developing the Autonomy Axiom: it
turned out that philosophers get right exactly that half of the picture mathematicians get wrong, and vice
versa. The challenge proved to be the integration of the philosophical and mathematical accounts in
such a way as to preserve the relevant intuitions.
8.1.4 Chapters 5 and 6
It was no great surprise to discover that the Autonomy Axiom depends upon ‘belief and
‘desire’, which, together with the term ‘deliberation’ introduced in the Base Axiom, generate a formidable
three-fold challenge. For if RAAT is near the mark, then any thing having the capacity for autonomous
action must have the capacity to form beliefs and desires and the capacity to deliberate. The challenge
is to find sets of conditions on deliberation, belief, and desire. Chapter 5 took up the challenge of
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finding sufficient conditions for deliberation. Unfortunately the literature here proved to be no great
help, since it almost invariably smuggled in unacceptable assumptions about rationality or relied on
question-begging anthropocentric principles. On the other hand, the literature was tremendously helpful
for Chapter 6, where Cummins' work on mental representation and Bogdan's work on belief formation -
synthesized with Swoyer's technical apparatus
- provided conditions on belief which led almost
immediately to conditions on desire.
8.1.5 Chapter 7
suPplerr>ented by the Deliberation, Belief, and Desire Axioms, supplies the necessary
tools for carving out the class of autonomous agents. The class of possible machines, we discovered, is
more easily obtained, thanks in large measure to the tools provided by theoretical computer science.
The task in this chapter was merely to distill some of the results of Computability Theory and
Complexity Theory into a general account of mechanism.
8.2 In Summary
The first and second chapters, then, set up the puzzle, and the next five do the work of
providing all the necessary pieces to solve the puzzle. It remains to show that the class of autonomous
agents and the class of possible machines intersect in an interesting - i.e., nonempty - way. In effect,
what is wanted is something of an existence proof, where the existence is that of a possible autonomous
machine agent. Before considering the details of the argument, and to be sure that we have all the
pieces, let us set out RAAT, including its attendant sufficient conditions and the account of mechanism.
Let o be a physical system, let ‘u', V, and ‘w 1 be replaced uniformly by verbs, and let t, t*, and
t
A be (not necessarily distinct) times. Then RAAT consists of the following nine axioms and two
definitions.
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The Base Clause
Axl: o's deliberately u-ing at t is an action.
The Induction Clause
Ax2: If o's u-ing at t is an action, then o's v-ing at t* is an action if either
o v's at t* by u-ing at t
or
o u's at t by v-ing at t*.
The Closure Clause
Ax3: Nothing else is an action.
The Transitivity Axiom
Ax4: If o u-ed at t by v-ing at t* and v-ed at t* by w-ing at tA
,
then o u-ed at t by w-ing at
The By-Historv Definition
Dfl : A by-history of o's action a„ =df any ordered n-tuple (a,,..., an) of o’s actions a,,..., a„
such that, for each aj; ak , j < k, o ak 's by aj-ing.
The Pathway Definition
Df2: A pathway =df any segment of a by-history of an action.
The Axiom of Autonomy
Ax5: o autonomously v's at t* by u-ing at t iff
a) o deliberately desires v-ing at t*,
b) o deliberately believes that v-ing at t* is probable to some non-zero
degree d of u-ing at t via a pathway p,
and
c) if not (a) or not (b), then o would not have u'ed at t.
The Axiom of Deliberation
Ax6: o deliberately u's at t iff o infers u-ing at t from
a) o's belief that u-ing at t is an alternative to v-ing at t, w-ing at t,...
and
b) o's desire to u at t at least as much as v-ing at t, w-ing at t,...
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The Axiom of Belief
Ax7: o believes that P to degree b iff o's application that Ph is such that the value, b , of o's
parametric belief function relative to P is greater than 0.
The Axiom of Desire
Ax8: o desires that P to degree d iff o's application that Pl)d is such that the value, d, of o's
parametric desire function relative to P is nonzero.
The Axiom of Mechanism
Ax9: o is a machine iff o's functions are algorithmically specifiable and practically
executable.
To be sure, a substantial amount of argument and a good bit of technical apparatus underlie the
relative simplicity of the last four axioms. For example, recall that ‘infers’ in Ax6 is extended from its
usual sense to include actions as permissible objects of inference. While this use of ‘infers' avoids
problems with unbridgeable gaps in autonomous agency, it presupposes a logic of action that was
touched upon in Chapter 5. Similarly, Ax7 and Ax8 assume the apparatus developed in Chapter 6 to
account for ‘application’, ‘parametric belief function', and ‘parametric desire function'. And Ax9 makes
no sense absent the account of algorithmic specificity in terms of Turing Computability and the account
of practical execution in terms of temporal and spatial complexity.
It is best, perhaps, to think of these axioms as summarizing the results of chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Intentional relational systems, intenders, alternative sets, and most of the rest of the technical apparatus
are removed from view in RAAT proper. All of the ‘hidden' apparatus comes into play when we
examine the functional characteristics of autonomous machine agents.
8.3 The Plan
RAAT implies that autonomous agents have certain capacities: they must have the capacity to
form beliefs and desires; they must have the capacity to evaluate their beliefs and desires for acceptance
or rejection; and they must have the capacity to evaluate and implement actions. Autonomous agents
share specific functional characteristics which suggest an underlying set of functions. By tracing out
these functions, we can effectively modularize autonomous agents. I therefore begin by separating out
various functions of an autonomous agent which implement the functional characteristics necessitated by
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RAAT. To show that there exist (possible) autonomous machine agents, I then argue that each function
module is algorithmically specifiable and practically executable. As we shall see, however, this picture
of the guts of an autonomous agent is somewhat disconcertingly general: it can at best be viewed as a
template or schema for autonomous agents. To see how the template applies to particular robotic
architectures, I close consider and assess a variety of robots (both proposed and currently in use) with
an eye towards showing what would have to be done to bring the robot up to the level of an
autonomous machine agent.
8.4 The Indeterminacy of Functional Specification
Before exploring the functional characteristics of autonomous agents, we must attend to a
problem of no small significance. RAAT spells out all those functional characteristics a physical system
must have to be an autonomous agent, but those characteristics do not uniquely determine a set of
functions. One function could well satisfy two or more of the functional characteristics given by
RAAT. For example, one can imagine both an agent having intenders which generate both actual and
possible applications and an agent with distinct types of intenders for distinct types of applications. It is
important to take care in distinguishing between an autonomous agent's functional characteristics, on the
one hand, and its functional implementation, on the other. Functional characteristics presupposed by
RAAT are abstract and unique. How these functions are implemented can and may well vary
enormously from autonomous agent to autonomous agent. In short, even though RAAT presupposes a
specific set of functional characteristics, it makes no sense to talk about 'the' implementation of these
functions, since there exist an indefinite number of such implementations.
In describing a general architecture for autonomous agents, there are nonetheless reasons for
preferring one set of functions over another. First, insofar as our goal is to demonstrate the possibility
of autonomous machine agents, the onerous constraints on practical computability as embodied in
Complexity Theory must be observed. These constraints tell in favor of an autonomous machine agent
which is maximally decomposable, functionally speaking. That is, computation should be off-loaded to
as many sub-processes as possible, so a specification with more function-modules is preferable to one
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with fewer function-modules, even if both instantiate the characteristics of an autonomous agent equally
well.
Second, nature is, as ever, our guide. It is clear that natural selection has favored massively
parallel computation and highly refined modularization in any system, like ourselves, that we might be
inclined to call an ‘autonomous agent’. A correlate of RAAT is that autonomous agency ‘in the wild' is
rare indeed: deliberation is fantastically expensive in ground-level processing terms. In fact, I strongly
suspect that autonomous action is much rarer even among supposed exemplars of autonomous agents -
ourselves - than we would like to think. Still, there are strategies an agent can employ to minimize the
expense ol the autonomy of its actions, and, given the obvious selective advantage in autonomous
agency, it is likely that natural selection has thoroughly explored many of these strategies. An
implementation which does not take advantage of such strategies surely ought to be rejected out of
hand.
8.5 The Geography of an Autonomous Agent
NASA has released composite satellite images which have been augmented with computer
animation in such a way as to allow one to ‘zoom in' on a point on the ground all the way from a point
in orbit. The visual effect is that of high-velocity skydiving from space to the ground. One begins with
the curvature of the Earth in full view and no more detail than rough outlines of land and sea below.
As one descends, more and more detail is discerned, until particular buildings and streets are clearly
visible. In developing the functional specifications of autonomous agents, I am going to employ a
similar device: gradually increase magnification to expose more and more detail of thefunctional
geography, with commentary along the way.
8.5.1 The Situated Autonomous Agent
At the furthest remove, we see the autonomous agent making deliberative contributions to its
causal environment (Figure 8.1), or so it appears. From this distance the autonomous agent is little
more than a black box. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that the autonomous agent is fully
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situated in an extremely complex causal environment. Among other things, it is subject to
electromagnetic radiation, gravitational and inertial forces, and interactions with other middle - neither
quantum nor cosmic — sized objects governed by naive physics.
The autonomous agent sits in a rich causal soup, to which it makes its contributions of one sort
or other. That is, the autonomous agent need not be mobile, but it must have some capacity for joining
the causal fray, else it would not be an agent in the first place. Hence motion and, with it, 'action' in
Figure 8. 1 are construed broadly to range from moving around relative to some landscape to merely
emitting sound or light.
Causal Environment
Autonomous Agent
Action
Figure 8.1. The Situated Autonomous Agent
From the viewpoint of Figure 8.1, an autonomous agent is prima facia no different than other
middle-sized objects in its vicinity. What sets the agent apart are the sometimes surprising contributions
it makes to its causal environment. Its motions aren't those of other objects inasmuch as it does not
serve as a mere link in various causal chains. The autonomous agent makes unexpected contributions to
its causal environment - contributions which suggest a substantial internal complexity. As usual,
autonomous human agents provide the best example.
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Consider Woody. Woody rebelled against his self-absorbed corporate-lawyer parents by
becoming a nerd s nerd with a global conscience. He has degrees in mechanical and environmental
engineering, and he works for a solar-and-wind power company designing low-cost power systems for
villages in poor countries. He commutes to work in a hybrid-electric car he designed and built himself.
Outraged at the President s veto of a bill that would require the same fuel-economy standards of trucks
and SUV’s as cars, Woody decided to think globally and act locally.
With his technical skill and a flare for physics, Woody devised a Directional High Energy
Radio Frequency (DHERF) gun that has the ability to turn unshielded electronic components into molten
slag at a distance of up to thirty yards by inducing brief but astonishingly high voltages. Now Woody
spends his evenings and weekends prowling the streets and parking lots in his hybrid-electric car in
search of parked SUV’s. Upon finding an unattended behemoth. Woody, flips the switch hooking the
DHERF gun into the car’s powerful bank of batteries, aims it out the window, pulls the trigger, and
drives on with a grin on his face as he pictures the beast’s smoldering electronic ignition system.
Woody kills SUV’s.
Killing SUV's is Woody's surprising, albeit criminal, contribution to his causal environment.
Woody is no mere causal cog. The route from causal environment to action - from Woody's ‘input’ to
his ‘output’, if you will - must be complicated.
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8.5.2 A First Look Inside
If we zoom in to have a closer look at an autonomous agent's internal complexity, we find in
Figure 8.2 that the agent has two distinct functional components:
Causal Environment
Action
Figure 8.2. Inside the Autonomous Agent
We see what RAAT tells us we should expect to see: a module for deliberating over action and a
module for the formation of beliefs and desires. This is intuitive but uninteresting. We've merely
exchanged one black box - the agent itself - for two. It tells us that Woody has decided to kill SUV’s
given his beliefs about non-renewable resources and political inaction and his desire to think globally
and act locally. But this is the barest of explanations. It tells us why his beliefs and desires result in
his actions but not how.
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8.5.3 A Closer Look
Peering closer, we see in Figure 8.3 that each module resolves into two sub-modules:
Causal Environment
Action
Figure 8.3. A Closer Look
The formation of beliefs and desires resolves into two sub-modules: one for the generation of
applications - i.e., the construction of a targeted Intentional Relational System as per Cummins and
Swoyer - and one for on-the-fly formation of beliefs and desires from those applications as per Bogdan.
Similarly, deliberation resolves into two sub-modules, since deliberation in the autonomous agent can be
directed at either beliefs and desires or actions.
For example, today Woody is hunting a Ford Expedition he’s just spied entering a mall parking
lot. Woody finds the Expedition in a distant, empty corner of the parking lot. After driving by to
verify that the hulking monster is unoccupied. Woody swings around, activates the DHERF gun, aims,
pulls the trigger, fires, and is immediately rewarded by a crackling noise and a thin stream of blue
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smoke from under the now-disabled beast’s hood. Woody casually drives home to carve another notch
in the DHERF gun’s stock.
So far we have the picture in Figure 8.1: an autonomous agent acting in its causal environment.
A slightly more detailed story can be told given the picture in Figure 8.2 by attributing to Woody the
desire to kill an SUV and the belief that the Ford Expedition is an SUV. Figure 8.3 moves us from the
‘why'-explanation offered by Figure 8.2 to a more detailed ‘how'-explanation found in the technical
resources of Chapters 5 and 6.
In particular, Woody's visual intenders supply an application to his belief-and-desire-formation
module by constructing a representation of an SUV and applying or targeting the representation to the
Ford Expedition. His belief-and-desire-formation module tests the resulting application to see whether it
meets parameters sufficient to warrant elevation to the cognitive-functional level of a belief that that is
an SUV. The application qua belief is then submitted for evaluation by the belief-and-desire-evaluation
module. While it's unlikely that Woody can deliberately disbelieve that the Ford Explorer is an SUV,
he can evaluate the belief for it's relevance to his desire to kill SUV's - a trivial matter in this case.
Thus in Woody's case the belief-and-desire-evaluation module functions as a filter in presenting beliefs
and desires to the next module in the sequence, wherein the action of killing the SUV is compared to
not killing the SUV. In light of the beliefs and desires passed on by the belief-and-desire-evaluation
module, killing the SUV is the better of the alternatives, so Woody shoots and kills the SUV.
8.5.4 The Autonomous Agent in Gory Detail
There is a distressing linearity to picture we have been developing. We expect the functional
path from causal environment to action to take some detours along the way, especially in the process of
deliberating over beliefs and desires. Moreover, it is clear that there are yet more features to resolve by
magnification. The formation and role of desires is left largely unexplained (although it may help to
recall that desires are formed from applications just as beliefs are, except that only applications targeted
at possible worlds are candidates for desires.) Unfortunately, upping the level of magnification once
reveals substantially more structure, structure that requires explanation.
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Causal Environment
Action
Figure 8.4. The Autonomous Agent in Full Detail
Each of the modules from Figure 8.3 has resolved into two sub-modules in Figure 8.4.
Beginning with application generation, recall from Chapter 6 that applications may target space-time
regions in the actual world or space-time regions of nearby possible worlds. Intenders construct
Intentional Relational Systems and target them at the actual world. Cummins suggests that there are
intenders whose job it is to target possible worlds, but such ‘intenders’ deserve a special class all their
own. ‘Protender' is apt, since it is their job to construct alternative or how-things-might-be-but-aren't
applications. Protenders are distinct from intenders not just by differences in output, however. Where
intenders take as input raw sensory data, protenders take as input the applications constructed by
intenders. To employ a metaphor, intenders construct sandbox models of the causal environment, while
protenders take the sandbox models produced by intenders and ‘play in them' to produce sandbox
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models of possible causal environments. Thus protenders are distinct from intenders by output and
input.
To illustrate, recall that Woody's visual intenders construct a representation of an SUV and
target the Ford Expedition parked in the corner of the mall parking lot by pairing the representation with
a Woody-relative location for the Ford Expedition. The content of the application is that that is an
SUV. The target of the application is the IRS at the Woody-relative location: namely, the Ford
Expedition parked in the corner of the mall parking lot. Call this the “Ford Expedition Application”.
Referring to Figure 8.4, the Ford Expedition Application is then output to a belief-attender and,
simultaneously, a protender. The protender shifts the location of the targeted IRS (the Ford Expedition
itself) to a nearby possible world and makes an alteration to the representing IRS (thereby constructing a
new representation from the old one.) Repeated operations spawn a series of applications each of which
has as its content a different outcome for the SUV. Of particular note is an application that has as its
content the SUV with a fried electronic ignition system. Call this the “Fried Ford Expedition
Application”. These applications are then presented to belief and desire attenders - ‘attended, since they
attend to the stream of applications for belief- and desire-relevant parameters - for candidacy to function
as beliefs and desires, which brings us to the next step.
Belief and desire-attenders to promote some of the applications generated by intenders and
protenders to the cognitive function roles of beliefs and desires. Using Bogdan's parametric model of
belief formation, and extending his model to desire formation, this is a matter of canvassing incoming
applications for relevant belief and desire properties and relations. That is, belief-attenders and desire-
attenders sift the stream of applications for those that satisfy parametric belief or desire functions.
Those that do are assigned an appropriate 'b' value and/or 'd value and graduated to the functional role
of belief or desire. Note the asymmetry between belief and desire-attenders. Whereas one can form
beliefs about the actual and the possible - i.e., belief-attenders take their input from both intenders and
protenders - desire-attenders take their input from protenders alone, since desires only make sense when
they are directed at possible states of affairs. In sum, belief-attenders and desire-attenders are jointly
responsible for the formation of beliefs and desires from the continuously generated stock of
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applications. We may also suppose that it is their job to store applications and, in particular, beliefs and
desires as fodder for deliberation.
Woody's Ford Expedition Application is tested for satisfaction of various parameters to
determine the application’s 'b' value. 1 Any number of parameters are possible, although one imagines
that the source of the application in a visual intender would weigh heavily in favor of its functioning as
a belief. Likewise, Woody's Fried Ford Expedition Application is passed on from its protender to a
behef-attender and a desire-attender. The desire-attender ranks the application as a desire in virtue of its
relationships, perhaps including similarity, to other desires and assigns it a ‘d' value. The belief-attender
assesses the likelihood of the Fried Ford Expedition Application by comparison to beliefs about previous
successful SUV-hunts and assigns the probability as a 'b' value. Clearly, the belief-attenders and desire-
attenders depend on the relationship of a given application to other applications. Woody's Fried Ford
Expedition Application is assigned a 'd' value at least in part because he has previously formed a
general desire to kill SUV s. In plain terms, Woody wants to kill the Ford Expedition because he wants
to kill SUV's. The resulting beliefs and desires fuel Woody's deliberations.
Deliberation over belief and desire naturally splits into two distinct deliberative modules: belief-
contenders and desire-contenders. 2 The distinction between the two is merely that of output. Both take
as input beliefs and desires from the belief and desire-attenders and their own output, which is why we
have such a complicated nest of lines. Together with action-contenders, these are the core deliberative
modules of the autonomous agent. The task of belief and desire-contenders is two-fold. First, and most
importantly, they evaluate alternatives and output the result. Second, they generate new beliefs and new
desires by inference from the stock of beliefs and desires presented by their respective attenders.
Recall that b - [0,1]. Every application starts with b = 0: we might call these
mere applications. My application that that is a 22-inch computer monitor has a 'b'
value very nearly 1. My application that the next toss of a fair coin will come up
heads has a 'b' value of .5. The parametric belief function, then, is chosen specifically
to coincide with what is ordinarily called ‘degree of belief. In any case, one expects
that Woody's visual intenders are generally quite reliable, so Woody’s belief-attenders
regularly assign high 'b' values to applications provided by visual intenders.
‘Contender' seems appropriate, since alternative beliefs and alternative desires are
therein contested.
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Woody deliberately desires killing the Ford Expedition because his desire to do so is evaluated
in light of countervailing desires such as his desire to not get caught or his desire to not hurt anyone.
Given his belief that he probably won't get caught and his belief that he won’t be hurting anyone,
Woody's desire to kill the Ford Expedition is passed on to an action-contender. Similarly, Woody
deliberately believes that that is an SUV (of the sort to be hunted) because he weighs his belief against
other beliefs he has about when an SUV is to be excused from hunting such as when, for example, the
SUV belongs to fire rescue, the police, or the military. Woody may even want a closer look or,
equivalently, a better representation, before passing the belief on to an action-contender.
As expected, action-contenders take the output of belief and desire-contenders and evaluate
alternative actions. The output from action-contenders is directly coupled to extenders, whose job it is
to translate actions into coordinated physical motion. Extenders - so-named because they extend the
simple directives of the action-contenders to encompass complex motion - complement intenders in the
sense that they provide an output interface to the causal environment just as intenders provide an input
interface.
His SUV-related beliefs and desires having been passed on to an action-contender. Woody is in
position to compare alternative actions. Given his confidence in the DHERF gun’s effectiveness
(another belief). Woody has two alternatives: kill the SUV or not. From the totality of desires and
beliefs passed on by his belief and desire-contenders, he concludes his deliberations with killing the
SUV. Of course, it is not quite as simple as that. Woody must aim and fire his gun, so his
deliberations conclude with a sequence of applications with the content 1) aim the gun at the SUV and
2) fire the gun at the SUV. It is these applications which form the input for Woody's extenders.
Woody does not need to form beliefs and desires about specific muscle contractions and relaxations;
extenders handle the job from there. To say that Woody is practiced in the art of SUV execution is just
to say that he has developed extenders that facilitate aiming and firing the DHERF gun.
This, then, is the geography of an autonomous agent. In most respects it is far more simplified
than one would expect to see in an actual autonomous agent. This is why I have been employing the
plural for each of the modules; presumably, an autonomous agent will have many, many such modules.
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Yet as a schematic, this does a reasonable job of displaying a basic set of modules and their
interconnections.
It is interesting to note that when viewed as an abstract system, the autonomous agent is a
fundamentally recursive structure. There are two levels of recursion. On one level, the agent's actions
(its ‘output') change its causal environment (its input). On another level, the agent's deliberations about
beliefs and desires feedback into further deliberations. In short, the agent's deliberations affect its
deliberations, and its actions affect its actions.
There is, however, a missing connection. One can be certain that the computational overhead
for autonomous action is enormous in terms of resources and time. That is, an autonomous agent
situated in a particular causal environment will doubtless encounter instances where the time it takes to
act autonomously is greater than the time at which the action must take place. The sudden appearance
of the SUV’s owner doesn’t leave Woody time to the think about dropping the DHERF gun into is lap.
He just, reflexively, drops the gun.
There must be a way to circumvent the time-costly deliberative path. To meet this requirement,
let us introduce a reactive path by drawing a line straight from the intenders to the extenders. We can
imagine intenders that function specifically to trigger a given extender. Woody's ‘person-detector'
intender triggers his ‘drop gun' extender. In the parlance of behavioral robotics, we now have the
schema for a hybridized reactive/deliberative system (Arkin, 1998, p. 205ff). Of course, my interest is
in the deliberative path, which may be summarized as follows:
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Function Input Output Description
intenders sensor data applications constructs a structural representation from sensor
data and fixes the target
protenders applications applications constructs a structural representation targeted at a
possible world
belief-
attenders
applications beliefs evaluates an application for feasibility as a belief
by testing satisfaction of belief parameters
desire-
attenders
applications desires evaluates an application for feasibility as a desire
by testing satisfaction of desire parameters
belief-
contenders
beliefs,
desires
beliefs infers beliefs from beliefs and desires
desire-
contenders
beliefs,
desires
desires infers desires from beliefs and desires
action-
contenders
beliefs,
desires
actions infers actions from beliefs and desires
extenders actions coordinated
physical
movement
translates action-directive into coordinated
muscle-contraction/muscle-relaxation
8.6 The Argument for Computability
To argue for the possibility of autonomous machine agency, it suffices to argue that each of the
above function-modules is algorithmically specifiable and practically executable. With eight distinct
function-modules, this might appear to be a daunting task. I argue that it is not such a difficult thing to
do. Indeed, we've already (largely) done it. Let me explain.
In terms of functionality, the modules can be grouped into four ‘phases', much as we saw in
Figure 8.3. The first phase of intenders and protenders takes input from the causal environment and
outputs applications. The second phase of belief and desire-attenders takes applications, beliefs, and
desires and outputs beliefs and desires. The third phase of belief and desire-contenders infers and
selects beliefs and desires and provides the source beliefs and desires for the fourth phase of action-
contenders and extenders, where actions are selected from alternatives and implemented in coordinated
physical movement.
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Except for intenders and extenders, all the other modules are, at root, operations on
applications. Protenders take applications targeted at the actual world and generate new applications
targeted at possible worlds by altering the representing IRS. Belief and desire-attenders test whether a
given application should be flagged as a belief or desire (and to what degree) by checking to see which
parameters the application satisfies. Belief, desire, and action-contenders evaluate and infer applications
by comparing and altering their content according to their degree of belief and/or desire.
Thus to argue for the possibility of autonomous machine agents, it suffices to show that the
formation of applications, operations on applications, and their translation into coordinated movement,
are algorithmically specifiable and practically executable. The hard work of giving a complete
mathematical account of applications has, however, already been done: in chapter 6 I set out to establish
a mathematically tractable pictorial account of belief and desire. To do so I employed Swoyer's
account of an embedded isomorphism between Intentional Relational Systems coupled with Bogdan's
parametric account of belief formation and, by analogy, desire formation. By the end of chapter 6 we
had achieved conditions on belief and desire formation in purely mathematical terms.
To be sure, merely having a mathematical account does not suffice to show that belief and
desire formation are algorithmically specifiable and practically executable. What Turing (1936) showed
is that only some mathematical problems can be solved by mechanical means, while other problems can
be just as precisely formulated yet resist Turing-computability. Nevertheless, having a precise
mathematical account of belief and desire is a huge step in the right direction. To see how big a step
this was, let us consider the formation of applications, operations on applications, and the translation of
applications to coordinated movement each in turn.
8.6.1 Application Formation
Applications may be formed in two ways. In the first case an application is derived in whole
or part from sensory data by the functioning of an intender. In the second case an application is derived
from other applications either by a protender or by belief and desire-contenders. Since the second case
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is, properly speaking, an operation on applications, we shall set it aside for later. For now we are only
concerned with the functioning of intenders.
In general terms, an intender forms an application by 1) constructing an Intentional Relational
System (IRS) from sensory data such that there exists an embedded isomorphism from the representing
IRS to the represented IRS and 2) targeting the representing IRS to the represented IRS by associating
with the representing IRS the space-time region of the represented IRS in the actual world. (2) is trivial
once we have (1), since the localization need only be agent-relative - which, interestingly, introduces
indexicality at the most basic level - and any agent with the capacity to construct IRS's for which there
exists an embedded isomorphism to an IRS in the environment can include itself, along with relational
properties like distance and direction, in the represented IRS.
To argue that there is an effective procedure for forming an application, then, it suffices to
show that there exists an effective procedure for constructing a structural representation of any 'sensible'
IRS. That is, an intender takes its input from a sensor: IRS's which do not have a causal affect on the
sensor are not sensible (to that sensor), so an intender could not form a structural representation.
Suppose we have an intender / that takes its input from a sensor S and an S-sensible IRS A. Recall that
A is specified mathematically as an ordered quadruple
</V9tV9V\ v),
where IA is a set of individuals, fcRA is a set of first order relations, and s9lA be a set of second-order
relations such that at least two of the adjacent sets /"VSl4
,
and are non-empty, and v is an extension
function which maps the relations in /SR'4 and (9IA into their extensions. Since the argument is strictly
analogous for the other cases, let us restrict our attention to the case where IA and f3iA are non-empty,
but is empty. 3
For A to be S-sensible, there must be at least one property or relation in /9lA which has a causal
affect on S: A is S-sensible because it has properties which are S-sensible. In order to construct a
In other words, we’ll only be concerned with an effective procedure to construct a
structural representation of an IRS as a collection of objects, their properties, and their
relations. The properties and relations of those properties and relations may be ignored
for the purposes of this argument.
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structural representation of A, we assume that S is veridical: regardless of the modality of the sensor's
input or output, a change in input causes a corresponding change in output. Hence S maps S-sensible
properties to corresponding properties of its output modality.4 Taken as a function, 5 maps its input
one-to-one onto its output. Recalling Kermit's bug-intenders from chapter 6, a structural representation
of A is constructed by an intender in the simplest case by storing a property P from the output of S. In
effect, the intender filters out all but P from the output of S, and, upon encountering P, stores the
property in memory. Using the trick of letting the index (store location) of P be an individual, the
intender has constructed an IRS B which is a structural representation of A since S' 1 is an embedded
isomorphism one-to-one into A. What this describes is an effective procedure for constructing a
structural representation.
To be sure, a structural representation so constructed will be rather crude. But intenders need
not be as simple as mere pass-through filters. Various combinatoric and transformational operations are
possible on the output of a given sensor or, more interesting still, on the output of multiple sensors of
different types.
Some of the more interesting research in robotics at the moment is on how to construct
representations which are maximally useful and minimally expensive (computationally speaking.) Work
at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics (LPR) under the
direction of Grupen provides three examples:
• Piater (Piater and Grupen, 2000; Coelho, Piater, and Grupen, 2001) has developed a system
for constructing structural representations in terms of what he calls ‘edgels’ and ‘texels’
from video sensors. These are trans-type structural representations, where properties in a
visual field are represented by objects, edgels and texels, in the representing IRS.
• Araujo (Araujo and Grupen, 2000) has developed a system for constructing structural
representations of concavity and convexity from stereoscopic sonar sensors so that a robot
can better model its environment. She shows that it is possible to construct rather
complicated structural representations of the robot's immediate environment by
implementing simple but non-trivial mathematical transformations on the data from sonar
sensors.
• Coelho (Grupen and Coelho, 2000; Coelho, Piater, and Grupen, 2001) has shown how
structural representations of small objects may be constructed from tactile (pressure)
sensors to facilitate robotic grasping tasks. For example, if the goal is to pick up an object
A microphone, for example maps sound waves to corresponding electrical waves.
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as gently as possible, then it is important to be able to determine whether the object has the
shape of a cube, cylinder, or cone so as to minimize the holding force to be exerted on the
object.
Piater, Araujo, and Coelho can be seen as tackling the problem of developing useful intenders. Useful
or not, the point is that there exist effective procedures for constructing structural representations, which
is enough to show that machines can construct applications.
8.6.2 Operations on Applications
Quite a number of operations on applications are conceivable, but three are key to the
possibility of autonomous machine agency:
Application Transformation: is there an effective procedure for generating new applications
from old applications?
Belief and Desire Formation: is there an effective procedure for forming beliefs and desires
from a stock of applications?
Application Comparison: is there an effective procedure for comparing alternative
applications?
8.6.2. 1 Application Transformation
In the functional description of autonomous agents given in Figure 8.4, there are two ways to
transform applications. First, protenders generate possibilia applications that represent not how things
are but how things might be from applications formed by intenders. Second, since every belief is an
application, the inference of beliefs and desires about possible states of affairs amounts to the
transformation of applications.
Suppose a protender is given an application A from an intender. To generate applications, the
protender must transform the structural representation of A and adjust the target of the transformed
structural representation to a possible world. In theory this is simple enough: take a property of the
structural representation provided by A and replace it with another property so as to generate a new
application by retargeting to a possible world. In so doing the blue car may be re-represented as a
green car, for example. In practice the transformation of applications is tricky, since changes in some
properties will only be correct when they are targeted at possible worlds very far from the actual world.
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A structural re-representation of the blue car as a green car may be targeted at a nearby possible world,
since a trip to the body shop is all that would be required to make the blue car green. But a structural
re-representation of the blue car as aflying car would be correctly targeted only at possible worlds very,
very far from the actual world. The primitive similarity relation that orders possible worlds presupposes
at the very least a naive physics which must be reflected in the operation of protenders. These are
problems which do not, however, impugn the basic point that there are effective procedures for the
transformation of applications.
It is easier, perhaps, to see how the transformation of an application may be constrained by
naive physics in the case of transformation by the inference of desire and belief, since beliefs about
naive physics constrain the variety of inferences - that, for instance, a blue car might well be green but
not likely flying. More generally, beliefs about beliefs and desires and, in particular, their inference,
constrain transformations on applications.
The clearest example illustrating the existence of effective procedures for the transformation of
applications is provided by IBM's chess playing computer Deep Blue. Deep Blue plays chess by brute
force: it compares the outcomes of alternative moves in the crudest way possible by generating millions
upon millions of applications via transformation. The advantage enjoyed by the designers of Deep Blue
is that the ‘physics' of chess is well-defined. That is, there exist easily formalized rules which
completely determine the range of alternatives at any given point in the game. Deep blue might well
construct an alternative structural representation of the Queen as at Queen's Bishop 3, but not a
structural representation of the Black Queen as blue or flying.
8. 6. 2.2 Belief and Desire Formation
Effective procedures for the transformation of applications by inference from beliefs and desires
presupposes that there exist effective procedures for the formation of beliefs and desires in the first
place. This is where Bogdan's parametric model of belief formation comes into play. Recall that every
application has an associated set of parameters which admit it for, or block if from, belief functionality,
and likewise for desire functionality. These parameters are really nothing more than the properties and
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relations of the applications, so Bogdan's model makes the un-startling claim that applications with
certain properties and bearing certain relations to other applications satisfy conditions to function as
beliefs. For example, a mobile robot might be programmed in such a way that it assigns a successively
higher degree of belief to an application that that is a corner of a room which has the property of having
been formed by a sonar-intender when subsequent applications from the same sonar-intender 'confirm' or
share the content that that is a corner of a room. Bogdan's parametric model is well-suited to answering
the question of the existence of effective procedures, since the parametric model is itself an effective
procedure for determining the formation of beliefs and desires.
8. 6. 2. 3 Application Comparison
At root, deliberation over beliefs, desires, and actions is a process of comparing alternative
applications. The functional role of belief, desire, and action-contenders is to compare alternative
beliefs, desires, and applications whose content specifies possible courses of action. 5 Belief, desire, and
action-contenders are appropriately differentiated by their output, but for purposes of arguing for the
existence of effective procedures, the modules can be viewed as functionally identical, where the
function in question is the comparison of alternative applications. Key to the autonomous agent's
capacity to compare alternative applications is its capacity to form applications targeted at applications.
Equivalently, the capacity to compare beliefs and desires presupposes the capacity to form beliefs and
desires about beliefs and desires.
Recall that Woody-the-ecoterrorist/SUV-killer, as part of his deliberations over whether to kill
the Ford Expedition, must consider whether the SUV is of the sort to qualify for killing. This involves
In so saying, I am being explicitly neutral with respect to the belief and/or desire
status of the output of action-contenders. One could argue that action-contenders
ouptut beliefs - that Woody forms the belief that he will kill the SUV prior to killing
the SUV, for instance. Or one could argue that action-contenders output desires - that
Woody forms the desire that he shall kill the SUV prior to killing the SUV. Or
perhaps the applications output by action-contenders have both belief and desire
functionality (a possibility not easily expressed in ordinary English attributions of
‘propositional' attitudes.) The belief and/or desire status of applications output by
action-contenders is irrelevant, however, since all that matters for the functioning of
extenders is the content of the application. More on this shortly.
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comparing his belief that it does qualify for killing against his belief that it might not, which
presupposes his forming a belief about the relative strengths of his beliefs that it does qualify versus not.
Woody, then, must have the capacity to form structural representations of structural representations.
Forming a structural representation of a structural representation is in principle no different than
forming a structural representation of an IRS (which has already been shown to be amenable to effective
procedure), since a structural representation is itself an IRS in the first place. Finally, the comparison of
alternatives itself may follow any of a number of deliberative strategies, many of which I outlined in
Chapter 4. But inasmuch as specifying a deliberative strategy amounts to giving an effective procedure
for comparison of alternative applications, the functioning of belief, desire, and action-contenders can in
principle be implemented by a machine.
8.6.3 The Translation of Applications to Coordinated Movement6
Extenders take the application output from action-contenders and translate the content of the
application into coordinated motion. For example, Woody's action-contender outputs an application
which has a structural representation of his killing the SUV targeted at a (very nearby) possible world.
The extender's job is to ‘make it so'. Let us break that down a bit. To kill the SUV, Woody must aim
and fire the DHERF gun. To aim and fire the DHERF gun is to point the gun and pull its trigger.
Pointing and pulling the trigger presupposes an extremely complicated series of muscular contractions
and relaxations with continuous feedback from visual and tactile intenders. Even a partial list of
involved muscles is daunting: Deltoid, Trapezius, Pectoralis Major
,
Teres Major, Brachialis and Biceps
Brachii, Pronator Teres, Brachioradialis, Flexor Carpi Radialis, Triceps Brachii, Extensor Carpi
Ulnaris, not to mention Latissimus Dorsi, Rectus Abdominis, and the External Oblique. The complexity
of what must happen for Woody to aim and fire - for Woody's extenders to ‘make it so' - is
breathtaking. But the mere complexity of Woody's accomplishment in killing the SUV should not
persuade us that the underlying processes are not describable by effective procedures.
Here, of course, I am construing 'movement' broadly so as to include any causal effect
the autonomous agent might have on its environment.
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Although not trivial, the process by which extenders function is by no means mysterious. The
applications wh.ch serve as input to extenders include in their structural representation a representation
of the agent itself in some new configuration and/or location. Extenders make it so by calculating and
implementing the movements necessary to bring the agent into the target of the application. A great
deal of simplification is possible by building up 'molecular' extenders from ‘atomic’ extenders which are
each responsible for a primitive, highly uncoordinated movement. For example, an extender might be
responsible for raising one’s arm and rotating one's wrist which is built out of two sub-extenders: one
responsible for arm-raising, another responsible for wrist-rotating. However it is implemented, the idea
is that extenders trigger movement when given an application with specific agent-centric properties and
relations.
Theie aie many real-world examples of the mechanical implementation of extenders. Of
special interest at LPR is the design of robotic architectures which have the capacity to learn
coordinated movement by constructing their own extenders, much as human agents do in learning how
to walk, tor instance. Huber and Grupen (1999) developed a hybrid control architecture which
combines elements of control models (applications) with simple reactive sub-control modules to create
control policies (extenders). Their platform for testing the architecture was a small four-legged robot -
affectionately known as ‘Thing’ - which is better pictured than described:
Figure 8.5. Thing
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Each of Thing's legs is positioned by the coordinated activation of three servo-motors; learning to walk
and turn presupposes the coordination of twelve servo-motors - a matter of considerable complexity.
As Huber and Grupen (1999) summarize their efforts,
Autonomous robot systems operating in an uncertain environment
have to be reactive and adaptive in order to cope with changing
environment conditions and task requirements. To achieve this, the
control architecture presented in this paper uses reinforcement
learning on top of an abstract Discrete Event Dynamic System
(DEDS) supervisor to learn to coordinate a set of continuous
controllers in order to perform a given task. In addition to providing
a base reactivity through the underlying stable and convergent
elements, the use of this hybrid control approach also allows the
learning to be performed on an abstract system model which
dramatically reduces the complexity of the learning problem.
Whether it be for application formation, operations on applications, or the translation of
applications to coordinated movement, we find that effective procedures can be specified for the
functional processes underlying the capacities of autonomous agents. Indeed, the argument for the
existence of such effective procedures was already largely completed in the work of developing accounts
of the precursors to autonomous agency: belief, desire, and deliberation. I conclude that autonomous
machine agents are
,
indeed, possible.
8.7 The Complexity of Autonomous Machine Agents
Nevertheless, autonomous machine agents may be logically possible without being physically
possible. The temporal and spatial complexity necessitated by autonomous agency might be so great
that no autonomous machine agent could ever be implemented beyond the drawing board. Spatial
complexity is not, I think, as much a worry as temporal complexity. If we think of the spatial
complexity necessitated by autonomous agency as the amount of memory presupposed by any
autonomous action, then each of the various functions — the intenders, protenders, attenders, contenders,
and extenders - each take a toll on spatial complexity. Yet the overall spatial complexity will always be
a function of the spatial complexity of the individual applications, and while those may be large, we
must bear in mind that they are never more complex than the IRS's to be found in the machine agent s
immediate causal environment. That upper bound is itself much larger than the autonomous machine
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agent requires, since the entire point of an intender is to extract just those features from sensors which
are needed for the construction of structural representations. There is a great deal more in the machine
agent's causal environment than the agent need represent prior to autonomous action. Because the
structural representations are embedded isomorphisms, they are simpler than what they represent.
Indeed, their utility presupposes simplification. A 1-1 map of the Pioneer Valley, for example, would
be utterly useless. 7 The fact that representing IRS's are simpler than what they represent applies equally
well to the added complication introduced by contenders forming structural representations of structural
representations. So spatial complexity is not a special concern.
Temporal complexity is a concern, however. There is a strict limit on the time an autonomous
machine agent can take in performing an autonomous action. Suppose ALT is a set of alternative
actions at a time t for an autonomous machine agent now at t*. Then the agent has only t - 1* in which
all the formational and deliberative precursors to autonomously acting at t must be satisfied. This is an
imposing constraint.
I do not have an argument that this constraint can always be met, because I do not think there
is such an argument (or, if there is, it certainly wouldn't be a sound argument.) Even autonomous
human agents must admit that there are situations in which t - 1* fails to suffice for deliberate action, to
say nothing of the much more demanding autonomous action. This is why, for purposes of
survivability, human agents come equipped with (involuntary) reactions. The upshot is that one should
not expect autonomous action to always be practically possible. But shouldn't autonomous action at
least sometimes be practically possible for autonomous machine agents to count as such?
The functional description I have given of the autonomous agent (Figure 7.4) tells strongly in
favor of non-deterministic implementation. In particular, one expects that only a massively parallel
computational platform will be able to satisfy the constraint the autonomous machine agents sometimes
be able to act autonomously. Of course, we can tilt the game in favor of the autonomous machine agent
by greatly simplifying the agent's causal environment. Robotic navigation is, after all, tar more
computationally tractable indoors than outdoors. Perhaps that is where we should leave it. Autonomous
7 Since it would be the Pioneer Valley, of course.
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machine agency meets temporal constraints provided the machine has sufficient computational
horsepower to meet the demands of its immediate causal environment, and since, roughly speaking, we
can restrict the causal environment willy nilly, a robust autonomous machine agent in a sufficiently
rarified causal environment will at least sometimes act autonomously. Even so, it suffices, I think, to
point out that even in a complex causal environment, there will always be actions which are sufficiently
far flung in time for even the dimmest of autonomous machine agents to meet the conditions for
autonomy. One isn't always having to duck or jump.
Clearly temporal complexity is the Achilles Heel of autonomous agency, although I don't think
that is a problem unique to autonomous machine agents. How often in deciding what course of action
to take do human agents evaluate their beliefs and desires? We act
,
because we act deliberately. But
we don’t always act autonomously, because we don't often take the extra and vastly more important step
of deliberating about the beliefs and desires by which we act.
8.8 Robot Architecture
So autonomous machine agency is practically possible. Granted, the argument suffers
somewhat from its level of abstraction. Where relevant I tried to make the argument a bit more
concrete by describing some of the robotic research with which I am personally familiar. But to further
ground the argument, and to apply the generic autonomous-agent framework, I turn now to a critical
examination of robotic architectures.
8.8.1 Reactive Robotics
In 1984 the neurologist Valentino Braitenberg published “Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic
Psychology”. “Vehicles” roughly sketches the design of fourteen increasingly complicated robots.
Braitenberg thinks of it as a process of philosophical ‘purification':
I have been dealing for many years with certain structures within
animal brains that seemed to be interpretable as pieces of computing
machinery because of their simplicity and/or regularity. Much of this
work is only interesting if you are yourself involved in it. At times,
though, in the back of my mind, while I was counting fibers in the
visual ganglia of the fly or synapses in the cerebral cortex of the
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mouse, I felt knots untie, distinctions dissolve, difficulties disappear,
difficulties I had experienced much earlier when I still held my first
naive philosophical approach to the problem of the mind. This
process of purification has been, over the years, a delightful experi-
ence.
8 (1984, p. 1)
In theory, Braitenberg's vehicles display complex behavior from extremely simple design. 9 Consider a
simple three-wheeled vehicle having two motorized wheels and two sensors mounted side-by-side on the
front. The motor speeds are a linear function of the sensor: the greater the excitation of the sensor (say
because of the proximity of a light source for a photo-sensor), the greater the speed of the motor to
which the sensor is connected. Very different behavior is predicted depending on which motor is
connected to which sensor. If each motor is connected straight to the sensor on its side of the vehicle,
and the vehicle not facing the light source square-on, the vehicle will veer away from the light source.
If each motor is cross-connected to the sensor on the opposite side of the vehicle, and the vehicle is not
facing the light source square-on, the vehicle will veer towards the light source. Braitenberg provides a
nice illustration:
Figure 8.6. A Braitenberg Vehicle
8 Braitenberg has surprisingly little patience for philosophical problems,
which he
generally dismisses as mere pseudo-problems. The title of the introductory
section
from which this passage is taken is “Let the Problem of the Mind Dissolve in
Your
Mind.”
9 In some cases it is more than just theory, the vehicles having
actually been built and
shown to exhibit the predicted behavior.
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Braitenberg calls the vehicle labeled ‘a’ a 'coward' and the vehicle labeled ‘b’ ‘aggressive’ since, he
thinks, the a-vehicle's behaviour would make the observer think it is fearful while the b-vehicle's
behavior would make the observer think it was aggressive. Of course Braitenberg doesn’t suggest that
the vehicles which happen to exhibit photophobic or photophilic behaviors actually have aversions and
desires. “We will be tempted, then, to use psychological language in describing their behavior. And yet
we know very well that there is nothing in these vehicles that we have not put in ourselves.” (1984, p.
2 )
Yet Braitenberg's vehicles don’t act, they react. Complex, fortuitous, or even apparently plan-
ful behavior does not make for agency, any more than a sunflower turned towards the sun makes the
sunflower an agent in any interesting sense. Braitenberg vehicles are mere cogs in their causal
environment. They do not even make a stochastic contribution to their environment; they are mere cogs
with predictable trajectories. 10 It follows from RAAT, then, that Braitenberg vehicles could not be
/
autonomous agents - and, indeed, could not be agents at all - since they entirely lack the crucial
deliberative capacity. The upshot is that Reactive Robotics is a dead end so far as autonomous agency is
concerned.
8.8.2 Deliberative Robotics
The capacity to deliberate is essential, which is why purely reactive robots cannot even be
counted as agents. Perhaps, then, traditional deliberative robotics offers some hope. Arkin (1998)
constructs a schema of deliberative robot architectures.
Only ‘trajectory’ suffices to describe a Braitenberg vehicle's motion.
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Figure 8.7. Deliberative Robotics (adapted from Arkin 1998, p. 210)
Note that the model of deliberative robotics given in Figure 8.7 equates deliberation with planning. If
planning includes the barest comparison of whether or not to act, which is the minimum necessary for
agency under RAAT, then this model is consistent with RAAT insofar as agency is concerned. If,
however, planning is restricted to the construction and comparison of complicated pathways, then the
model is far too restrictive. Yet it seems that the latter is how Arkin conceives planning.
A robot must have the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to
dynamic and unmodeled changes that occur within its world. If a
purely deliberative system attempts to model and preplan for all
eventualities, it risks becoming so bogged down that the planning
process never terminates. It is also unsafe for a robot to make gross
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assumptions about the world that do not reflect its dynamic nature
(Arkin, 1998, p. 221 )
It agency presupposed planning for ‘all eventualities', then Temporal Complexity would sink the
(practical) possibility of any interesting agency - to say nothing of autonomous agency. To be sure, it
is not clear that the architecture-schema given in Figure 8.7 requires that the implementing robot be
constrained to plan for every eventuality. Nevertheless, there is no room in this model to off-load
computationally intensive functions like protenders and extenders. Where purely reactive robotics fails
to satisfy the axioms of RAAT by having no deliberative capacity at all, purely deliberative robotics
fails to countenance the significant complexity constraints on autonomous agents. Perhaps a solution is
to be found somewhere between purely deliberative and purely reactive robotics.
8.8.3 Hybrid Reactive/Deliberative Architectures
Hybrid architectures attempt to combine deliberative capacities with reactive capacities in such
a way as to satisfy autonomous agency while meeting the complexity constraints imposed by limited
computational resources in a rapidly changing environment. The puzzle is to see just how deliberative
and reactive capacities are best combined. Arkin (1998, p. 214) canvasses four alternatives:
Selection: Planning is viewed as configuration. The planning component determines the
behavioral composition and parameters used during execution. The planner
may reconfigure them as necessary because of failures in the system.
Advising: Planning is viewed as advice giving. The planner suggests changes that the
reactive control system may or may not use. This is consistent with the
“plans as advice” view (Agre and Chapman 1990) in which plans offer
courses of actions but the reactive agent determines whether each is advisable.
Adaptation: Planning is viewed as adaptation. The planner continuously alters the
ongoing reactive component in light of changing conditions within the world
and task requirements.
Postponing: Planning is viewed as a least commitment process. The planner defers
making decisions on actions until as late as possible. This enables recent
sensor data, by postponing reactive actions until absolutely necessary, to
provide a more effective course of action than would be developed if an
initial plan were generated at the beginning. Plans are elaborated only as
necessary.
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Figure 8.8. The AuRA Schematic (adapted from Arkin, 1998, p. 216)
The Autonomous Robot Architecture (AuRA) incorporates deliberative and reactive capacities
by Selection. That is, deliberative capacities function so as to adjust the range and parameters of
reactive behavior. Schematically, we have a core reactive element which is functionally altered on a
continuous basis by a variety of deliberative - or planning - functions.
A robot constructed according to the AuRA architecture might be an agent, provided that the
Mission Planner/Spatial Reasoner/Plan Sequencer is up to the task of representing alternative courses of
action. Moreover, it must be the case that the directives of the deliberative elements suffice to specify
particular motor behaviors in the Schema Controller - which is, roughly, a generalized extender. Yet
AuRA is mistitled, since a robot constructed according to this architecture could not be an autonomous
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agent. This is explicit in the User Input of the architecture. The goals of the robot implementing this
architecture are in no way an object of the robot's deliberative resources. More simply, AuRA does not
allow for the implementing robot to deliberate about its goals. The most it can do is deliberate about
how best to achieve the goals set it by its user, but that does not suffice for autonomous agency under
RAAT. Autonomous agents have no users, apart from themselves.
8. 8. 3.2 Atlantis
An alternative hybrid reactive/deliberative architecture (Figure 8.9) was developed at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory by Gat (1992). The Atlantis architecture is intriguing because it has been
implemented with success on a number of robot platforms, including Sojourner (Figure 8.10), Rocky IV
(Figure 8.1 1), and Tooth (Figure 8. 12). 11
Figure 8.9. The Atlantis Architecture (adapted from Arkin,
1998, p. 219)
Figures 8.10-8.12 are from http://ranier.hq.nasa.gov/telerobotics_page/photos.html.
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Figure 8.10. Sojourner
Figure 8.11. Rocky IV
Figure 8.12. Tooth
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The Atlantis Architecture implements the Advising Strategy by balancing deliberative and
reactive capacities. As Arkin explains it,
Atlantis... incorporates a deliberator that handles planning and world
modeling, a sequencer that handles initiation and termination of low-
level activities and addresses reactive-system failures to complete the
task, and a reactive controller charged with managing collections of
primitive activities. The architecture is both asynchronous and
heterogeneous. None of the layers is in charge of the others, and
activity is spread throughout the architecture. (1998, p. 218)
Atlantis is a promising architecture, which, to be sure, has been proven on a number of platforms.
Nevertheless, robots implementing the Atlantis Architecture are not autonomous agents. Fundamentally,
the problem is that the deliberative element functions merely as an advisor. The behavior of Rocky IV,
say, is never the conclusion of its deliberations. Rather, the sequencer consults the deliberative element
and may or may not employ the ‘advice'. As Arkin describes it,
Conditional sequencing occurs upon the completion of various
subtasks or the detection of failure. In particular, the notion of
cognizantfailure is introduced (Gat and Dorais, 1994), referring to
the robot's ability to recognize on its own when it has not or cannot
complete the task. Monitor routines are added to the architecture to
determine if things are not going as they should and then interrupt
the system if cognizant failure occurs. Often these monitor routines
are very task specific, such as checking alignment conditions when
conducting wall following, but they can be more general, such as a
time-out for the overall completion of a task.
Deliberation occurs at the sequencing layer's request (Gat, 1992).
The deliberator consists of traditional LISP-based AI planning
algorithms specific to the task at hand. The planner's output is
viewed only as advice to the sequencer layer: it is not necessarily
followed or implemented verbatim. (1998, p. 219)
Yet RAAT presupposes that the deliberative capacity of an autonomous agent is a necessary core for
which there is no provision under the Atlantis Architecture. Autonomous agency requires a deliberative
capacity that is more than merely advisory.
8. 8. 3. 3 The Planner-Reactor Architecture
An alternative to deliberation-as-advising is deliberation as continuous adaptation. On this
view, “[t]he planner is in essence an execution monitor that adapts the underlying behavioral control
system in light of the changing environment and the agent's underlying goals.” (Arkin, 1998, p. 222)
234
Under the Planner-Reactor Architecture (Figure 8.13), the reactive element is fundamental to the
behavior of the robot, and the deliberative capacities of the robot adjust the parameters of the reactive
element so as to improve goal-directed performance.
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Figure 8.13. The Planner-Reactor Architecture (adapted from Arkin, 1998, p. 223)
Arkin (1998, p. 225) summarizes the Planner-Reactor Architecture as follows:
Deliberation and reactivity are integrated through asynchronous interaction of a
planner and a concurrent reactive control system.
Planning is viewed as a form of reactor adaptation.
Adaptation is an on-line process rather than an off-line deliberation.
Planning is used to remove errors in performance when they occur.
As with the AuRA Architecture, however, the Planner-Reactor Architecture suffers from its inability to
take as proper objects of deliberation goals. Note that goals are not even considered part of the
architecture proper; rather, goals are imposed upon the implementing robot from above. Yet, as we
have seen, the imposition of goals without subsequent deliberative evaluation is inconsistent with
autonomy.
8. 8. 3.4 The Procedural Reasoning System
The Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) employs a postponement strategy for integrating
deliberative and reactive capacities. It amounts, as Arkin (1998, p. 227) points out, to implementing a
least-commitment strategy. It is often advantageous to delay deliberation in a complex and changing
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environment until necessary because of the temporal-complexity constraints on deliberation and the
necessity of up-to-date information about the environment. “Least-commitment” in this context refers to
postponing a decision until the last possible moment. Let the environment, in other words, play out as
it will until such time as action is necessary. As Arkin describes it,
In PRS, plans are the primary mode of expressing action, but these
plans are continuously determined in reaction to the current situation.
Previously formulated plans undergoing execution can be interrupted
and abandoned at any time. Representations of the robot's beliefs,
desires, and intentions are all used to formulate a plan. The plan,
however, represents the robot's desired behaviors instead of the
traditional AI planner's output of goal states to be achieved... The
interpreter drives system execution, carrying out whatever plan is
currently deemed suitable. As new beliefs, desires, or intentions
arise, the plan may change, with the interpreter handling the plan
switching. A symbolic plan always drives the system, however, so it
is not reactive in the normal sense of tight sensorimotor pair
execution, but it is reactive in the sense that perceived changing
environmental conditions permit the robotic agent to alter its plans on
the fly. (1998, p. 227)
The PRS schematic (Figure 8.14) does indeed depict a greater emphasis on deliberation than the
alternative hybrid reactive/deliberative architectures considered here.
Figure 8.14. The Procedural Reasoning System (adapted from Arkin, 1998, p. 227)
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The PRS has been implemented in Flakey (F.gure 8.15), a robot designed to accomplish navigational
tasks.
12
Figure 8.15. Flakey
Flakey is the strongest candidate yet for an autonomous agent, given that the deliberative elements of
the PRS are essentially coupled to its reactive functions. Yet it must be noted, as in the other examples,
that Flakey's desires and goals are not its own in the sense that it cannot deliberate about them. Flakey
may, nevertheless, satisfy RAAT's constraints on agency, since it is true that the deliberative capacities
under PRS, unlike Atlantis, are directly coupled to the command generator such that the conclusion of a
given deliberation will be an action on Flakey's part.
8.8.4 Summary
The conclusion of this cursory examination of robot architecture is stark: no robot considered
thus far has the capacity for autonomous action, and, thus, no robot considered thus far can be
considered an autonomous agent. To be sure, interesting behavior and perhaps even action can be
demonstrated by these robots. Yet a key element has been almost wholly ignored in these architectures.
From http://www.ai.sri.com/people/flakey/
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What sets an autonomous action off from mere action is its by-history in deliberations which
are complete. The agent, in performing an autonomous action, has deliberated not simply as to the
action at hand; it has, one might say, self-reflectively deliberated as to the desires and beliefs it brings to
bear on its act-related deliberations. Given the enormous computational expense in meeting the
conditions for autonomous agency, it should come as no surprise that autonomous actions is rare indeed.
Rare though it may be, it is clear from this survey of robotic architecture that no consideration is given
to the self-reflective deliberation presupposed by autonomous agency. This is true whether we are
considering purely reactive robotics, deliberative robotics, or hybrid reactive/deliberative robotics. The
fact that scant attention has been paid to the problem does not impugn the basic point that autonomous
machine agency is, however, possible.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
9.1 The Skeptical Arguments Revisited
The skeptical arguments we discussed in Chapter 2 launched this investigation by challenging
the notion that machines could in principle be autonomous agents. There are, I suggested, two ways to
handle the skeptical arguments. One could respond to each argument in turn, which is something of a
piecemeal approach. Or one could give a straightforward argument for the possibility of autonomous
machine agents. By itself, the piecemeal approach would have been unsatisfactory: even if all the
skeptical arguments from Chapter 2 were successfully countered, a novel skeptical argument might still
be lurking around the corner. The only satisfactory approach is to spell out, once and for all, why
autonomous machine agency is possible. Having done so, however, provides ample resources to see just
how the skeptical arguments go astray.
9.1.1 Baker's First Argument
Baker argues that agency presupposes the capacity to form intentions, which in turn
presupposes an irreducible first-person perspective that machines necessarily lack. Thus,
1 In order to be an agent, an entity must be able to formulate intentions.
2 In order to formulate intentions, an entity must have an irreducible
first-person perspective.
3 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-person perspective.
4 Machines cannot be agents. 1,2&3
RAAT neatly shows that premise (2) is false. In order to be an agent, an entity's behavior must issue
from its deliberations. Yet nowhere in those deliberations is an irreducible first-person perspective
assumed. To be sure, there is indexicality, since the agent's representations are all targeted at agent-
relative locations. Although indexicality might be presupposed by an irreducible first-person
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perspective, there is no reason to think that the converse is true. Given RAAT, there is every reason to
think that indexicality does not presuppose an irreducible first-person perspective. 1
9.1.2 The Argument from the Mentality of Mechanisms
Put simply, if machines cannot have mental properties, then machines cannot be agents:
1 Necessarily, if X is an agent, then X has mental properties.
2 Machines cannot have mental properties.
3 Machines cannot be agents. j^2
RAAT, however, lays to rest the notion that machines are in principle incapable of mental properties.
The formation of beliefs and desires is perfectly compatible with mechanism, provided that the
mechanism involved is sufficiently robust to be able to construct and target structural representations
and track their belief- and desire-relevant parameters.
The Skeptic, naturally, may counter that what we are calling ‘mental properties' in such
sufficiently robust machines are not truly mental properties. Having an application with a positive 'b'-
value may appear, given what the value summarizes, to be the same thing as having a belief, but it is
not really the same thing. The problem for the Skeptic, however, is that this counter has weight only if
there exists some essential property a ‘real' belief has these faux machine beliefs lack. Yet there are no
such properties if beliefs are specified by their functional role, since any functional equivalent will have
all the (functionally relevant) properties a 'real' belief has.
It follows that the Skeptic's only recourse is to argue that ‘real' beliefs and machine beliefs are
not functionally equivalent. But any functional inequivalence the Skeptic might point to is trivially met
by altering the composition of the parameters of machine-belief formation. I say ‘trivially’, because the
Skeptic is making the mistake of thinking that a sub-class of belief is ‘real’. We can always collapse the
rest of the class to this sub-class by appropriately restricting the parameters of belief-formation, but why
should we? A virtue of RAAT's account of belief is its flexibility, and even though we can answer the
I discuss this issue in greater detail in considering Baker's Second Argument.
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Skeptic, it would be much more interesting to investigate the full range of belief - the Skeptic's narrow
conception of belief notwithstanding.
9.1.3 Wolfs Argument
Only agents are appropriate objects of praise or blame. Towards anything else it can only
make sense to take the objective attitude. Thus nothing which necessarily warrants the objective attitude
can be an agent. How do we determine whether something necessarily warrants the objective attitude?
Presumably, if it is behaviorally distinguishable, perhaps in virtue of failing a Turing Test, then it
warrants the objective attitude.
1 Necessarily, if X is an agent, then it is not rational to take the objective
attitude with respect to X.
2 Necessarily, it is rational to take the objective attitude with respect to
machines.
3 Machines cannot be agents. 1&2
There are two problems with this argument, which really come to the same thing. First,
premise (1) is false because it sometimes is rational to take the objective attitude with respect to an
agent. To a clinical psychologist, a patient is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. It would be a
poor psychologist indeed who would resent the patient's rages. The psychologist takes the objective
attitude towards the patient as a necessary part of psychological/behavioral therapy, yet the patient is
clearly an agent.
Second, premise (2) is false because it is sometimes rational to take the reactive attitude with
respect to machines. Dennett (1987) has a point: where explanations and predictions from the physical
or design stances are not forthcoming, the best we can do, and thereby the rational thing to do, is to
take the intentional stance. Surely, though, if one is going to take the intentional stance towards a
machine, it is only one short further step to take the reactive attitude. One ought to take the extra step,
moreover, since doing so increases the range of possible explanations and predictions, which is the point
of taking the intentional stance in the first place. Hence it is sometimes rational, contrary to premise
(2), to take the reactive attitude with respect to a machine.
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At root, the trouble with Wolfs argument is that it presupposes that whether or not something
is an agent is a matter of the attitude we happen to take towards it. If one has any realist-leanings
towards agency whatsoever, this is unacceptable.
9.1.4 The Argument from Derived Agency and Searle's Argument
Agents enjoy original agency. That is, a putative agent that is a mere puppet-on-a-string has
only derived agency, and thus cannot be considered an agent separate from its puppeteer. Yet machines
have only derived agency if they have any agency whatsoever. It follows that no machine can be an
agent.
1 Necessarily, if X is an agent then X has original agency.
2 Necessarily, if X is designed and programmed, then X has only derived
agency.
3 Necessarily, if X has only derived agency then X does not have original
agency.
4 Every machine must be designed and programmed.
5 No machine can be an agent. 1,2,3&4
We might profitably wonder why premise (2) is true. Why should the mere fact of having
been designed and programmed necessarily exclude original agency?
For some thing to enjoy original agency, it must be possible for the thing to understand what it
is doing. Yet machines, which only operate according to symbol-manipulation, cannot understand what
they do. Hence machines, as per Searle's Argument, cannot be agents.
1 If it is possible for machines to be agents, then machines must understand
what it is that they are doing.
2 Nothing which operates only according to purely formal rules can
understand what it is doing.
3 Necessarily, machines operate only according to purely formal rules.
4 Machines cannot understand what it is that they are doing. 2&3
5 Machines cannot be agents. 1&4
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If having been designed and programmed precludes the possibility of understanding, then
having been designed and programmed does indeed, and of necessity, exclude original agency. Yet
having been designed and programmed presupposes operation only according to purely formal rules. 2
Thus the Argument from Derived Agency falls with Searle's Argument. That is, if Searle's Argument is
unsound, then so is the Argument from Derived Agency.
The obvious thing to say about Searle's Chinese Room Thought Experiment, upon which
premise (2) is founded, is that the Chinese-to-Chinese rule-book is an impossible fiction. That is, no
such rule-book could exist that suffices to meet the conditions of the experiment - i.e., such that
questions put to Searle in Chinese can answered in such a way as to fool a native speaker of Chinese.
The only way that the conditions of the experiment could be met would be if Searle were, indeed,
capable of understanding Chinese, which foils the experiment. Searle does not have an argument for
premise (2). Nevertheless, why should we think that premise (2) is false?
I confess that I do not understand what Searle understands by “understand”. If
X understands that P
implies that
X is consciously aware that P,
then I am at a loss, because I have with good reason studiously avoided any discussion of consciousness
whatsoever. In one respect, at least, RAAT should be taken as a demonstration of how much can be
accomplished without having to tackle all the horrible problems introduced by consciousness.
There is, however, another sense of “understand" that does not involve conscious awareness.
An agent situated in an environment and interacting in the environment in such a way as to make
neither deterministic nor stochastic but deliberative contributions to its causal environment must be said
to have understanding, else it could not make deliberate contributions. That is, the comparison of
alternatives and the requisite formation of beliefs about beliefs and desires suffices for understanding
This is not, strictly speaking, true. Neural Networks arguably do not operate according
to purely formal rules. So Searle's Argument is unsound in any event, since premise
(3) is false. However, it is more interesting, I think, to explain why it is not the case
that operation only according to purely formal rules necessarily precludes
understanding.
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under any reasonable sense of “understand” that does not presuppose conscious awareness.3 Since
RAAT suffices to show that such an agent can be a machine, premise (2) is false.
9.1.5 Baker's Second Argument
In addition to avoiding any discussion of consciousness, I have also tried to avoid any
discussion of ‘the will'. I have never, for instance, cast my investigation of autonomous agency in terms
of the traditional problem of Freedom of the Will. To be sure, one might conceive of my project as an
effort to defend compatibilism between a particularly troublesome species of determinism - mechanism
- and free will - suitably recast in terms of autonomous agency. I am not eager to endorse that
conception, however. The vast literature on Freedom of the Will and the overly psychologistic
conceptions of the will that are common in the literature (see Watson, 1982) make a fresh start in terms
of autonomous agency highly desirable.
If, therefore, Baker's understanding of what it is to have a will of one's own is consistent with
RAAT, then it is clear that sub-conclusion (4) of her argument is false.
1 Necessarily, if X has a will of its own, then X is able to formulate
intentions.
2 Necessarily, if X is able to formulate intentions, then X has a FPP.
3 Machines cannot have a FPP.
4 Machines cannot have wills of their own. 1,2&3
5 Necessarily, if X is an autonomous agent, then X has a will of its own.
6 Machines cannot be autonomous agents. 4&5
On the other hand, if Baker understands something about having a will of one's own which is not
countenanced by RAAT, then Baker must explain what that feature is and show how it escapes RAAT.
From her argument, there appear to be just two options. In premise (1) we are told that having a will of
one's own necessarily presupposes the capacity to form intentions. Recall, though, that the Axiom ot
Autonomy was developed out ot a Davidsonian (Davidson, 1980a) account ot intention in such a way
3 Nor is it legitimate to demand conscious awareness. After all, even human persons
understand things about which they are not consciously aware: various tacts of naive
physics, for example.
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that every autonomous action is an intentional action. So even though RAAT makes no explicit mention
of ‘intention', premise (1) of Baker's Argument is perfectly consistent with RAAT under a Davidsonian
account of intention.
There is the rub, however. Baker's second option is to point to the First-Person Perspective
(FPP) introduced in premise (2), but premise (2) is false under a Davidsonian account of intention. To
defend premise (2), then, Baker must argue that Castaneda's (1975) account of intention is preferable to
Davidson's account. Castaneda's account, though, is either mysterious or gappy.
Intending is a dispositional mental state of endorsingly thinking such
thoughts as “I shall do A.” Such thought-contents Castaneda calls
“practitions” to distinguish them from the practical counterparts of
propositions. In linking a subject and an action practically,
practitions have a causal thrust which propositions — e.g, propositions
expressing predications about oneself- lack. (Baker, 1981, p. 157)
It is fair to ask, what is this ‘causal thrust' enjoyed by practitions that is not shared by other thought-
contents? If ‘causal thrust' is supposed to bridge the gap from endorsingly thinking the thought, “I shall
do A" and doing A, then it is mysterious, since it seems open to endorsingly think the thought, “I shall
do A” without thereby doing A.
9.1.6 Fisher's Argument
M 1 If it is possible for a machine to act freely, then it is possible for a human
to act freely.
2 If determinism is true then it is not possible for a human to act freely.
3 Determinism is true.
4 It is not possible for a machine to act freely. 1
,
2&3
The simplest response to Fisher's Argument is to point out that premise (3) is false. That is not
especially satisfactory, however, because locally mechanistic processes may arise in a globally
indeterministic universe. A better response is to argue that premise (2) is false. Fisher assumes Hard
Determinism: free action is incompatible with determinism, and so much the worse for free action.
Recasting Fisher's Hard Determinism in our terms, Fisher is claiming that autonomous agency is
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incompatible with mechanism. Using the resources provided by RAAT, the argument of the previous
chapter shows that this is not the case. Hence premise (2) is false.
9.1.7 The Argument from Complete State Descriptions
A more challenging argument than Fisher’s is the Argument from Complete State Descriptions.
Put in the most general way possible, the argument assumes that no machine's actions can be self-
directed, since there are always other factors which direct action, as the possibility of a complete state
description would seem to imply.
1 If X can act autonomously, then it is possible for X’s actions to be
self-directed.
2 It is not possible for a machine’s actions to be self-directed.
3 No machine can act autonomously. 1&2
RAAT implies, however, that a machine's core deliberative elements direct the machine’s action. To
rescue premise (2), then, the Skeptic will have to explain why the deliberate direction of action does not
suffice tor self-direction, for it is not clear what "self-direction” could otherwise mean.
9.1.8 The Look-Up Table Argument and the Corollary to Malcolm’s Argument
The Skeptic may concede the point that it is possible for a machine’s actions to be self-directed,
yet still argue that if the resulting behavior can be represented by a look-up table, then the machine's
actions cannot be autonomous. To wit,
1 If X's behavioral characteristics can be represented by a look-up table, then
X cannot act autonomously.
2 Every machines' behavioral characteristics can be represented by a look-up
table.
3 No machine can act autonomously. 1&2
The Look-Up Table Argument presupposes a particular conception of a look-up table. Let us
distinguish between a deterministic look-up table, a stochastic look-up table, and a deliberative look-up
table. In a deterministic look-up table, the function from sensory inputs to behavioral output is such that
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for a given set of sensory inputs, there is exactly one behavioral output. The function, in other words,
is a function in the precise sense of the term.
In a stochastic look-up table, the function from sensory inputs to behavioral output is such that
a given set of sensory inputs specifies a probabilistically-weighted range of behavioral outputs. The
table specifies the probability of each behavioral output, but any of a range of behavioral outputs is
possible for a particular set of sensory inputs. Thus the table represents a probability function from
sensory inputs to behavioral output.
In a deliberative look-up table, the function from sensory inputs to behavioral output is like that
of a stochastic look-up table in that a range of behavioral outputs is possible given a set of sensory
inputs, but in this case the behavioral output is generated by deliberation from beliefs and desires to
action. Where the stochastic look-up table gives a range of possible behavioral outputs in terms of a
particular probability function, the deliberative look-up table is much more complicated inasmuch as it
must reflect the reasons the agent has for acting some particular way.
Premise (1) is true only if “look-up table” refers to either deterministic or stochastic look-up
tables. The possibility of a deliberative look-up table, provided by RAAT and the argument of the
previous chapter, shows premise (1) to be false.
Suppose, however, that we generalize the Look-Up Table Argument as follows:
1 If it is possible to give mechanistic explanations for X's behavior, then X
cannot act autonomously.
2 It is possible to give mechanistic explanations for machines' behavior.
3 No machine can act autonomously. 1&2
This corollary to Malcolm's Argument proposes that the possibility of any mechanistic explanation
whatsoever precludes the possibility of autonomous agency. For Bok (1998), this is the fundamental
challenge to the possibility of autonomous agency. To be sure, Bok is only interested in human
autonomy, but the point extends to machine autonomy as well - even more so, perhaps, because we are
much more confident of the possibility of giving mechanistic explanations for machine behavior than for
human behavior.
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Bok argues in effect that premise (1) is false, and it may be that she is correct. A better
criticism of the argument, though, is that it equivocates on “mechanistic explanation”. Specifically,
there are two senses of “mechanistic explanation” such that premise (1) is true only under one sense and
premise (2) is true only under the other.
Premise (1) is true only if the sense of “mechanistic explanation” is the sense - whatever that
sense may be - such that (true) predictions of behavior follow from the mechanistic explanation. This
is the sense of mechanistic explanation” in which explanation implies prediction. It is, for want of a
better term, the newtonian sense of “mechanistic explanation”.
In what (distinct) sense is premise (2) true? Mechanistic explanations are always possible, but
only if the mechanistic explanations do not imply prediction, since prediction falls away from
mechanistic explanation in cases of stochastic and deliberative machines. Where mechanistic
explanations do not imply prediction, let us say that “mechanistic explanation” is taken in its non-
newtonian sense. In the case of deliberative machines in particular, mechanistic explanations do not
support prediction because the global behavior is not a result of locally mechanistic processes. Rather,
it emerges from the interaction of those processes. Just as locally deterministic processes can give rise
to globally indeterministic processes - as in the case of rolling fair dice - locally mechanistic processes
can give rise to globally deliberative behavior - as the functional decomposition of the autonomous
machine agent in the previous chapter proposes.
The distinction between newtonian and non-newtonian mechanistic explanations is nothing new.
The philosophically interesting feature of so-called ‘Chaos Theory' is that a mathematical (mechanistic)
explanation for a physical system can be given which does not imply prediction. Thus we have an
example where explanation and prediction come apart, although in Chaos Theory the issue is that of
sensitive-dependence on initial conditions - as, for example, in the old homily that a butterfly flapping
its wings in Tokyo causes a thunderstorm in New York.
If the corollary to Malcolm's Argument is to apply to autonomous machine arguments, then
premise (1) is only true if “mechanistic explanation” is taken in its newtonian sense, while premise (2)
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is only true it “mechanistic explanation” is taken in its non-newtonian sense. Either way, the argument
is unsound.
9.2 Further Implications
RAAT effectively defuses the Skeptic's case against autonomous machine agency, which is
unsurprising given its service in showing the possibility of autonomous machine agents. RAAT is not
without its costs, however. The implications are particularly grim for Situated Robotics.
9.2.1 Situated Robotics Revisited
In Chapter 1, 1 explained that I was setting out to provide a foundation for situated robotics. In
particular, it seemed to me that Rod Brooks' (1999a) claims regarding situated robotics warranted a
close philosophical investigation into his assumptions.
Recall that the idea that complex behaviors might be based in simple mechanisms took hold in
1986 when Rodney Brooks launched the situated-robotics revolution in Artificial Intelligence with the
publication of two papers: “A Robust Layered Control System for a Mobile Robot” (1999b), in which
he describes his ‘subsumption' robotic architecture, and “Intelligence without Representation” (1999a), in
which he argues that while we should all be pleased that we now have computers which are hard to beat
in chess, the field of Artificial Intelligence has failed miserably to accomplish even the simplest insect-
level tasks like learning to walk or navigating a complex environment.
Artificial intelligence started as a field whose goal was to replicate
human level intelligence in a machine.
Early hopes diminished as the magnitude and difficulty of that goal
was appreciated. Slow progress was made over the next 25 years in
demonstrating isolated aspects of intelligence. Recent work has
tended to concentrate on commercializable aspects of "intelligent
assistants" for human workers.
No one talks about replicating the full gamut of human intelligence
any more. Instead we see a retreat into specialized subproblems, such
as ways to represent knowledge, natural language understanding,
vision or even more specialized areas such as truth maintenance
systems or plan verification. All the work in these subareas is
benchmarked against the sorts of tasks humans do within those areas.
Amongst, the dreamers still in the field of A1 (those not dreaming
about dollars, that is), there is a feeling that one day all these pieces
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will all fall into place and we will see "truly" intelligent systems
emerge.
However, I, and others, believe that human level intelligence is too
complex and little understood to be correctly decomposed into the
right subpieces at the moment and that even if we knew the
subpieces we still wouldn’t know the right interfaces between them.
Furthermore, we will never understand how to decompose human
level intelligence until we’ve had a lot of practice with simpler level
intelligences.
In this paper I therefore argue for a different approach to creating
artificial intelligence:
• We must incrementally build up the capabilities of
intelligent systems, having complete systems at each
step of the way and thus automatically ensure that
the pieces and their interfaces are valid.
• At each step we should build complete intelligent
systems that we let loose in the real world with real
sensing and real action. Anything less provides a
candidate with which we can delude ourselves.
We have been following this approach and have built a series of
autonomous mobile robots. We have reached an unexpected
conclusion (C) and have a rather radical hypothesis (H).
(C) When we examine very simple level intelligence we
find that explicit representations and models of the
world simply get in the way. It turns out to be
better to use the world as its own model.
(H) Representation is the wrong unit of abstraction in
building the bulkiest parts of intelligent systems.
(1999a, pp. 80-81)
Brooks' Subsumption Architecture avoids explicit representation in much the same way that
Braitenberg's vehicles do: sensors are coupled to motors via behavior modules like “fear” or
“aggression” that map sensory input to motor output. Behavior modules may be layered in such a way
that other behavior modules can inhibit the sensory input of a module or suppress its motor output.
Thus behavior modules are ‘subsumed’ by other behavior modules, and the resulting total behavior of the
robot is a complex function of all the behavior modules.
Robots designed according to Brooks' Subsumption Architecture may ditter enoimously in the
range and complexity of their behavior from Braitenberg's simple photophobic/photophilic robots, but
the principle is the same. Motors and sensors are not mediated by any deliberative element whatsoever.
Such robots are purely reactive. It follows, then, that they are not autonomous, despite Brooks
use of
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the term. Worse, RAAT implies that such robots do not even qualify as agents: they cannot act since
they are incapable of deliberate action. 4 This result is, I think, bolstered by intuition when one realizes
that even though their contributions may be complex, subsumption architecture robots are in the end
merely causal cogs in their environment.
Far bom providing a foundation for Situated Robotics as Brooks conceives it, RAAT shows
that it autonomous machine agency is the goal, then Brooks' subsumption architecture is a dead-end.
Worse, RAAT shows that the situated roboticist does not escape the problem of having to develop
robots with the capacity to represent their environment. The capacity to compare alternatives is
tundamental to both agency and autonomous agency, which tells against any purely reactive robotic
architecture whatsoever. The effort to provide a foundation for Situated Robotics has turned into a
critique.
9.2.2 At the Nexus of Philosophy and Computer Science
The implications are not all bad, however. The theories and arguments presented here open up
a host of intriguing prospects for further investigation; I close by considering three.
9.2.2. 1 Empirical Epistemology
The parametric model of belief and desire formation given in Chapter 6 never commits to a
specific set of belief-relevant parameters or a specific set of desire-relevant parameters. I argued that it
was a virtue of the theory that it be flexible and that to assign parameters would merely serve to
possible agents with alternative parametric assumptions. Indeed, the possibility of agent-control over
parameters raises the prospect of agents that can deliberatively adjust parameters based on further
factors like action failure and environmental changes.
If we assume that agents are distinguished by the parameters they employ in belief and desire
formation, then we realize that human agents are but one kind of agent - perhaps a highly specialized
I suppose one might make the case that the robot's behavior is deliberate because the
robot's designer has built the robot to behave as the designer sees fit. Perhaps, but
then we are no longer talking about the robot's behavior. Agency cannot be inherited.
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kind of agent - in a broad range of poss.ble agents. I, is then posstble to investigate the range of
possible agents empirically by construe.ing agents with distine, parametrie compos,lions. Normative
tssues like fitness for a given environment would naturally arise and would be fit for empirical
investigation. Epistemology need not be restricted to philosophical speculation and argument: the
empirical study of epistemological assumptions - or what we may call empirical epistemology
- is open
for further study.
9. 2.2.2 Decision Theory by Design
If, on the other hand, we distinguish agents by their deliberative strategies, then we have the
possibility of investigating agents in terms of their deliberative resources. Recall that a specific
deliberative strategy was never spelled out in Chapter 5; instead, a series of poss.ble strategies was
discussed - and doubtless many more are possible. Even more interesting is the prospect of adaptive
agents that have the capacity to reflectively deliberate about deliberative strategies.
In general, it can be seen that questions about deliberative normativity, or rationality, are no
longer restricted to human agents. Nor is rationality a purely mathematical ideal, inasmuch as a critical
factor in rationality is the agent's environmental context. The possibility arises, then, of studying
situated rationality : the study of the fitness of deliberative strategy for a given agent in a given
environment.
9. 2. 2. 3 Cognitive Architectures
The possibility of alternative belief and desire formation strategies and the possibility of
altei native deliberative strategies suggest a further topic of study. The functional decomposition of the
autonomous agent given in Chapter 8 is surely but one of a range of possible cognitive architectures.
Considering the constraints imposed by temporal complexity on autonomous agency, there is a clear
need to consider simple - i.e., computationally efficient - cognitive architectures. The key is to
minimize complexity without sacrificing the core capacities demanded by autonomous agency.
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In any case, the possibility of alternative cognitive architectures under the constraints of
autonomous agency raises important issues. Consider, for example, the problem of the construction of
applications targeted at possible worlds, which was neatly glossed-over by positing protenders.
Transformations on representations generated by intenders cannot just be of any sort; they must be licit
given the agent's environment and available possible worlds. What rules, then, might an agent employ
for transformations on representations?
9.3 A Common Theme
Empiiical epistemology, situated rationality, and cognitive architecture are of particular interest
because they emphasize investigating not how actual autonomous (human) agents are composed, or how
ideal autonomous agents ought to function, but how a range of possible autonomous agents might be
built. This, Cummins and Pollock (1991) note, is an important shift in perspective.
Rather than ask what rationality is, or what “our concept” of
rationality is..., we must ask how a rational agent might be designed.
Rather than ask under what conditions someone can be said to know
something, we are led to ask how an agent might be designed that
acquires information and applies it in the service of some goal, and
what such an agent's environment must be like for the design to
work... Rather than ask how things (practical reason, belief fixation,
justification, etc.) ought to work, we are led to ask how things could
work. (pp. 2-3)
Finally, empirical epistemology, situated rationality, and cognitive architecture - and, indeed,
the entire effort of investigating the possibility of autonomous machine agency - share a common
emphasis on the realizability of traditionally theoretic or philosophical problems. Depending on how
one looks at it, philosophers now either bear the burden or enjoy the opportunity of implementing and
testing their ideas. As Cummins and Pollock (1991) put the point,
You cannot make a computer do anything by waving your hands at
it. If a theory is to be implementable on a computer, the details have
to be there. You cannot get away with concealing intellectual
sloppiness behind a mask of vague profundities.
...Those philosophers who have begun to test their theories by trying
actually to implement them in computer programs have found that
the discipline required almost invariably reveals ambiguity,
vagueness, incompleteness and downright error in places where
traditional philosophical reflection was blind, (p. 2)
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The test for RAAT is not to show the possibility of autonomous machine agents. The test for RAAT is
to construct an autonomous machine agent.
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APPENDIX A
ACTION ONTOLOGY
A.l Are Actions Abstract or Concrete?
An open question is whether Recursive Action Theory (RAT) presupposes anything about
action which is clearly false or objectionable. Consider a story:
I wake up very early in the morning feeling parched; I get up to get
a drink of water. Sleepy, I open the creaky bathroom door a bit too
quickly and wake the cat downstairs, which grooms itself. I get a
glass from the cupboard, fill it with water, and take a sip. Slouching
back to bed I hear the 4:15 a.m. freight train sound its horn.
In taking a sip of water I perform an action. Taking a sip is something that I do. What thing
is the sip-taking? In our ordinary talk we treat actions as if they were objects. We quantify over them:
Everything I did yesterday came to naught; something needs to be done about that. We identify them:
You did the same thing yesterday; whatever you do, don't do what I did. We ascribe properties to
them: The singing was loud; the bombing was ruinous. But are actions objects?
There is an important similarity between the problem of action ontology and the traditional
problem of universal. The proposition that there is something the two red chairs share seems to imply
that redness is a thing just as much as the chairs themselves are things. But if the property of being red
is a thing like a chair, so the problem goes, how can it be in two places at once? One solution is to
hold that redness is an object but not like chairs. Instead, the property of being red is an abstract object
or, equivalently, a universal. Universal are unlike particulars such as chairs insofar as a universal can
be in more than one place at a time. Another solution is to hold that the red of the first chair is a
particular thing just like the chair itself which happens to resemble the red of the second chair.
Similar solutions are proposed for the problem of action ontology. If actions are held to be
abstract objects, then they are repeatable over time. My taking a sip is repeatable; it is something I can
do again later in the morning. If actions are held to be concrete particulars, then they are not repeatable
over time. My taking a sip now is an act-token which instantiates the act-type sipping. But I cannot
take the same sip later. At best all I can do is token the same act-type.
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A.2 Are Actions Fundamental or Derived?
Part ot the puzzle of action ontology is understanding whether an action is a type or a token -
whether, that is, an action is an abstract or concrete entity. There is more. Regardless of whether
actions are properly viewed as abstract or concrete entities, they are entities. What kind of entity are
they? You might take actions to be a subset of events, as I did in constructing RAT, and assume that
events are fundamental entities — i.e., an essential part of the fabric of the universe such that, though
other things might be composed of events, there is nothing more basic than events out of which they
might be composed or from which they might be derived.
Taking events to be fundamental doesn t sit well with some philosophers. Perhaps events are
derivative entities. On such views facts or states-of-affairs are considered basic, and events are derived
from them. Still others find fact-talk unhelpful and turn to set-theoretic constructions: events might be
ordered-pairings of times to objects, for example.
A. 3 RAT's Implications
Whether actions are abstract or concrete, on the one hand, and whether they are basic or
derived, on the other, form two independent ontological axes; where on these axes does RAT fall?
My own inclination is to think of actions as concrete entities — i.e., tokens, but there is
nothing in RAT per se demanding it. The v-ing agent A does at noon may be taken as an abstract,
repeatable entity A might do at any other time, or, just as easily, the v-ing at noon may be taken to be a
non-repeatable particular such that A's v-ing at noon is not the same thing as A's v-ing at three in the
afternoon. RAT, in other words, takes no stand on whether actions are abstract or concrete entities, and
neither will I.
Are actions basic or derived entities? RAT makes no assumption about this debate, nor must it.
If actions are basic entities
—
part of the underlying fabric of the universe, as it were—then RAT is
unaltered. RAT makes no special mention of what kind of entity an action must be. To be sure, I have
take actions to be a subclass of events. This is a prejudice I import; it is not an implication driven by
RAT. But it is a harmless prejudice. Those who think that events are not legitimate entities bear the
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burden of providing translation schemas for translating between talk of actions qua events and talk of
actions qua whatever their favorite basic entity happens to be. If actions are construed as events and
RAT-translated turned out to be extensionally inequivalent to RAT-original — if, that is, RAT differed
in implications from its translated version — then the proposed schemas will have failed since they
would in such a case hide illicit assumptions about action theory. It thus turns out to be irrelevant
whether actions are considered basic or derivative entities. RAT is safely neutral with respect to
foundational issues in action ontology, which should come as no surprise since RAT is explicitly non-
reductive. RAT, in short, has no implications for the two ontological axes of concern.
A.4 The Identity Puzzle
There is, however, a further foundational issue that warrants attention. One reason to think that
events must be derived entities is that it is difficult to give identity conditions on them (Davidson,
1980b; Mackie, 1997). Put simply, is my signalling the same action as my arm-raising, or are they
distinct actions? G.E.M. Anscombe (1969) properly receives credit for drawing attention to the problem
of action individuation. Her test-case is this: Smith, just performing one of his normal duties while at
work, is pumping water into a cistern which supplies a house being used by a small group of “party
chiefs” who are in control of the state (p. 37). Without Smith's knowledge, an undercover agent has
poisoned the water supply because the party chiefs are plotting genocide and the agent believes that
their deaths will enable good men to come to power. The agent happens upon Smith and explains all of
this to him, whereupon Smith, no friend of the party chiefs, pumps faster. So it is true to say, following
Mackie's (1997) discussion of Anscombe's example, that
A. Smith is moving his arm.
B. Smith is pumping the water.
C. Smith is replenishing the water supply.
D. Smith is poisoning the inhabitants.
Are A, B, C, and D different descriptions of the same action, or are they different actions?
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The problem of action individuation is normally thought to be part of the problem of action
ontology. Perhaps this derives from Quine's slogan “No Entity without Identity” (Davidson, 1980b, p.
164), or perhaps the usual subsumption of the problem of act-individuation under the problem of
ontology is because what we have to say about the problem of individuation will have important
implications for action ontology. For example, if actions are abstract entities then there are just as many
act-types openings, sippings, fillings, etc—as there are actions one might care to perform. Yet if
actions are concrete entities, then it is possible for a single act-token to be a token of more than one
type. My opening the bathroom door wakes the cat. Is this opening also a cat wakening? Or is the
opening distinct from the cat wakening? Or consider my slouching off to bed. Is this slouching off to
bed the same act as, say, walking to bed or simply returning to bed?
So far as I know there are three possibilities. Fine-grained individuation holds that a slouching
is not a walking, nor is an opening a wakening. Thus the act-token of my opening the door is an
instance of opening but it is not an instance of wakening. There are, accordingly, two concrete actions
in this stretch of the story: my opening the door and the cat's being woken up. In Anscombe’s example,
A, B, C, and D are distinct if fine-grained individuation is true. Course-grained individuation,
alternatively, holds that the opening is the wakening and the pumping is the poisoning. Finally, we
might hold that Smith's poisoning of the inhabitants is composed of distinct actions which include
pumpings and replenishings.
Course-grained individuation — the view that A, B, C and D are but different descriptions of
the same action — has been defended by both Anscombe (1969) and Davidson (1980b). Their
argument is simply that there is nothing more that Smith does to pump the water, replenish the water
supply, or poison the water than to move his arm. So it doesn't make sense to think of A, B, C, and D
as distinct actions; they are clearly different descriptions of the same action. 1
In one respect, at least, Anscombe's own case turns out to be awkward for course-grained
action individuation. There is an implicit order in A, B, C, and D: Smith’s moving his arm is pumping
There is, perhaps, no better statement of the thesis of course-grained action
individuation.
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the water, is replenishing the water supply, and is poisoning the inhabitants. It would be false to say
that Smith s poisoning the inhabitants is moving his arm. The ’is’ here is asymmetric and cannot be the
’is’ of identity. There is no problem, of course, if each description denotes a distinct action. Yet
construed as the same action under different descriptions, the existence of the asymmetry is mysterious.
Hovering over the problem of course-grained versus fine-grained versus part-whole
individuation is the problem of determining just what should count as an action in the first place. For
instance, is my hearing the 4:15 freight train sound its horn an action on my part, or is it merely
something that happens to me? Likewise, is my waking up early something I do, or something that
simply happens? In the case of waking up early it seems most natural to say that it is something that
happens to me. I did not, for instance, set my alarm so as to get up early. But my hearing the train is
not so straightforward. Suppose I had filled in the story a bit: I knew what time it was and, taking
pleasure in the hustle of trains, I listened for the early morning freight - succeeding in hearing it as I
slump off to bed. Put this way it sounds as if my hearing the train is an action. But given the original
statement of the story, it's hard to decide whether or not my hearing the train is an action on my part or
just something that happens to me.
A. 5 Individuating Actions Under RAT
The problem of action individuation is two-fold: First is the problem of carving out the class of
actions from the broader class of events; second is the problem of specifying just how many actions one
has got when all the carving is done.
RAT carves out actions from the class of events by requiring that an action either be deliberate
or have a by-history which includes an action. There is a clear intuitive sense in which actions are just
like events except that they are brought about in a special way. The cat's being woken up because of
my opening the door differs importantly from the cat's being woken up by thunder. The former is an
action since it is the indirect result of a deliberate action on my part. The latter is a mere event since it
is not the result of any sort of deliberation. This is, I think, a fairly natural way to discriminate between
actions and mere events or occurrences.
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It is not clear, however, that a by-history is always a causal-history. In the billiards example it
is, but in the example of signaling by arm-raising the by-history of the signaling includes a segment
which may not be causal. This suggests that, insofar as it takes the by-relation as a primitive, RAT has
very little to say about how many actions there are once it’s got the actions carved out from events.
Indeed, RAT takes no stance regarding the course-grained v. fine-grained individuation debate. On the
course-grained analysis, A's u-ing is identical to A's v-ing in Ax 2, while on the fine-grained analysis,
A's u-ing is distinct from A's v-ing in Ax 2. RAT does not preclude either fine or course-grained or, for
that matter, part-whole individuation from being true.
A.6 RAT and the Ontology of Action
Any inquiry into the ontology of action requires answering (at least) the following three
questions:
• Are actions concrete or abstract entities?
• Are actions fundamental or derived entities?
• How are actions individuated?
RAT answers none of these questions, or so I have argued. So much the worse for RAT? I think not.
It is all the better for RAT that it remain neutral on these questions. RAT is, after all, a non-reductive
theory of action with the sole purpose of generating the class of actions. RAT may be useful in framing
ontological questions, as the above discussions indicate, but it does not settle ontological questions, nor
should it. RAT is happily neutral.
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APPENDIX B
THEORIES OF BELIEF
B.l The Range of Theories
Roughly speaking, three approaches to theories of belief have emerged in the literature: the
Linguistic Approach, the Dispositional Approach, and the Picture Approach. On the Linguistic
Approach, necessary and sufficient conditions on belief are given in terms of the agent's altitudinal
relation to propositions or actual or potential utterances. Theories of belief that take the Linguistic
Approach include Frege (1985, 1968) and Davidson (1984). On the Dispositional Approach, necessary
and sufficient conditions on belief are given in terms of the agent's behavioral dispositions. Such
theories of belief have been developed and defended by Marcus (1993) and Baker (1995). On the
Picture Approach, necessary and sufficient conditions on belief are given in terms of the agent’s
employment of representations. Wittgenstein (1983) took the Picture Approach early on, and Cummins
(1995, 1996) has continued its development.
Intermediate positions are possible, and some of them are intriguing. Fodor (1975, 1981) can
be seen as synthesizing both the Linguistic and the Picture Approaches, while Aune (1990) appears to
draw upon both the Linguistic and the Dispositional Approaches.
Although the competing approaches are typically presented as such, it is not clear to me that
they are in competition with one another anymore than triangularity and trilaterality are in competition
to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on being a triangle. Still, one approach may be preferred
over the others to the extent that it better meets our conditions of adequacy. I find that the Linguistic
and Dispositional Approaches are not up to snuff: The Linguistic Approach is not sufficiently general,
while the Dipositional Approach is both imprecise and explanatorily impotent. By elimination, I take
the Picture Approach.
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B.2 The Linguistic Approach
Belief is commonly classified as a propositional attitude. Contrast
Joe believes that they are going to the movies
with
Joe hopes that they are going to the movies
and
Joe regrets that they are going to the movies.
In each case, Joe is taking a distinct attitude towards the proposition that they are going to the movies:
Joes regret signals his displeasure, his hope indicates his desire, and his belief tells us that he is,
perhaps, holding it to be true that they are going to the movies. Thus a belief is a relationship between
an agent and a proposition. What are propositions?
We may usefully take a proposition to be a set of possible worlds. That is, a proposition is the
set of possible worlds at which the sentence that denotes the proposition is true. Sets of possible worlds
are serve as a logical device to make sense of propositions. Yet we can also understand propositions to
be abstract linguistic entities that bear all the same syntactic and semantic features as the sentences that
denote them. So understood, beliefs are relations between agents and abstract linguistic entities. This,
at any rate, is the intuition behind Frege's (1968) account of belief.
B.2.1 Frege
Frege is the first to have sharply drawn an extremely important distinction.
[T]wo things must be distinguished in an indicative sentence: the
content... and the assertion. The former is the thought, or at least
contains the thought. So it is possible to express the thought without
laying it down as true. Both are so closely joined in an indicative
sentence that it is easy to overlook their separability. Consequently
we may distinguish:
(1) the apprehension of a thought—thinking,
(2) the recognition of the truth of a
thought
—
judgment,
(3) the manifestation of this
judgment—assertion. (Frege, 1968, p. 513)
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It we take Frege's 'thoughts' to be our 'propositions', then his distinction amounts to this: There is an
important difference between understanding a proposition and judging that the proposition is true. I
may understand the proposition that grass is red without believing that grass is red. Belief requires
something more than mere understand, ng. Building upon this insight, it seems fair to attribute to Frege
the following account of belief:
S believes that p if, and only if,
i) S understands the proposition that p,
and
ii) S accepts the proposition that p as true.
B.2.2 Davidson
Less than happy with abstract objects like propositions, Davidson (1984) prefers an agent's
actual or potential utterances to propositions. Hence,
S believes that p if, and only if,
i) p is a translation of one of S's actual or potential utterances,
and
ii) S holds true what p translates.
The symmetry between Davidson and Frege's accounts is striking. If we assume that S
understands its own actual or potential utterances, then Davidson's account is very much like Frege's,
without the apparently objectionable ‘proposition' talk. Where Frege is careful to distinguish between
understanding a proposition and accepting the proposition as true, Davidson marks a difference between
a mere utterance (“Grass is green”) and holding the utterance true (“Grass is green!”). Where Frege
requires that the agent accept a proposition as true, Davidson requires that the agent holds a sentence to
be true. Surely “holding true" and “accepting as true” are synonymous, even though the accounts differ
in what is being held true or accepted as true. In sum, Davidson's account may be seen as a slightly
more sophisticated update on Frege's account, or if not, then at least the roots of Davidson's account are
clearly found in Frege's work.
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B.2.3 An Implication of the Linguistic Approach
The Fregean and Davidsonian accounts of belief are exemplars of the Linguistic Approach,
since both construe belief as a relation between an agent and either a quasi-linguistic abstract entity -
Frege’s ‘thoughts' or propositions - or a purely linguistic item - Davidson's utterances. At least one
implication of the Linguistic Approach, clear in Davidson's case but maybe not so clear in Frege's, is
that believers must be language users.
For Frege, the believer must have access to propositions. But access to propositions is only
available through their denoting sentences; hence believers must be language users. Davidson's account,
relying as it does on the speaker's actual or potential utterances, presupposes quite explicitly that only
language users can be believers.
Davidson is evidently pleased with this implication; he explicitly argues (1984) that the capacity
to have beliefs presupposes having a language. If Davidson's arguments are sound, and if the Linguistic
Approach is fundamentally correct, then the implication for autonomous agency is enormous: RAAT
tells us that agency presupposes belief, so that if belief presupposes having a language, then only
language users can be agents, to the amazement of animal lovers everywhere. This seems like a gross
violation of the Generality Constraint. After all, why should only language users be agents? What
about deaf/mute human agents? Surely Helen Keller was an agent long before she was a language user.
Davidson's reasons for excluding the class of non-language users from the class of believers are more
complicated than drawing a straight line from his definition of belief to the conclusion, so they bear
examination.
B.2.4 Davidson's Argument
Davidson has presented two arguments in the literature for the thesis that only language users
are believers: one in “Thought and Talk” (1984), and the other in “Rational Animals” (1982). The
argument in "Rational Animals” fills in some gaps in the “Thought and Talk” argument, so I shall
consider just the “Rational Animals” argument.
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1 If S has beliefs, then S has the concept of belief.
2 If S has the concept of belief, then S has the concept of objective truth and
error.
3 If S has the concept of objective truth and error, then S has the concept of
intersubjective truth and error.
4 It S has beliefs, then S has the concept of intersubjective truth and error.
5 It S has the concept of intersubjective truth and error, then S is an interpreter.
6 If S has beliefs, then S is an interpreter
7 If S is an interpreter, then S has a language.
8 If S has beliefs, then S has a language.
1
,
2&3
4&5
6&7
Let us grant premise (6): being an interpreter implies having a language. Also, premise (5) is
not especially troublesome. What is peculiar is sub-conclusion (4). Why should we think that having
beliefs requires having the concept of intersubjective truth and error?
If I were bolted to the earth I would have no way of determining the
distance from me of many objects. I would only know they were on
some line drawn from me toward them. I might interact successfully
with objects, but I could have no way of giving content to the
question where they were. Not being bolted down, I am free to
triangulate. Our sense of objectivity is the consequence of another
sort of triangulation, one that requires two creatures. Each interacts
with an object, but what gives each the concept of the way things are
objectively is the base line formed between the creatures by
language. The fact that they share a concept of truth alone make
sense of the claim that they have beliefs, that they are able to assign
objects a place in the public world. (Davidson, 1982, p. 327)
Davidson is, of course, speaking metaphorically here. Still, the passage nicely singles out the premise
upon which Davidson thinks (4) hinges. According to premise (3), the concept of objective truth and
error presupposes the concept of intersubjective truth and error. Somehow, a believer cannot have the
idea that things might not be as it thinks they are unless it can compare notes with a fellow believer:
“but what gives each the concept of the way things are objectively is the base line formed between the
creatures by language.” Believers must triangulate with one another to be believers.
Davidson's triangulation hypothesis is at least as interesting as it is implausible. To be sure,
one way in which a believer might get the idea that things aren't necessarily as it thinks they are - to
wit, that it can be mistaken - is by asking other believers how they think things are. But there are other
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ways. A believer can be surprised - i.e., it can learn that it is mistaken, and so it can learn about what
it is to be mistaken - when it contrasts what it believes with what others believe; yet a believer which is
also an agent may just as well learn about being mistaken when what it expects to see happen by its
actions does not. Indeed, isn't Davidson’s triangulation hypothesis merely a special case of the general
way in which agents discover the possibility of being in error? I query a co-agent about their beliefs -
my action - and, expecting one result, I get another. Surprised that my action did not lead to what I
anticipated, I conclude that some of my beliefs, at least my beliefs about my co-agent's beliefs, must be
in error. Perhaps believers which are not also agents, if there are such things, would have no choice but
to consult one another. Even so, there's no need to worry about these cases given our singular focus on
agency. No special behavior, linguistic or otherwise, is necessary for being a believer, provided that
some behavior or other is possible.
B.2.5 The Adequacy of the Linguistic Approach
In the absence of any further argument in favor of a linguistic obligato, to borrow a phrase
from Marcus, it seems safe to conclude that the Linguistic Approach is inadequate because it fails to
meet the Generality Constraint. Davidson's mistake is to ignore a further distinction of Frege's: the
distinction between assenting to a proposition or utterance and holding the proposition or utterance to be
true. An agent's verbal assent is what we usually use to ascribe belief. For Davidson, belief cannot be
divorced from the ascription of belief.
Yet Frege clearly acknowledges that there is a distinction between the evidence for belief-
attribution and belief proper, so perhaps I was being too hasty in claiming that Frege takes the
Linguistic Approach. After all, Frege does not develop his account of belief in terms of propositions.
Rather, he employs the German “Gedanke”, which is usually translated as “thought’ . But along with
the remarkable symmetry between Frege and Davidson's accounts, the way Frege talks about ‘thoughts
is much the same way we talk today about propositions.
Without wishing to give a definition, I call a thought something for
which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a
thought just as much as what is true. So 1 can say: the thought is the
sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of
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every sentence is a thought. The thought, it itself immaterial, clothes
itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes
comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thouoht.
(Frege, 1968, p. 511)
Thoughts appear to be quite a lot like propositions. Unless Frege has some other explanation for how
thoughts are accessed which does not involve language, I think it is fair to place him in the Linguistic
Approach camp - although perhaps not as far to the center as Davidson.
In any case, the Linguistic Approach is unacceptable because it fails to meet the Generality
Constraint. There is an attempt on Davidson's part to meet the burden of proving that agents must be
language-users, but his proof does not succeed since premise (3) is false. Nonetheless, there are
valuable lessons to be learned from the Linguistic Approach: Any account of belief must honor the
distinction - in other terms, no doubt — between merely entertaining a proposition and holding it to be
true, and any account of belief must be careful not to confuse having beliefs with the basis upon which
those beliefs are correctly attributed.
B.3 The Dispositional Approach
Incredulity that highly sophisticated non-human animals and not-so-sophisticated human
animals might not have the capacity for belief has, in part, motivated the Dispositional Approach as an
alternative to the Linguistic Approach. “To deny belief to the dog who accompanies his master to the
store and waits patiently outside for his master to emerge is as anthropocentric as Descartes' denying
pain to an animal undergoing a surgical procedure despite behavioral evidence to the contrary.”
(Marcus, 1983, p. 331) Since utterances are but one behavior which can be used as the basis for belief
attribution, perhaps an account that relies upon the full range of behavior - linguistic and non-linguistic
alike - would meet the Generality Constraint. This is the intuition behind the Dispositional Approach.
B.3.1 Marcus
If an account of belief is to meet the Generality Constraint by denying that belief is a relation
between an agent and a linguistic or quasi-linguistic entity, then it must give an alternate account of just
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what is related to the agent by belief. Marcus' account of belief exchanges propositions and utterances
for states of affairs.
Believing is understood to be a relation between a subject or agent
and a state of affairs that is not necessarily actual but that has actual
objects as constituents. We may think of states of affairs as ordered
structures of actual objects: individuals as well as properties and
relations. The structure into which those objects enter need not be an
actual world structure. (Marcus, 1993, p. 240.)
To be sure, this is sketchy at best. For example, it is not clear how we should understand “structure” in
this context. At most, we have it that
States of Affairs are structures containing actual objects.
States of Affairs contain individuals, properties, and relations.
States of Affairs may not be actual, but their constituents are.
No explanation of structures or the distinction between actual and, presumably, non-actual states of
affairs is forthcoming. Nevertheless, Marcus builds her account of belief on the basis of this rough
characterization of states of affairs:
x believes that S just in case under certain agent-centered
circumstances including x's desires and needs as well as external
circumstances, x is disposed to act as if S, that actual or non-actual
state of affairs, obtains. (1993, p. 241. Italics hers.)
Marcus does not explain what she has in mind for “certain agent-centered circumstances” or “external
circumstances”, nor does she offer an example to help explain the account.
Apparently, an agent finds itself in certain contexts - contexts which include the agent's desires
- and acts, or is disposed to act, according to what it believes to be the case. If so, then being disposed
to act as if a state of affairs obtained is both necessary and sufficient for belief.
The important question is this: How should we understand x's being ‘disposed’ to act? There is
a strong and a weak sense to ‘disposition’. According to the weak sense, an agent has a disposition to
act in a certain way if there is a likelihood or some probability less than one but perhaps greater than
one half that the agent will act that way. The strong sense takes the probability to be one: the agent
will act in the specified manner.
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Marcus does not offer an explanation of what she means by “disposition”, nor does she appear
to not.ce the d.fference between a weak and a strong sense. I suspect that on her account an agent is
disposed to act thus and so if it is prone to act thus and so or tends to act thus and so. In other words,
dispositions are behavioral tendencies such as what a psychologist might look for in evaluating a patient.
In the end it is a matter of choice on just how to read ‘disposition’ for Marcus, but casting Marcus'
account of belief in terms of the weak sense of ‘disposition’ contrasts nicely with Baker's account.
B.3.2 Baker
An agent has a disposition on Baker's account in exactly the same sense in which salt, for
instance, has a disposition to dissolve in pure liquid water. As Baker (1995) puts it (in several ways),
• Whether a person S has a particular belief (individuated by a ‘that’ clause in its
attribution) is determined by what S does, says, and thinks, and what S would do,
say, and think in various circumstances... So, whether ‘S believes that p' is true
depends on there being relevant counterfactuals true of S. The antecedent of a
relevant counterfactual may mention other of S's attitudes, but not, of course, the
belief in question. If S is a speaker of a language, then the relevant
counterfactuals concern her linguistic as well as her nonlinguistic behavior. These
counterfactuals bear the weight of revealing the “nature” of having beliefs and the
other attitudes... (pp. 154-155.)
• S believes that p if and only if, in S ' s context, there are relevant counterfactuals
nonvacuously true of S. (p. 158.)
• S believes that p just in case there are relevant counterfactuals nonvacuously true
of S
,
where relevant counterfactuals concern what S would do, say, or think in
various circumstances, (p. 167.)
Clearly, the guiding intuition is that “counterfactuals, and counterfactuals alone, reveal the
nature of belief." (Baker, 1995, p. 167.) Something further about counterfactuals would be helpful. In
a footnote. Baker adds that, “[ajlthough it is beyond the scope of this work to give an account of
counterfactuals, I would begin with the Lewis-Stalnaker truth conditions, with a suitably chosen
"similarity metric." ‘If a had not been F, then b would not have been G is true if and only if in the
nearest world in which a was not F, b was not G.” (1995, p. 155.)
Bearing in mind the distinction between Lewis (partial ordering) and Stalnaker (total ordering)
drawn in chapter 5, the semantics Baker adopts for counterfactuals appear to be closest to the Stalnaker-
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style ( 1968) semantics for the ‘would’ conterfactual. 1 As such. Baker's account is much stronger than
Marcus'. 2 It's not that an agent has a belief if it has a tendency to behave in a certain way; rather, an
agent has a belief provided it would behave - or think, in the absence of overt behavior - in a certain
way, much as a pinch of salt would dissolve if placed in pure liquid water.
To be fair. Baker is not proposing an ontologically reductive analysis of belief (neither, for that
matter, is Marcus, although both are proposing logically reductive analyses of belief vis a vis necessary
and sufficient conditions on belief). “In general, the fact that a person believes that p is not the same
fact as the fact that certain counterfactuals about the person are true [since] ‘x believes thatp' may be
true of S and S' even if the relevant counterfactuals for S and S' have few, if any, members in
common. (1995, p. 156.) What, then, are the relevant counterfactuals?
Believing that p is a state of a person that depends on the truth of
counterfactuals. We know what counterfactuals are relevant in part
by understanding the ‘that' clause of the attribution, in part by
knowing generalizations about how people behave, and in part by
knowing the circumstances and other attitudes of the believer. (1995
p. 156.)
Unfortunately, that does not tell us much more than when we first got the account. Baker, however,
claims not to owe us an account of counterfactual belief-relevancy:
Since it is not my intention to give a reductive account of belief in
terms of counterfactuals (or of anything else), I need not specify
counterfactuals that would guarantee that S believes that p. I can rest
here with exposing and exploring the substantive metaphysical fact
that the existence of relevant counterfactuals true of S is both
necessary and (non-question beggingly) sufficient, given a context,
for S ' s believing that p. (1995, p. 167.)
B.3.3 The Adequacy of the Dispositional Approach
Setting aside quibbles about conceptual completeness, I find the comparison between Marcus
and Baker's accounts intriguing. Both accounts assume that necessary and sufficient conditions on belief
can be given in terms of the agent's actions - and/or thoughts, for Baker - in a given actual or possible
Specifically, Stalnaker's (1968) theory is a special case of Lewis' (1973) more general
theory, as Lewis (1973, pp. 77-83.) demonstrates.
Or, at least, the account we have attributed to Marcus.
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context. So stated, the root intuition of the Dispositional Approach seems like an exercise in the
obvious. Ofcourse an agent's actions, not to mention thoughts, are closely linked to the agent's beliefs;
RAAT takes th.s to be one of, if not the, key feature of agency. The trouble is in the transition from
intuitive basis to precise account. I note in passing that both Marcus and Baker give accounts which are
at best sketchy. Marcus tells us that an agent has a belief if it tends to perform certain unspecified
actions in certain unspecified contexts. Likewise, Baker tells us that an agent has a belief if certain
unspecified counterfactuals are true of it. Coincidence? Hardly. I suspect that Marcus and Baker are
struggling with exactly the same problem.
The trouble dogging both Marcus and Baker is something I don’t believe I’ve seen before;
Marcus and Baker are caught in the intersection of two independent dilemmas. The way I've cast
Marcus account so as to contrast it with Baker's account makes setting up the first dilemma fairly easy.
By my reading of Marcus - and I point out that it doesn’t really matter for this dilemma whether
Marcus actually agrees with my reading - an agent's beliefs are belied by its tendency to act in certain
ways in a given context. The best way to make sense of this, logically speaking, is to employ the
might-counterfactual. An agent believes that p, on this reading, just in case if it were the case that the
agent was in a certain context, then the agent might behave as if the state of affairs that p obtained,
where ‘might’ here is used in a much stronger sense than mere possibility, but it is weaker than
certainty. An agent might behave thus-and-so if it were in a given context provided it is likely to so
behave, but there is nothing saying that it must so behave. Baker's account, on the other hand, makes it
the case that the agent must so behave, given her explicit identification of the relevant counterfactuals in
logical terms as would-counterfactuals. So we have Marcus taking might-counterfactuals and Baker
taking would-counterfactuals. These are the horns of the first dilemma, since neither is workable.
If Baker's would-counterfactual analysis of belief is correct, then agents are entirely at the
mercy of their beliefs. Agents are, so to speak, compelled by their beliefs much as a cannonball is
compelled by the cannon from which it was fired. The trajectory an agent takes - it can only be
described as such on Baker's view - is dependent on its beliefs, where the dependence is that of effect
to cause. Note that attempts at providing an analysis of causation likewise employ the logic of would-
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counterfactuals (Sosa and Tooley, 1993). This is no accident: would-counterfactuals imply a sort of
necessitation which is quite useful in understanding causation.
The problem, of course, is that on Baker's account the agent does not by deliberating determine
its course of action. Rather, its beliefs simpliciter determine its actions. To be sure, beliefs play a
crucial role in an agent's deliberations, and so they are explanatorily relevant. Yet they do not
determine the course of the agent's deliberations. Beliefs are the raw material out of which an agent
constructs its deliberations: they do not decide the shape of the resulting structure or any of its
functional aspects any more than a piece of wood decides the shape of the house of which it is a part or
the use to which the house is put. Under Baker's analysis, an agent cannot be autonomous, since it does
not determine its actions. Setting the argument out makes the point.
1 If Baker's analysis of belief in terms of would-counterfactuals is true, then no
system with the capacity to form beliefs can perform autonomous actions.
2 If RAAT is true, then only systems with the capacity to form beliefs can
perform autonomous actions.
3 RAAT is true.
4 Only systems with the capacity to form beliefs can perform autonomous 2&3
autonomous actions.
5 Baker's analysis of belief in terms of would-counterfactuals is not true. 1&4
Note premise (3). Till now I've never claimed that RAAT is simply true. It may well not be
in all its details. Nevertheless, I think something very much like it is the correct story to tell about
autonomous agency. In that sense I have no doubt that RAAT is the kernel of the truth. Yet I would
not be surprised to hear Baker say, “well, so much the worse for the appropriately dubbed RAAT that it
contradicts my account. One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens.” Regardless, we
human agents are quite convinced that we have the capacity to form beliefs and we have the capacity
for autonomous action. Baker's adoption of would-counterfactuals is problematic for any account of
autonomy that presupposes the autonomous agent must have beliefs.
Unfortunately, the only other alternative to would-counterfactuals is equally unworkable. For if
Marcus’ might-counterfactual analysis of belief is correct, then there is little or no reason for thinking
that necessary and sufficient conditions on belief can be given in terms of what the agent might do in a
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given context. The agent might do something altogether different in the same context while having
exactly the same beliefs. Baker's account does not allow for this, and so rules out autonomy. Marcus'
account (on my reading) allows for autonomy, but in making room for autonomy, her account
dramatically under-determines belief - so much so that it is entirely implausible to suppose that
something as strong as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on belief in terms of might-
counterfactuals could be given. Might-counterfactuals simply cannot underwrite a sufficiently strong
correlation between belief and action to support the truth-functional equivalence Marcus hopes it can.
The second horn of this first dilemma goes something like this:
1 It Marcus analysis of belief in terms of might-counterfactuals is true, then it
is possible for two agents in identical contexts and having identical beliefs to
pursue distinct courses of action.
2 It it is possible for two agents in identical contexts and having identical
beliefs to pursue distinct courses of action, then there is insufficient
correlation between belief and action for a truth-functional equivalence
between beliefs and possible actions.
3 If there is insufficient correlation between belief and action for a truth-
functional equivalence between beliefs and possible actions, then Marcus'
analysis of belief in terms of might-counterfactuals is not true.
4 Marcus' analysis of belief in terms of might-counterfactuals is not true. 1,2&3
The second horn of this first dilemma is at least as sharp as the first. But this has only been the first
dilemma; there is yet one more to go.
We need not go into the second dilemma in quite as much detail as we did for the first. Note
that in the various statements of their analyses, both Marcus (explicitly) and Baker (implicitly) give
necessary and sufficient conditions on belief in terms of the agents actions in a given context. This
seems all fine and good, until one recalls that their accounts of belief presuppose an account of action,
yet accounts of action generally - and RAAT in particular - presuppose an account of belief, at least in
terms of sufficient conditions. The first horn of the second dilemma cuts rather quickly: the project of
giving necessary and sufficient conditions on belief in terms of action is circular. But, by way of
getting on to the second horn, if we give the analysis of belief in terms of the agent's behavior
,
with no
explicit mention of action, then there is an insufficient correlation between belief and behavior to ground
truth-functional equivalence. An agent may not stumble because of any of its beliefs - it may very well
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just be clumsy. Indeed, when a psychologist is trying to tease out a picture of some patient’s beliefs by
considering the agent's behavior, it is crucial for the psychologist to be able to discern action from mere
behavior - i.e., what the patient has done versus what has happened to the patient. To mistake mere
behavior for action is to end up incorrectly attributing beliefs. The second horn of the second dilemma
cuts as quickly as the first, since it is not possible to give necessary and sufficient conditions on belief
in terms of behavior.
Frankly, I don't see any way out of either dilemma for Baker or Marcus. I suggest that the
reason why their respective accounts are so imprecise is because of these dilemmas. By being
circumspect about what makes a counterfactual relevant or what makes a context relevant, Marcus and
Baker turn their backs on the dilemmas. But the dilemmas don't go away.
In a nutshell, those who take the Dispositional Approach fail to appreciate that explanation and
prediction come apart in a wide variety of phenomena. We can explain an action in terms of belief: we
cannot predict actions on the basis of belief. In this respect action theory bears a striking resemblance
to non-linear dynamics in physics - so-called Chaos Theory. There the problem is one of sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. Fancifully, although not entirely so, a butterfly flapping its wings in
Paris results in a hurricane in Hawaii. In action theory the reason why we can give explanations and
yet be unable to provide predictions is because of the agent's role in deliberation. One cannot tell in
advance the shape of an agent's deliberations. Perhaps not even the agent can tell. But actions issue
from deliberation, so actions cannot be predicted, either. But they can be explained by reference to the
agent's deliberations.
To see where all this leaves us, run the Dispositional Approach by the Generality, Precision,
and Explanation Constraints in short order. The Dispositional Approach meets the Generality Contraint,
but fails to meet the Precision Constraint. Of course, precision is relative, so that alone would not be
enough to reject the Dispositional Approach.
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The Explanation Constraint sinks the Dispositional Approach once and for all, I think. For
consider:
How is it that belief underwrites an agent's capacity to evaluate alternatives?
The Dispositional Approach gives no answer whatsoever.
How is it that a finite agent can have an indefinite number of beliefs?
The Dispositional Approach clearly allows that a finite agent can have an indefinite
number of beliefs, since there are an indefinite number of contexts and an indefinite
number of possible actions. But it does not explain how this can be so: the tension
between finite agent and indefinite number of beliefs remains.
How is it that beliefs can be correct or incorrect with respect to both the actual and the
possible?
The Dispositional Approach does not make us any the wiser.
Why is it that neither co-referring terms nor co-extensive predicates can be substituted for one
another in a ‘believes that' context?
This is a specifically linguistic issue, so perhaps we shouldn't expect an answer from
the Dispositional Approach. Nevertheless, failure of substitution is a deeply curious
feature of belief attribution. Surely there is some explanation for this to be found in
an account of belief.
Perhaps it is stating the obvious, but I think the reason why the Dispositional Approach is so
explanatorily impotent has everything to do with the two dilemmas creating a vacuum at their
intersection. In any case, the Dispositional Approach is inadequate to my purposes.
B.4 Conclusion
My argument for taking the Picture Approach can be summed up as follows. There are three
central alternative approaches to theories of belief. The Linguistic Approach must be rejected because it
fails to meet the Generality Constraint. The Dispositional Approach must be rejected because it fails to
meet the Precision and Explanation Constraints. Any intermediary approach - Fodor's (1981) quasi-
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linguistic/representational theory, say, or Aune's (1990) linguistic/dispositional theory — inherits the
problems of the Linguistic and Dispositional Approaches.
By elimination, I take the Picture Approach.
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